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RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED

TO

MY LEARNED PRECEPTOR

DR. RĀMA ŚĀṆKARA ŚUKLA 'RASĀLA,'

M. A., D Litt.,

AT WHOSE FEET
THIS WORK HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

PREFACE

The present work is the result of the studies and investigations, carried on by me under the able supervision of Dr. Rāma Śaṅkara Śukla 'Rasāla', M.A., D.Litt. during 1941-43 as a Research Scholar in the Hindī Department of the Allahabad University. It was submitted and approved as a Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Arts. The Board of Examiners consisted of Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopinātha Kavirāja, Dr. R. S. Śukla and the late Dr. N. N. Sengupta.

In the pages that follow I have dared to criticize the great critics, both modern and ancient; and, in the words of one of my learned examiners, I have "done so severely." I have evolved and elaborated my own theory on Poetic Relish and have expressed my dissent from the tradition of Indian Poetics at hundred other places. It is now my turn to be criticized, and I invite scholars to judge me freely and frankly. I do so, not because I feel that I have said the last word on my subject, but because I think that true criticism is necessary for any real advancement of knowledge. I am, however, confident that, entirely a virgin field as I have surveyed, whatever else is said of my work, the originality of my contribution and the worthwhileness of my subject cannot be doubted by anybody.

The debt that I owe to my learned preceptor Dr. R. S. Śukla, not only on account of the guidance and encouragement he has given me, but also on account of his infinite affection for me, cannot be truly estimated. I have the privilege of his valuable advice for the other Thesis entitled *Studies in Nāyaka-Nāyikā-Bheda* as well, which I am writing at present. I am grateful to my friend and colleague Prof. Tulasi

Nārāyaṇa Simha, who very kindly took the trouble of going through the manuscript before it was given to the press. I am also indebted to Dr. P. S. Naidu of the Allahabad University for the keen interest he took in my work. His valuable suggestions, which he had taken pains to write down, were unfortunately not destined for me, as they were lost twice in postal transit. Last but not the least, my thanks are due to Mr. Rāma Kṛṣṇa Dāsa and other members of the staff of the B. H. U. Press for their cooperation in the neat and correct printing of this book, and to Mr. M. L. Merh, Assistant Paper Controller, for his help in obtaining paper.

February, 1950.

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RĀKĒṢAGŪPTA.

A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

Words and terms from *Devanāgarī* Characters have been transliterated into the Roman letters according to the scheme accepted by the International Oriental Congress in 1894. Popular Spellings have been avoided.

CONTENTS

	Page
Preface	v.
A Note on Transliteration	vi.
Contents	vii.
List of Abbreviations	viii.
Introduction	1-6.
FIRST SECTION (<i>Rasa</i> as Relish)	
Chap. I. Definitions of Poetry	9-35.
Chap. II. Perception and Relish of Poetry	36-82.
Chap. III. Component Feelings of Poetic Relish	83-90.
Chap. IV. Determining Elements of Poetic Relish	91-103.
SECOND SECTION (<i>Rasa</i> as Emotion)	
Chap. I. Feeling, Emotion and Sentiment	107-127.
Chap. II. <i>Sthāyī</i> and <i>San̄cārī Bhāvas</i> as Mental Affections	128-146.
Chap. III. <i>Vibhāvas</i> and <i>Anubāvas</i>	147-159.
Chap. IV. A Classification of the <i>Bhāvas</i> and <i>Rasādi</i>	160-169.
APPENDICES	
Appen. A. <i>Rasadoṣas</i>	171-174.
Appen. B. Bibliography	175-179.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- A.B., Abhinavabhāratī.
A.C.S., An Anthology of Critical Statements.
Analytic Psych., Analytic Psychology.
B.V., Bhāvavilāsa.
D.A., Dhvanyāloka.
D.A. Grantha, Dvivedī-Abhinandana-Grantha.
Daśarūpa, for Haas's Translation.
Daśarūpaka, for N. S. P. Edition.
Educational Psych., Groundwork of Educational Psychology.
Elements of Psych., Elements of Psychology.
Exp. of Emotions, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals.
Hist. of Poetics, Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics.
I.S.L., An Introduction to the Study of Literature.
J.O.R.M., Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.
K.A., Kāvyañuśāsana by Hemacandra.
K.K., Kāvya-Kalpadruma.
La Rhe. Sans., La Rhétorique Sanskrite.
Manual of Psych., A Manual of Psychology.
N.S., Nāṭyaśāstra.
N.S.P., Nūṇaya Sāgara Press of Bombay.
Outline of Psych., An Outline of Psychology.
Phil. of Aesth. Pleasure, Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure.
Psych. J., Psychology by William James.
Psych. of Emotions, The Psychology of the Emotions.
Psych. W., Psychology by R. S. Woodworth.
R.G., Rasagaṅgādhara.
R.K., Rasakalasa.
Sc. of Emotions, The Science of the Emotions.
S.D., Sāhityadarpana.
S.K.A., Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharana.
Social Psych., An Introduction to Social Psychology.
S.S.I., Saṁskṛta Sāhitya kā Itihāsa.
Text Book of Psych., A Text-Book of Psychology.
U.N.M., Ujvalanīlamanī.

INTRODUCTION

I

The present work is an attempt to study and interpret in the light of modern psychology all that has been discussed by the literary critics of this country for over a score of centuries under the subject of *Rasa*. The need of a study of this nature was first felt by me, while I was a student of the M. A. classes, as an anti-thesis to the view of Dr. Śyāmasundara Dāsa that the theory of *Rasa* cannot be understood on the basis of the western psychology¹. Consequently I wrote an article entitled *Rasa-Siddhānta aura Ādhunika Manovijñāna*² indicating therein the necessity and scope for psychological studies in the field of *Rasa*. Later, when I had already offered this subject for my research and was engaged in collecting material, I discovered three other authors suggesting it as a fit subject for investigation. Dr. Rāma Śaṅkara Śukla³ was the first in chronology to make this suggestion, and the other two were Gulābarāya⁴ and D. M. Datta⁵. Thus though the propriety of this subject for Research has been recognized even by others, yet so far no real study of it, other than the present one, is known to have been made

The scope of this work is well defined by the title itself. All discussions on the dates of the authors

¹ Vide *Sāhityālocana*, p. 236.

² Published in the *Kaumudī*, the annual journal of the Hindī Parisad, University of Allahabad, in the year 1941.

³ Vide his Preface to *Rasakalasa*, p. 16.

⁴ Vide his article *Rasa aura Manovijñāna*, published the *Sāhitya-Sandeha*, vol. V, pp. 1-8

⁵ Vide his review on *The Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure*, published in the *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, vol. XXVI, p. 371.

and their works, as they could have nothing to do with psychology, have been entirely omitted. Also all such topics of psychology, as have no parallels in the science of *Rasa*, have been either altogether excluded or referred to only in passing. Bharata has assigned a colour and a god to each of the eight *Rasas*, out of which, according to him, only four are fundamental, the other four being derived from them, one from each. All this, though copied by most of the later writers, can hardly be said to have any real psychological significance, and hence it has not been discussed in the following pages. A treatment of the classifications of the Heroes and the Heroines has been wilfully avoided, because, too wide a subject as it is in itself, full justice could not have been done to it in the limited space which it could have claimed in the scheme of *Rasa*.* Everything else discussed with direct relation to *Rasa* in the *Alankāraśāstra* or the Indian Critical Literature has been carefully considered and critically examined in the light of the psychology of the day, and more scientific theories based on actual observation and experience have been substituted wherever possible.

The principal sense of the term *Rasa* with reference to poetry, as it is even with reference to food, is *relish* or *flavour*. The term was applied, it appears, to a particular set of some important emotions by Nandikeśvara⁶ or some other unknown predecessor of Bharata, because Sympathetic feelings, the most distinctive constituents as they are of the relish of poetry and drama, particularly of the latter, can be called forth only by a delineation of the emotions; for otherwise there is nothing in the etymology of the word to convey this sense. Now it was but natural for the exponents of *Rasa*-theory, who should have synthesized both the

⁶ "Nandikeśvara has been mentioned by Rājaśekhara as the original exponent of *Rasa*-theory"—*Hist. of Poetics*, vol. II, chap. I.

* A separate work entitled *Studies in Nāyaka-Nāyikā-Bheda* is under preparation and will be out shortly.

above senses of the term, to make *Rasa* mean *relish* of the emotional literature only and to call a combination of the different factors operating in the portrayal of an emotion (*Vibhāvas* etc.) the cause of its consummation⁷. The earliest critics, however, could have reason to limit their theory of *Kāvya-Rasāsvāda* (Relish of Poetry) to this extent, for, fixed as their attention was on the dramas alone, they sincerely believed that poetic relish consists solely in emotional appeal⁸. But the position of the later writers on poetics, who laid down unambiguously that poetry is not only of the emotional kind, has been surely very unsafe in carrying on the old narrow tradition of *Rasa*-theory. In the present thesis the problem of the relish of poetry and the subject of the delineation of the emotions in literature have been disentangled from each other, and have been dealt with independently in two separate sections. The first section is devoted to the study of *Rasa*, the term *Rasa* taken in its wider and original sense of Relish. In the second section a study has been made of the constituents of *Rasa*, which, being analogous to the factors in Emotion, give the term *Rasa* the special restricted sense of Emotion acquired in usage. In thus finding out two distinctly detached meanings of *Rasa* and discussing the theory of Poetic Relish without any reference to the *Vibhāvas* and *Anubhāvas* etc. though a great convention of the Indian poetics has been broken, yet, it cannot be denied that it has been broken justly and on fair grounds.

There occurs in the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* the text '*Raso vai saḥ, Rasam hyevāyam labdhvānandī bhavati*', which has been quoted by Jagannātha in the support of his view that the *Rasa* realized through the perception of poetry and drama is nothing but the experience of the Blissful

⁷ "विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसयोगाद्रसनिष्पत्तिः।"

—N S, chap. VI.

⁸ "न ही रसादृते कश्चिदप्यथः प्रवर्तते।"

—*Ibid.*, chap. VI.

Ātman itself⁹. The presence of the word *Rasa* in the above text seems to have been responsible, even in the case of those earlier authors who have made no explicit reference to it like Jagannātha, for the importation of the tenets of the different schools of philosophy in the field of literary criticism and their application to the theory of *Rasa*. But it may be plainly remarked here that *Rasa* in any of its spiritual or *Alaukika* sense is not only outside the scope of this thesis, but also beyond the range of the experience of the *Sahridayas* who find interest in the perception of the different forms of poetry. Whatever joys or sorrows, whatever pleasures or pains have been experienced by the millions of the readers and spectators of Kālidāsa and Shakespeare were purely worldly in character. It is definitely not in the search of any Perennial Bliss that the thousands of the enthusiastic cinemagoers assemble at the picture-houses every day and in each city. Even Bharata himself, who has said in clear terms that the theatre is for the sake of entertainment¹⁰, could not have meant to liken the experience of its perception with anything like *Brahmānanda*. As for the authority of the *Upaniṣad*, where *Rasa* surely stands for the *Ānanda* or the Bliss which is realized by the seer at the attainment of the 'Supreme Reality of the Universe', the 'Self-luminous Consciousness', the following lines from Dr. A. Sankaran may be noted :

"But it must be distinctly understood that the two texts quoted above do not at all, in the context where they occur, contain the germs of the theory of *Rasa* conceived of and developed by later writers on Poetics. And to read into the text '*Raso vai saḥ*etc.' any of the later ideas, as Pandita Rāja Jagannātha does, believing in the ultimate authority of the *Veda* and seeking to obtain scriptural sanction for his views, is wholly unhistorical".¹¹

⁹ "वस्तुतस्तु वक्ष्यमाणश्रुतिस्वारस्येन' रत्याद्यर्वाच्छिन्ना भग्नावरणा चिदेव रसः ।.....'रसो वै सः, रस ह्येवाय लब्धवानन्दी भवति' इति श्रुतिः ।"

—R.G., p. 27.

¹⁰ "विनोदजनन लोके नाद्यमेतद्भविष्यति ।"

—N.S., I, 117.

¹¹ *Theories of Rasa and Dhvani*, p. 3.

II

That this Thesis is definitely an advancement in the study of *Rasa* is clearly indicated by its scope which is comprised not even partially by any other work. My theory of Poetic Relish, which has been expounded and maintained in the first section of this work, is based entirely on my own observations. I have shown that there is nothing mysterious about the phenomenon of Poetic Relish and that it is constituted by our own feelings which are evoked in our mind at our perception of poetry and which sustain our interest in what we perceive. I have also discovered and collected at one place all those elements which operate conjointly in determining the form of our poetic relish. In examining the already existing theories of poetic relish, it will be noticed, I have hardly ever repeated the criticisms which have been offered against them by other critics. On the other hand I have criticized them in my own scientific way, first breaking them into their basic propositions and then pointing out how each proposition proves invalid with reference to actual experience; and, besides this, I have also shown how most of the charges levied against these theories by other critics are both wrong and irrelevant. In the second section, which interprets *Rasa* as Emotion, the constituents of *Rasa*, for the first time, have been critically compared with the factors involved in an emotional experience, and the differences have been adequately accounted for. A more scientific interpretation has been given to the term *Rasadoṣa*, and *Rasadoṣas*, which have been dealt with in a small appendix¹², have been examined with a strict adherence to this sense of the term.

To cut short, whatever is included in the body of this work, except, of course, the matter which has

¹² The topic of *Rasadoṣas* has been treated in an appendix, as it could not have been assigned exclusively to any one of the two sections of this thesis.

been imported either in the form of data or for criticism, is directly the result of my own investigations and research; and a conscious attempt has been made to eliminate, as far as possible, everything that would have proved no better than a mere repetition.

III

A note about the Bibliography also seems to be necessary here. Though I have consulted most of the original Samskr̥ta works on *Rasa*, yet, on account of my limited knowledge of the language, a detailed use has been possible only of those that were available in translation. But my work, I believe, has hardly suffered on this account, as almost all the important authors have been translated either in English or in Hindī. P. Pañcāpagaśa Śāstrī has amply interpreted and elaborated those portions of *Abhinavabhāratī*, the great commentary of Abhinavagupta on *Nāṭyaśāstra*, which deal with the four most important theories of *Rasa*-realization; and I have made full use of his work. About the Hindī works on *Rasa* I have to say, though a sad remark it is to be made, that except for the indiscriminate addition of a few *Saṅcārī* and *Sāttvika Bhāvas* and *Hāvas* they have nothing substantial to contribute to this branch of poetics. As the ultimate authority for the psychological principles and theories is one's own experience, I have fully supplemented, it will be noticed, this part of my Bibliography by my own observational studies.

FIRST SECTION

RASA AS RELISH

CHAPTER I.

DEFINITIONS OF POETRY.

Rasa, as we have already noticed in the Introduction, means *relish of poetry* in its broader sense, and it is this sense of the word with which we are concerned in the present section of the thesis. 'What is poetry?' is the question which naturally makes its appearance before us ere we speak anything on the relish of poetry. It will not be a digression, therefore, if to answer this question we consider a number of definitions and descriptions of poetry given by the great critics and also the great poets of the east and the west, and analyse them into such attributes of poetry as are indicated by them.

But it should be made clear at the outset that mine is not the outlook of a judicial literary critic, who would criticise, condemn and find fault with the views of his contemporaries and predecessors and would dictate his own canons to his readers; it is rather that of a psychologist, who would study the facts as they exist and on their basis would bring out his generalisation, if it can possibly be so done, by means of logical analysis and synthesis, and, who, yet again, would be ever ready to modify or even give up his results so attained if he afterwards discovers a mistake either in his observation of phenomena or in his method. I am not going to lay down anywhere in this discourse what *ought* to be poetry; my attempt will be to find out what has *actually* been known as poetry.

The long list of definitions that we shall presently come across can be extended indefinitely, and yet it will not form complete data for the investigation we have in hand. And the reason is not far to seek. Poetry has been an object of relish not only for the men of letters, It has been enjoyed in its one form, or

another since ages immemorial even by the uneducated peasants and the half-educated townsmen, whose views and experiences have not been handed down to posterity in any written chronicles. All the extracts that have been selected here are from the intellectuals who never cared to look down to the psychology of the vulgar. To them poetry was meant to be relished by very rare personalities¹ and the right of discrimination between good and bad poetry was vested, not in each individual reader, but in a dignified authority². In such a state of affairs we cannot solely rely for our data on merely the literary records; hence I shall try to supplement this symposium with my own observation of facts.

Here is my anthology of definitions :

1. *Bhārata, Nāṭyaśāstra*,

मृदुललितपदाढ्यं गूढशब्दार्थहीनं,
जनपदसुखबोध्यं युक्तिमन्तृत्रयोज्यम् ।
बहुकृतरसमार्गं सन्धिसन्धानयुक्तं,
स भवति शुभकाव्यं नाटकप्रेक्षकाणाम् ।³

(For a spectator of a dramatic performance good poetry is that which is composed of delicate and beautiful words and is easy to understand, which is not bereft of reason and can be combined with dance, and in which various *Rasas* have been depicted and the different dramatic unities have been observed.)

2. *Āgṇipūraṇa*,

शास्त्रे शब्दप्रधानत्वमितिहासेषु निष्ठता,
अभिधायाः प्रधानत्वात्काव्य ताभ्या विभिद्यते ।⁴

(Pre-eminence is given to terms in words of science, to fidelity to truth in books of history, while in books of poetry the *Abhidhā*—denotation or literal meaning of a word—draws greatest attention; and hence poetry

¹ Vide *Āgṇipūraṇa*, chap. CCCXXXVII.

² “... The true test is easily applied; that which to competent judges affords the appropriate pleasure is good poetry.....”
—R. Whately, *Elements of Rhetoric*, A.C.S., p. 59.

³ XVI. 118.

⁴ CCCXXXVII. 2-3.

is differentiated from the two preceding sorts of works.)⁶

संक्षेपाद्वाक्यमिष्टार्थव्यवच्छिन्नापदावली,
काव्यं स्फुरदलंकारं गुणत्रयोषवर्जितम् ।⁶

(Poetry is that distinguished arrangement of words which conveys the desired sense concisely, which is embellished with figures of speech and excellences, and which is free from faults.)

3. Bhamaha, *Kāvya-lankāra*,
शब्दार्थौ सहितौ काव्यम् ।⁷

(The word and sense taken together are poetry.)⁸

4. Dandi, *Kāvya-darśa*,
शरीरं तावदिष्टार्थव्यवच्छिन्ना पदावली ।⁹

(The body of poetry consists in well arranged words expressive of the intended sense.)

5. Vamana, *Kāvya-lankāra-sūtra*,
काव्यं ग्राह्यमलंकारात् । सौन्दर्यमलंकारः ।
स दोषगुणालंकारहानादानाभ्याम् ।¹⁰

(Poetry is to be liked because of its embellishments ; beauty is embellishment, and it consists in poetry's being devoid of defects and full of excellences and figures of speech)

रीतिरात्मा काव्यस्य ।¹¹

(Style is the soul of poetry.)

⁶ Translation by M. N. Dutt.

⁶ CCCXXXVII. 6-7.


⁷ I.16., S.S.I., Vol. II, p. 24.

⁸ Dr. T. Tatakarya is inclined to believe that Bhamaha did not intend to define poetry in these words. He says, "It cannot be deemed that he intends to define poetry. Rather the idea underlying these words seems to be that neither the word nor the sense alone is poetry, but both of them taken together. . . Bhamaha repeatedly says that *Vakrokti* embellishes the poetic speech and sense, it may be concluded that according to Bhamaha the indispensably essential requisite of poetry is *Vakrokti*".—J.O.R.M., vol. III, p. 332.

⁹ I.10., S.S.I., vol. II, p. 24.

¹⁰ I.I.1,2,3., p. 1.

¹¹ I.I.6., p. 3.



6. Rudrata, *Kāvya-lāṅkāra*,ननु शब्दार्थौ काव्यम् ।¹²

(Decidedly the word and the sense taken together are poetry)

7. Anandavardhana, *Dhvanyāloka*,काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिरिति . . . ।¹³

(Suggestion is the soul of poetry.)

8. Dhananjaya, *Daśarūpaka*,रम्यं जुगुप्सितमुदारमथापि नीचं
उग्रं प्रसादि गहनं विकृतं च वस्तु ।यद्वाप्यवस्तु कविभावकभाव्यमानं
तन्नास्ति यन्न रस भावमुपैति लोके ।¹⁴(Nothing is there, in the world, whether it be delightful or detestable, high or low, gross or elegant, occult or deformed, entity or nonentity, which when touched by the imagination of poet and men of taste, does not become *Rasa*.)¹⁵9. Kuntala, *Vakroktijīvita*,

शब्दार्थौ सहितौ वक्रकविव्यापारशालिनि ।

वन्धे व्यवस्थितौ काव्य ।¹⁶(Poetry is word and sense in unison and set in *Vakrokti*.)10. Bhoja, *Sarasvatīkanthābharana*,निर्दोषं गुणवत्काव्यमलकारैरलंकृतम् । रसान्वितं ।¹⁷(Poetry should be free from faults and should be embellished by the use of excellences, figures of speech, and *Rasas*.)11. Māmmata, *Kāvya-prakāśa*,तददोषौ शब्दार्थौ सगुणावनलंकृती पुनः क्वापि ।¹⁸¹² II.1., p. 8.¹³ I.1., p. 3.¹⁴ IV.85., p. 110.¹⁵ Translation by D. T. Tatacarya Siromani.¹⁶ I.7., S.S.I., vol. II, p. 28.¹⁷ I.2., p. 2.¹⁸ P. 4.

(Poetry consists in word and sense—without faults and with excellences—which may at times be without figures of speech.)

12. Hemacandra, *Kāvyañuśāsana*,

अदोषो सगुणो सालंकारो च शब्दार्थो काव्यम् ।¹⁹

(Poetry consists in word and sense, devoid of defects and embellished with the excellences and the figures of speech.)

13. Vidyanatha, *Pratāparudrayaśobhāṣana*,

गुणालंकार सहितो शब्दार्थो दोषवर्जितो काव्यम् ।²⁰

(Poetry consists in word and sense, devoid of defects and embellished with the excellences and the figures of speech.)

14. Vagbhata (Primus), *Vāgbhatāṅkārā*,

साधुशब्दार्थसन्दर्भं गुणालंकारभूषितम् ।
स्फुटरीतिरसोपेतं काव्यं कुर्वीत कीर्तये ।²¹

(Poetry, which consists in beautiful word and sense embellished with excellences, figures of speech, *Rīti* and *Rasa*, is to be created for the sake of fame.)

15. Vagbhata (Secundus), *Kāvyañuśāsana*,

शब्दार्थो निर्दोषो सगुणो प्रायः सालंकारो काव्यम् ।²²

(Poetry consists in word and sense—without faults and with excellences—which are often embellished with figures of speech.)

16. Jayadeva, *Candrāloka*,

निर्दोषा लक्षणवती सरीतिर्गुणभूषिता,
सालंकार रसानेक वृत्तिर्विककाव्यानामभाक् ।²³

(A sentence devoid of faults and embellished with *Rīti*, *Guna*, figures of speech, *Rasa* and *Vṛtti* is poetry.)

17. Visvanatha, *Sāhityadarpaṇa*,

वाक्य रसात्मक काव्यम् । रस्यते इति रसः ।²⁴

¹⁹ P. 19.

²⁰ S.S.I., vol. II, p. 29.

²¹ I.2., p. 5.

²² P. 14.

²³ I.7., p. 10.

²⁴ P. 27.

(A sentence full of *Rasa* is poetry, That which is relished is *Rasa*.)

18. Jagannatha, *Rasagādhara*,

रमणीयार्थ प्रतिपादकः शब्दः काव्यम् ।²⁵

(A word denoting a beautiful sense is poetry.)

19. D. T. Tatacarya Siromani, *Definition of Poetry or Kavya*,

Word and sense which directly aim at, and produce, pleasure are poetry.²⁶

20. Ramacandra Sukla, *Kavitā kyā hai ?*

कविता वह साधन है जिसके द्वारा शेष सृष्टि के साथ मनुष्य के रागात्मक सम्बन्ध की रक्षा और निर्वहण होता है ।²⁷

(Poetry is the instrument to protect and preserve the *Rāgātmaka* relation²⁸ of man with the rest of the Universe.)

21. Aristotle, *Poetics*,

“Epic, poetry, tragedy, comedy and also dithyrambic poetry, and the music of the flute and the lyre in most of their forms, are all in their conception modes of imitation. . . . There is another art which imitates by means of language alone and that either in prose and verse as if it were not the imitation that makes the poet.... Since he is a poet because he imitates.....”

We may gather from these extracts that according to Aristotle poetry is to be defined as an art, the fundamental principle of which is imitation—that imitation being through the medium of language.²⁹

22. Sir P. Sidney, *An Apology for Poetry*,

Poesy is an art of imitation. . . . to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture: with this end, to teach and delight.....³⁰

²⁵ P. 4.

²⁶ J.O.R.M., vol. IV, p. 56.

²⁷ *Hindī Nibandhamālā*, vol. II, p. 157.

²⁸ The relation which consists in the adhesive (*Pravṛtṭyātmaka*) and renunciative (*Nivṛtṭyātmaka*) attitude of man towards the Universe.

²⁹ J.O.R.M., vol. III, p. 199.

³⁰ A.C.S., p. 44.

23. J. Milton, *Education*,

[Poetry must be] simple, sensuous, and passionate.⁸¹

24. J. Dryden, *Defence of an Essay of Dramatic Poesy*,

...[Delight] is the chief, if not the only end of poetry; instruction can be admitted but in the second place, for poesy only instructs as it delights. 'Tis true that to imitate well is poet's work, but to affect the soul, and excite the passions, and, above all, to move admiration (which is the delight of serious plays); a bare imitation will not serve.⁸²

25. J. Dennis, *Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry*,

Poetry is an imitation of nature by a pathetic and numerous speech. Numbers are nothing but articulate sounds and their pauses measured by their proper proportions of time. Passion is the characteristic mark of poetry, and consequently must be everywhere.⁸³

26. Sir W. Temple, *Of Poetry*,

... The truth is, there is something in the genius of poetry too libertine to be confined to so many rules. I do not know there was any great poet in Greece after the rules of that art laid down by Aristotle... After all, the utmost that can be achieved or, I think, pretended by any rules in this art is but to hinder some men from being very ill poets, but not to make any man a very good one⁸⁴

27. S. Johnson, *Dictionary*,

Poetry is metrical composition.⁸⁵

Lives of Poets (Milton),

Poetry is the art of uniting pleasure with truth, by calling imagination to the help of reason.⁸⁶

Lives of Poets (Waller),

Its essence is invention.⁸⁷

⁸¹ A.C.S., p. 45.

⁸² *Ibid*, p. 45.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 48-49.

⁸⁵ A.C.S., p. 49 and I.S.L., p. 82.

⁸⁶ A.C.S., p. 49 and I.S.L., p. 82.

⁸⁷ A.C.S., p. 50 and I.S.L., p. 82.

Preface to Shakespeare,

The end of writing is to instruct ; the end of poetry is to instruct by pleasing.³⁸

28. W. Wordsworth, *Preface to Lyrical Ballads,*

[Poetry] is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge.³⁹

[Poetry] is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings ... [and] emotion recalled in tranquillity.⁴⁰

29. S. T. Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria,*

A poem is that species of composition, which is opposed to works of science, by proposing for its immediate object pleasure and not truth ; and from all other species—(having this object in common with it)—it is discriminated by proposing to itself such delight from the whole, as is compatible with a distinct gratification for each component part.⁴¹

Table Talk,

....Prose—words in their best order ; poetry—best words in the best order.⁴²

30. P. B. Shelley, *A Defence of Poetry,*

Poetry, in a general sense, may be defined to be 'the expression of the imagination'Poetry is ever accompanied with pleasure.⁴³

31. J. H. Newman, *Poetry, with Reference to Aristotle's Poetics,*

Poetry, according to Aristotle, is a representation of the idealFidelity is the primary merit of biography and history ; the essence of poetry is fiction.⁴⁴

32. T. Carlyle, *The Hero as Poet,*

For my own part, I find considerable meaning in the old vulgar distinction of poetry being metrical, having music in it, being a song A musical thought is one spoken by a mind that has 'penetrated into the

--38 A.C.S., p. 50.

39 I.S.L., p. 83.

40 A.C.S., p. 50.

41 A.C.S., pp. 52-54.

42 Ibid., pp. 52-54.

43 A.C.S., pp. 55, 57 and I.S.L., p. 83.

44 A.C.S., p. 59.

inmost heart of the thing ; detected the inmost mystery of it.⁴⁵

33. Lord Macaulay, *Essay on Milton*,

By poetry we mean the art of employing words in such a manner as to produce an illusion on the imagination, the art of doing by means of words what the painter does by means of colours.⁴⁶

34. Leigh Hunt, *Imagination and Fancy*,

[Poetry is] the utterance of a passion for truth, beauty and power, embodying and illustrating its conceptions by imagination and fancy.....⁴⁷

What is Poetry?

Its means are whatever the universe contains ; and its ends, pleasure and exaltation.⁴⁸

Poetry begins where matter of fact or of science ceases to be merely such, and to exhibit a further truth ; that is to say, the connexion it has with the world of emotion .⁴⁹

Imagination, teeming with action and character, makes the greatest poets, feelings and thought the next, fancy (by itself) the next ; wit the last. Thought by itself makes no poet at all.....⁵⁰

35 Edgar Allan Poe, *Letter to B*,

Music, when combined with a pleasurable idea, is poetry ; music, without the idea, is simply music, the idea, without the music, is prose, from its very definiteness.⁵¹

36. Matthew Arnold, *The French Play in London*, in *Mixed Essays*,

[Poetry] is simply the most delightful and perfect form of utterance that human words can reach.⁵²

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p 61.

⁴⁶ *A.C.S.*, p. 64 and *I.S.L.*, p. 83.

⁴⁷ *I.S.L.*, p 83.

⁴⁸ *A.C.S.*, p 64.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 66.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p 68

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p 69

⁵² *Ibid*, p. 71 and *I.S.L.*, p. 83,

Wordsworth, in Essays in Criticism, Second Series,

[Poetry is] nothing less than the most perfect speech of man, that in which he comes nearest to being able to utter the truth.⁵³

The Study of Poetry, in Essays in Criticism, Second Series,

[Poetry is] a criticism of life under the conditions fixed for such criticism by the laws of poetic truth and poetic beauty.⁵⁴

37. J. S. Mill, *Thoughts on Poetry and its Varieties*, in *Dissertations and Discussions*, Volume I,

What is poetry, but the thoughts and words in which emotion spontaneously embodies itself?⁵⁵

38. G. H. Lewes, *Inner Life of Art*,

The office of poetry is not moral instruction, but moral emulation, not doctrine but inspiration.⁵⁶

39. Watts-Dunton, *Poetry*, in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Ninth Edition,

[Poetry is] the concrete and artistic expression of the human mind in emotional and rhythmical language.⁵⁷

- 40 William Hazlitt, *Lectures on the English Poets*,

[Poetry is] the language of the imagination and the passions.⁵⁸

Poetry is only the highest eloquence of passion, the most vivid form of expression that can be given to our conception of anything, whether pleasurable or painful, mean or dignified, delightful or distressing.⁵⁹

41. Keble, *Lectures on Poetry*,

[Poetry is] a vent for overcharged feeling or a full imagination.⁶⁰

⁵³ A.C.S., p. 71 and I.S.L., p. 83.

⁵⁴ A.C.S., p. 71 and I.S.L., p. 83

⁵⁵ A.C.S., p. 82 and I.S.L., p. 82.

⁵⁶ A.C.S., p. 83.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 83 and I.S.L., p. 84.

⁵⁸ I.S.L., p. 83.

⁵⁹ J.O.R.M., vol. III, p. 213.

⁶⁰ I.S.L., p. 84.

42. Doyle, *Lectures on Poetry*,

[Poetry expresses our] dissatisfaction with what is present and close at hand.⁶¹

43. Ruskin, *Modern Painters*,

[Poetry is] the suggestion, by the imagination, of noble grounds for the noble emotions.⁶²

44. Courthope, *The Liberal Movement in English Literature*,

[Poetry is] the art of producing pleasure by the just expression of imaginative thought and feeling in metrical language.⁶³

45. Goldsmith, *Poetry Distinguished from other Writings*,

Were the histories of Polybius and Livy simply turned into verse, they would not become poems, because they would be destitute of those figures, embellishments, and flights of imagination which display the poet's art and imagination.⁶⁴

46. Benedetto Croce, *The Essence of Aesthetic*,

Artis intuition. . . Intuition, vision, contemplation, imagination, fancy, figurations, representations, and so on are the words continually recurring, like synonyms, when discoursing upon art.⁶⁵

47. Tolstoy, *What is Art?*,

To evoke in oneself a feeling one has once experienced, and having evoked it in oneself, then, by means of movements, lines, colours, sounds, or forms expressed in words, so to transmit that feeling that others may experience the same feeling—this is the activity of art. Art is a human activity, consisting in this, that one man consciously, by means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that other people are infected by these feelings, and also experience them..... Art is not, as the metaphysicians say, the manifestation of some mysterious Idea of Beauty, or God; it is not as the aesthetical physiologists say, a game in which man lets off his excess of stored up energy; it is not the expression

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁶² Vol. III, Part IV, chap. I, *I.S.L.*, p. 84

⁶³ *I.S.L.*, p. 84.

⁶⁴ *J.O.R.M.*, vol III, p. 91.

⁶⁵ First chapter entitled *What is Art?*

of man's emotions by external signs ; it is not the production of pleasing objects ; and above all it is not pleasure ; but it is a means of union among men, joining them together in the same feelings, and indispensable for the life and progress towards well-being of individuals and of humanity.⁶⁶

48. Rabindranath Tagore, *What is Art, in Personality,*

The principal object of Art being the expression of personality...⁶⁷

49. Bhagavan Das, *The Science of the Emotions,*

.....Art, or artistic activity, is that activity which is consciously and deliberately intended to produce, and produces, *Rasa*, sympathetic enjoyment, in the mind of the witness.⁶⁸

50. Ramacandra Srivastava, *Class Lectures,*

Poetry is the realization of Beauty expressed in words.⁶⁹

The complicated task of analysing this jumble of opinions will never be accomplished unless we study and take a note of the nature of these definitions. There are some which lay down in a straightforward manner *what is poetry*. There are others which tell us *what is the end of poetry*, or *what poetry aims at* ; and there are those which indicate *what poetry does*. There are yet others which fix up *the essential attributes, accompaniments and components of poetry or its language*, and there are also those which discover *what poetry is not capable of, what it should not contain or do, or what is not poetry at all*. There are those which find out figuratively *the essence or soul of poetry*, and others *what poetry utters or expresses*, and yet others *what can be the subject-matter*

⁶⁶ *Sc. of Emotions*, pp. 427-428.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 422.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 406-407.

⁶⁹ From his *Class Lectures* delivered by him as the Principal of the Hindī Sāhitya Vidyālaya, conducted by the Nagari Pracārini Sabha, Agra, during the years 1935 and '36, when the author of the present work was a student of the said Vidyālaya.

of poetry. Not the least important are those which are logical⁷⁰, in as much as their form is concerned, and which point out *a clear differentia to make poetry distinctly recognizable among the other species of the same class*. And, finally, there are many which do two, or even more, of the functions that have been enumerated above.

So now our scheme of analysis is obvious, and we can easily break up these definitions collectively into as many parts as are suggested by their types or nature. In the table shown below I shall put down under each head or type all such matter as each of the definitions individually has to contribute towards that particular head. The serial number of the definition will be placed within the brackets immediately after its each contribution.

A. What is Poetry ?

- (a) Word and sense (3, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19) ; words and thoughts (37).
- (b) A sentence full of *Rasa* (17).
- (c) Word denoting a beautiful sense (18).
- (d) Art of imitation (21, 22) ; imitation of nature (25).
- (e) Metrical composition (25, 27, 32⁷¹, 44).
- (f) Art of uniting pleasure with truth (27).
- (g) Best words in the best order (29) ; perfect speech of man (36) , most vivid form of expression (40).
- (h) Music combined with a pleasurable idea (35).
- (i) Criticism of life (36)
- (j) Concrete and artistic expression of the human mind (39).
- (k) Intuition (46).
- (l) To evoke in oneself a feeling one has experienced and to transmit it to others (47).
- (m) Realization of Beauty expressed in words (50).

⁷⁰ *Per Genus et Differentia* is Aristotle's dictum for a logical definition.

⁷¹ Carlyle makes *metre* synonymous with *music*; note the special meaning he gives to *musical thought*.

B. End of Poetry—What Poetry Aims at ?

- (a) Fame (14).
- (b) Pleasure or delight (19, 22, 24, 29, 34).
- (c) Instruction or teaching (22).
- (d) Instruction through pleasing (24, 27).
- (e) Exaltation (34).
- (f) Moral emulation and inspiration (38).
- (g) Expression of personality (48).
- (h) Production of *Rasa* or sympathetic enjoyment (49).

C. What Poetry Does ?

- (a) Produces pleasure (19, 44); produces *Rasa* or sympathetic enjoyment (49).
- (b) Protects and preserves the *Rāgātma* relation⁷² of man with the rest of the universe (20).
- (c) Affects the soul (24).
- (d) Excites the passions (24).
- (e) Moves admiration (24).
- (f) Produces an illusion on the imagination (33).
- (g) Suggests noble grounds for the noble emotions (43).
- (h) Unites men (47).

D. Essential Attributes, Accompaniments and Components of Poetry or its Language:

- (a) Beautiful and delicate language (1); best words (29); perfect speech (36).
- (b) Simplicity (1, 23).
- (c) Reason (1); reason helped by imagination (27).
- (d) Combinability with dance (1)⁷³
- (e) Dramatic unities (1).⁷³
- (f) *Rasa* (1, 10, 14, 16); emotion (37, 39); feeling and thought (34).
- (g) *Guna*⁷⁴ (2, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16).

⁷² Refer to foot-note No. 28 supra.

⁷³ These qualities of poetry refer exclusively to the Drama.

⁷⁴ The conception of *Guna* or excellence includes delicacy and simplicity of language referred to by the items (a) and (b) of this head.

- (h) *Alankāra*⁷⁵ (2, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16); figures and embellishments (45, 46).
- (i) Conciseness (2).
- (j) Marked or distinguished arrangement of words (2, 4); best words (29).
- (k) *Vakrokti* (9).
- (l) *Rīti* or style (14, 16).
- (m) *Vṛtti* (16).
- (n) Sensuousness (23).
- (o) Passion (23, 25, 40); pathos—used almost as a synonym to 'passion'—(25)
- (p) Pleasure or delight (30, 36).
- (q) Imagination (34, 40, 43, 46).
- (r) Fancy (34, 46).
- (s) Rhythm (39).
- (t) Vision (46).
- (u) Contemplation (46)
- (v) Representation (46).
- (w) Wit (34)⁷⁶

E. What Poetry is not Capable of, what it should not Contain, or what is not Poetry at all ?

- (a) Poetry should not contain blemishes (2, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16).
- (b) Poetry cannot be confined to so many rules (26)
- (c) Thought by itself makes no poet at all (34).
- (d) Moral instruction or doctrine is not the office of poetry (38).
- (e) Poetry is not the manifestation of some mysterious idea of Beauty or God (47).
- (f) Poetry is not a game in which man lets off his excess of stored up energy (47).
- (g) Poetry is not the expression of man's emotions by external signs (47).
- (h) Poetry is not the production of pleasing objects (47).

⁷⁵ Mammāṭa and Vāgbhata (secondus) do not recognize *Alankāras* as absolutely essential to poetry.

⁷⁶ Wit, according to Leigh Hunt, makes lowest quality of poetry.

(i) Poetry is not pleasure (47).

F. The Essence or Soul of Poetry.

(a) *Rīti* or style (5).

(b) *Dhvanī* or suggestion (7).

(c) Invention (27).

(d) Fiction (31).

G. What Poetry Utters or Expresses ?

(a) Imagination (30, 41), imaginative thought or feeling (44).

(b) Passion for truth, beauty and power (34).

(c) Overcharged feeling (41).

(d) Dissatisfaction with what is close at hand (42).

H. What can be the subject-matter of Poetry ?

(a) Anything whether it be delightful or detestable, high or low, gross or elegant, occult or deformed, entity or non-entity (8), whatever the universe contains (34); our conception of anything, whether pleasurable or painful, mean or dignified, delightful or distressing (40).

I. Differentia of Poetry.

(a) Importance of sense—in science the important element being word, and in history truth (2).

(b) Expression through the medium of language (21, 50).

(c) Connection with the world of emotion (34).

(d) Pleasure as immediate object—the immediate object of science being truth (29).

(e) Figures, embellishments and flights of imagination (45).

There can hardly be any enquiry concerning poetry which this lengthy chart will not readily attend to ; but its replies to almost each of the enquiries will be many, and not one, and very often inconsistent with each other, sometimes even contradictory⁷⁷. The

⁷⁷ E.g., while we find Tolstoy saying that Pleasure is not poetry, there are so many others who regard it to be the essential accompaniment or end of poetry. Further examples can easily be sought in the analysed chart.

Vedānta parable⁷⁸ of the five blind men and an elephant cited by Dr. Bhagavan Das to illustrate a principle of reconciliation can help us only if we ignore all the negative matter that has been collected above, and include in our conception of poetry everything that is connoted under all the heads. Suppose, for a moment we do so. But even then the problem does not end here; and we have to proceed further to find out the denotation of our conception. And here again we meet a fresh difficulty. The difficulty is not there because the terms of connotation are many, but because these terms are words and words have with them their usual ambiguity, which neither the author nor the reader can paralyse. The meanings of these connotative terms differ from critic to critic, and there is no reason why they should not differ from reader to reader. With the critics this difference sometimes is so important that while their denotation of poetry is practically coinciding, they combat over the terms. Kuntala, for instance, in his system of *Vakrokti* does not discover poetry in any such work which was hitherto unknown as poetry. All the great works of art, which were considered as such by his predecessors, were great works of art to him. His discussions and criticism, therefore, amount more to the inauguration of a system of new terminology than to the establishment of a new theory of poetry.

So that we find that with the help of these definitions separately or of their analysed chart it is not

⁷⁸ "One [of the blind men] touched the tail-brush [of the elephant], another a leg, the third the abdomen, the fourth an ear, the fifth the trunk. The first then decided that the animal was like a broom, the second insisted it was like a pillar, the third vehemently asserted that it was like a great boulder, the fourth was positive that it was like a winnowing fan, and the fifth had absolutely no doubt that it was a huge python. The sixth man, with eyes (the *Vedāntī*), passing along, tried to make peace between them, telling them that all of them were right, in part, and if they would only add up their experiences, would gain the whole truth. . . ."

—*Sc. of Emotions*, p. 411.

possible for us to know the exact objective denotation of poetry. Nor can we know the connotation, as supposed by us previously, in a way analogous to the *Vedānta* parable, for here the *blind men* are not only five, not even fifty, and not even fifty thousand. It is useless to talk of any increased figure in this connection, for we can never count or know all the views on poetry expressed in all times and in all countries by all nations. The idea of adding up all such views to get a complete connotation is obviously all the more incomprehensible.

But anybody who knows logic may doubt the validity of my inference and may like to point it to me that my symposium contains even logical definitions and that I should have no reason to disregard their efficacy. I admit, as I have already observed, that there are definitions in my collection which are logical *in form*; but there are none, I stress, which are logical *in spirit*. To speak of definitions in plural of one and the same object is to deny the possibility of its being defined at all. Let us examine these definitions and see why in spite of being logical in form they are not logical in spirit. Aristotle defines poetry as *art of imitation expressed in language* (21) and Śrīvāstava as *realization of Beauty expressed, again, in language*. In both of these definitions the differentia of poetry, *viz.*, its expression through the medium of language, is clear, and nobody can confuse poetry with painting or sculpture. But the nature of the genus Art, considered synonymous with Imitation by one and with Realization of Beauty by the other, remains obscure, and there is every chance of its being confused with so many other arts and sciences which too are expressed in language. The four other logical (?) definitions (2, 29, 34, 45) obviously make *all that is expressed in language* the genus, and here we do not discover any indefiniteness. But their differentia, *viz.*, importance of sense, pleasure as immediate object, connection with the world of emotion, and figures, embellishments

and flights of imagination, once again create confusion on account of their plurality and ambiguity. Thus we see that all these definitions fall short of that accuracy and definiteness which must accompany a logical definition—logical both in form and in spirit.

If, then, these definitions, either individually or in combination, cannot give us any unambiguous idea about poetry, what are they, after all, and what is their use? To the first question it may be replied unhesitatingly that each one of them is nothing but an attempt of its author to give his conception of poetry a form in words. In reply to the second it may be said that the use of these definitions consists in this that they impart to us the views of their propounders as accurately as the medium of language permits. Let us elaborate these answers.

A definition is an *attempt* of representation and not a *genuine* representation of its author's conception of poetry, for such attempts have hardly ever been cent per cent successful, not even in the case of subjective definitions. The object of anybody who attempted to give a definition was obviously to frame it in such a way that it could include all what he thought to be poetry and exclude all what he did not. But the criticisms that practically all the important definitions have undergone show that this end was not achieved. The scope of this essay does not permit to illustrate profusely how any definition, as indicated by the sense of the words that compose it, may be shown either to include in its denotation such matter as would never be recognized as poetic by its author, or to exclude such works as were not intended to be so excluded, or to suffer from both these shortcomings. Criticism of this nature is already available in abundance and may be searched for elsewhere⁷⁰ by those who

⁷⁰ I suggest Jagannātha's *Rasagangādhara* and D. T. Tatacarya Siromani's *Definition of Poetry or Kāvya*. The latter is published in the *Journal of the Oriental Research, Madras*, vols. III & IV.

find it interesting. I would like to cite here only Siromani's definition (19), which maintains "that poetry aims at and produces pleasure. But pleasure is a subjective phenomenon, and it shall not be very difficult to find out such persons who would read works on chemistry or philosophy with extreme pleasure and would experience none of it while going through a piece of poetry—if at all they do so. Perhaps Siromani himself had smelt this weakness in his definition, though not to this extent; and it is why, while admitting that pleasure may sometimes be derived even from other sorts of writings, he calls such pleasure *an accident*.

And a definition tells about the views and conceptions *only* of its propounder through the faulty medium of language⁸⁰. For the language we cannot help; and I have already said on it whatever I could. Coming to the conception of poetry we find people believing in the possibility of having a personal one as well as a general or normative. "The distinction", says I. A. Richards,

"between a personal or idiosyncratic judgment and a normative is sometimes overlooked. A critic should often be in a position to say, 'I don't like this but I know it is good', or 'This is the effect which it produces on me, and this quite different effect is the one it should produce.' .. Any honest reader knows fairly well the points at which his sensibility is distorted, at which he fails as a normal critic and in what ways. It is his duty to take these into consideration in passing judgment upon the value of a work. His rank as a critic depends at least as much upon his ability to discount

⁸⁰ The medium of language has been called faulty, not only because of its ambiguity, but also because of its inability to photograph a conception correctly, even if it be absolutely clear in the mind. Most of the eminent critics, whose definitions have been quoted in this chapter, could tell unscrupulously whether a composition was poetic or not, were it placed before them, according to their conception. But even with the help of all the lengthy explanations and elaborations, which have been given to their views, nobody else, it should be obvious to us by now, can perform the same function with as much confidence.

these personal peculiarities as upon any hypothetical impeccability of his actual responses".^{*1}

But I emphasize that it is impossible to pass a normative judgment in the field of art and literature, or anywhere else where there is scope for difference of opinion or difference of taste; and also that it is impossible to pass a personal judgment in the field of science, or anywhere else where there is no scope for any difference of opinion. It would sound as much ludicrous if anybody were to say that the taste of sugar is more pleasant to him than the taste of salt, but that the taste of salt ought to be more pleasant than the taste of sugar, as it would if he were to say that the taste of sugar is sweet but that to him it is sour. Wherever a normative judgment is possible, there is no scope for personal idiosyncracies; and wherever we can have a personal judgment, to talk of a normative is only a false pretence. It has been a general tendency with the critics, who disbelieve in the subjectivity of poetry and its criticism, to fix up a standard of their own for passing all judgment and to give that standard the exalted adjective *general* or *universal*. This self-imposed superiority anon finds its heirs, from whom again it passes to others; and the process goes on indefinitely. We can never be in a position to say that we don't like a thing which we know to be good^{*2}; what we can say at the best is this that we don't like a thing which, we know, is considered to be good by so many others. Richards says, "Many people would regard praise of a work which is actually disliked by the praiser as immoral"^{*3}. But I stress here again, even, at the risk of repetition,

*1. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 224; chap. XXX entitled 'The definition of a poem'

*2. This statement cannot be refuted by a false analogy like this. One may dislike the taste of a distasteful medicine which, he knows, will do good to him. Here Taste and Action of the medicine have been confused together. The true analogy will be to say that one may dislike the taste of a mango though he knows it to be excellent.

*3. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 224.

that such an act is a psychological impossibility. If there are any such points at which, a reader knows, his sensibility is distorted, their existence is the direct result of his consciousness of the fact that they are the points at which his taste and choice differ either from the majority, or from some great critic who has already immensely influenced him.

From the above discussions we can now safely conclude that there is no further utility of these definitions except the information which they impart individually about the personal views of their authors. There is nobody—no student, no layman, no scholar—who has ever attempted to understand what is art or what is poetry through any definition. A child begins to read poems from his early classes. They interest him and help him to form and develop his own conception of poetry—a conception which is clear to him, but which he cannot express. In the language of St. Augustine his reply to the question ‘What is poetry?’ will be: “If not asked, I know; if you ask me, I know not.”⁸⁴ It is only at a very later stage that he bothers his head about definitions, and even then it is not to correct or to revise his already existing idea of poetry, but to find an expression in words for that idea. And the layman never worries himself about a definition. He reads, hears and appreciates whatever is intelligible and interesting to him, and is satisfied only with so much. Definitions have been given by those who knew what poetry connotes and denotes, and the business of each one of them was to frame a definition free from the fallacies of *too narrow* or *too wide*. Definitions have been criticized by those who knew what poetry is, and their business was either to find out the inner inconsistencies and the logical fallacies in the definitions, or to criticize and differ from their connotation and denotation as intended by their authors. The value of this original exposition, and its criticism and recriticism consists not in any

⁸⁴ I.S.L., p. 82.

such help in learning, as the definition of noun extends to a student of grammar, but in the amusing mental exercise which they afford to their readers.

Having considered the views of the men of letters now we turn to the other part of our data which consists of the opinions of those who never express themselves in writing. It is the task of the interested to elicit from them their ideas through verbal enquiry and observations, the two methods supplementing each other. Accordingly I made several enquiries among the uneducated people in this connection and a typical one is noted below :

Subject : Hara Prasāda, a village boy of fourteen, working as a servant

Object Village Rāmalilā—very crude stage—Paraśurāma with a whip in his hand, posing anger on Rāma and Lakṣmana, turning round the whip over and over again and striking another king ; as if unintentionally, the king being ridiculously made fat by thrusting cotton between his body and the outer garment.

Enquiry : Q. Do you enjoy seeing the Rāmalilā ?

A. Too much

Q. What is good there ?

A. The stage, the peculiar dresses of the actors, their dialogues and other activities.

Q. What appealed to you most ?

A. The fat king being whipped repeatedly, as if by mistake or accident, posing fear and pain, though actually he had none—this scene was most funny.

This scene was really most interesting to the major portion of the audience, and I could not myself hear a greater noise of laughter at any other point throughout the whole performance of the day. The children, wherever they were in groups, were in pranks and ticklings with each other ; and the older persons, who had gathered sobriety with age, showed a continuously interested face marked with alternately appearing feelings of devotion and amusement.

But this is not the only form of stage-representation which has been collecting large gatherings. There is another which goes by the popular name of *Nautankī*. Even a *Kathā* without stage finds so many interested listeners, and sometimes its emotional appeal is so great that flow of tears in abundance can be observed on all sides. And then there are also folk-songs and folklores. While many of them contain elements of poetry even to the highly educated mind, there are others which, in spite of being extremely popular, are vulgar and nonsense.⁸⁸

The collection of this sort of data and its study and examination lead us directly to the denotation of poetry without telling us any of its qualitative terms. But here again even this list of denotation we can never make complete, for whatever shall be taken interest in or relished as poetry by whomsoever, will have to be added to this list; and to do this, it is obvious, is impossible.

So that we find that even with the help of all the information that can be availed through all the possible sources, we are not yet in a position to answer the question which we had raised in the beginning of this essay; and the evident reason is the absolutely subjective nature of poetry, its connotation and denotation changing with every individual. In spite of the vivid explanations and specifications given to the terms, in which poetry has been defined, by their advocates, there are hardly any which are objective realities without any subjective element in them. Delight, simplicity, passion, imagination, fancy, vision beauty and *Ālaṅkāra* are not discovered and distinguished in the same fashion by everybody. Even a term like *mètre* has its subjectivity with it, for free verse is not recognized by all as one of its species. So if we have to interpret and

⁸⁸ A typical example is the song 'सरौता कहाँ भूल आये प्यारे जेनदोहया'. I have heard it being recited in almost all parts of this province.

study our subject in the light of a natural science, as opposed to normative or regulative, it is but legitimate that we should admit the individual differences to the extent to which they actually exist. The only possible reply in this spirit to the question *What is poetry?* is *that which is relished or taken interest in as poetry.*

But is it a reply at all? Yes, it is the reply to all who must have a reply to the question unconditionally; and also it is the definition to all who must have a definition of poetry categorically.⁸⁶ To say anything other than this about poetry is to introduce a personal *ought*, which is unwanted, instead of a general *is*, which is desired. If I do not relish a composition, or its representation either on the screen or on the stage, as poetry, none of its high sounding praises⁸⁷ and no external criterions can make me relish it as poetry; and if a work interests me as poetry, no attempts to outcast it from the sphere of poetry and none of its blemishes and faults discovered in it by its critics can make me lose my interest in it.

The use of the word *poetry* in the above definition makes it logically fallacious.⁸⁸ But, as I have already observed, mine is an apology for a definition, and not a definition proper; and it has been introduced because logical definitions have been found to stand nowhere. There is, however, one alternative. If we prefer a negative definition to a definition in a circle, we may say that poetry is that which interests, and, at the same time, which is not any other definite art or science. Thus *Sāketa* is poetry to all those whom it can interest, because it is not history; *Rāmacaritamānasa*, because it is not a treatise on religion or philosophy; *Sevā-*

⁸⁶ Otherwise, as I have already said, there is nobody who needs a definition of Poetry to understand what it is.

⁸⁷ 'Praise' must not be confused with 'interpretation' which sometimes may reveal a new relishable sense.

⁸⁸ The definition being in a circle.

Sadana, because it is not a text-book of sociology; *Mudrārāksasa* or *Candragupta*, because they cannot be included in the books on politics; and *Guñjana*, because it is not a research-work in botany. But if the definition is necessarily to suffer from one fallacy or the other, our position, for obvious reasons, is safer with the former than it is with the latter.

A point which needs clarification here is whether the same work can be poetry and also something else simultaneously, and whether even a part of a composition may be poetical without the whole of it being a poem. A reply to the latter problem may be directly deduced from our definitions, for whatever we can relish as poetry is poetry; if it is a part, the part is poetical, if it is a whole composition, it is a poem.⁸⁹ The former problem, which is not very much different from the latter, can be put in another form also: Is it correct to speak of poetic touches in a work which deals with a different subject? And to this I would answer that if in the treatment of any subject there is some such thing, which the nature of the work does not require in its presentation, and which affords poetic interest to a reader, it can safely be designated as poetic. Even the whole of a history, or a biography, or any other true story may be called poetry by a person who relishes it as such. To a police, judicial or administrative officer the true account of a criminal case does afford some interest, but it is not the interest of poetry, and they know it themselves. But the same account may be found very interesting by a person who has got nothing to do with that particular case, or even with any other, and if it so happens, the nature of the interest of such person would evidently be poetic.

⁸⁹ "The parts of a composition may be poetical, without the composition as a whole being a poem. A single sentence may be considered as a whole, though it may be found in the midst of a series of unassimilated portions; a single word even may be a spark of inextinguishable thought".

—P. B. Shelley, *A Defence of Poetry*, A.C.S., p. 56,

But poetry has an objective aspect too, and it should not be ignored here totally. There are people who find no interest in poetry, and yet they use the term and thereby mean to denote something. We also often talk of such poetic works as we have never read, and, hence, have never relished them as poetry. Poetry in this objective sense includes in its denotation all that is known to have been relished as poetry and all that is known to have been passed as poetry by its authors, advocates and critics.

As my anthology of definitions will show, poetry has been differentiated from prose-writings by some of the western critics. To the oriental scholars verse and poetry are entirely different phenomena; and they have never been confused with each other, for here works even on subjects like medicine and mathematics were written in verse, and prose was regarded to be the touchstone of poets.⁹⁹ The term *Poetry* has been used by me in this work as a synonym to Creative Literature and includes its all forms of expression (viz., poetry in verse, drama, novel, short story etc.), and their representation on the screen and the stage.

It should have been observed by some of the careful readers that in this essay I have always talked only of *poetic interest*, and never of *poetic pleasure* or *poetic enjoyment*. That it is neither pleasure nor enjoyment which attracts us towards poetry I shall deal with in detail in the following chapter

⁹⁹ 'गद्य कवीनां निकष वर्दन्ति ।'

—Cited by Vāmana, *Kāvya-lankārasūtra*, p. 10.

CHAPTER II

PERCEPTION AND RELISH OF POETRY

Having known in the preceding chapter what poetry is we now proceed to investigate the secrets of its perception and relish. It is worthwhile to differentiate here between the meaning of the terms Perception and Relish. To perceive poetry means to convey it to the mind either through the eyes by reading it in a written form, or through the ears by listening to its recitation, or through both by witnessing its representation either on the screen or on the stage. To relish poetry means to perceive it with interest.¹ It is needless to repeat here that the problem of the relish of poetry (*Kāvya-Rasāsvādāna*) has been discussed by the Samskr̥ta critics only with reference to *Rasa* and its constituents (*Vibhāvas* etc.) in spite of the fact that most of them recognized poetry even in other sorts of writings;² and that their endeavour chiefly consists in interpreting the famous dictum³ of Bharata in their own way. Neither they thought it necessary to say anything about the way in which poetry, other than that which comes under the denotation of *Rasa*, is relished, nor could it be possible for them to disregard Bharata's authority and to give their view on the relish of poetry independent of his *Sūtra*.

Out of the fifty definitions of poetry, which I have quoted in the first chapter of this section of the work,

¹ For an elaborate discussion on the term see towards the end of this chapter.

² According to the most dominant school of literary criticism in Samskr̥ta, viz., the *Dhvani* School inaugurated by Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, *Dhvani* is the soul of poetry and *Rasa* is but a species of *Dhvani*. (Vide *D.A.*, pp. 3 & 78).

³ "निभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसयोगाद्रसनिष्पत्तिः ।"

there are not more than ten which find *pleasure* connected with poetry in one way or the other. But critics, who, consciously or unconsciously, do not believe in a hedonistic theory of art, are few ⁴. All the scholars of Hindi and Saṁskṛta poetics, who have dealt with *Rasāsvāda* (or the relish of poetry), without any exception ⁵ and a majority of the western critics seem to have been labouring under the illusion that the end of all poetry is to please. Erroneously assuming that we undertake to do only pleasing things, but observing rightly that we voluntarily go to witness even the scenes of pathos or misery at the theatre they have been led to the wrong conclusion that the perception of even such pathetic scenes affords nothing but pleasure. We see Sītā banished and hear her cries of anguish in a state of utter helplessness in a lonely forest. We then shed tears; and, it has been argued, our tears are those of joy, because we shed tears even when we feel excessive joy.

Before I elaborate my own theory on the relish of poetry and give my answer to the question 'What attracts us towards poetry even when it excites pity and terror?' it is but proper that I should consider all the known important views on this subject and should point out how and where they are erroneous and faulty.

Bhaṭṭalollāṭa is the earliest critic who tried to analyse and explain the experience of poetic relish, and his view has been known as the theory of Generation (*Utpattivāda*). His own work is unfortunately lost, but it has been possible to reconstruct his opinion on the basis of the brief quotations from him found in *Abhinavabhāratī*, *Kāvyaṇuśāsana* and *Kāvyaaprakāśa* etc. P. Pañcāpagesa Śāstri has epitomised his view as follows :

"Love and emotions like it are, as a fact, first generated by the *Vibhāvas* and further developed into

⁴ Tolstoy is one.

⁵ Save the authors of *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*.

Rasa by *Vyabhicāribhāvas* only in the original personage. By reason of resemblance the actor is mistaken for that personage. As a result of his skilful acting the spectator is deluded into the belief that the actor himself is the original personage and possesses the emotions possessed by the original personage. Through this invalid cognition the spectator realises pleasure... The emotion, love and the like, were generated in the original character alone—not in the spectator. He, on the other hand, superimposes these emotions on the actor; the consequence is that he enjoys pleasure".⁶

"...It may be questioned how an invalid cognition can generate a subjective pleasure that the spectator really enjoys. That is, the pleasure enjoyed by the audience being not false while the cause of it is, men may ask 'How could this be?' Bhaṭṭalollata's answer is this: We have very often seen invalid cognition giving birth to real actions in men. For instance a man who mistakes a rope for a snake is frightened; and he trembles. He runs away very swiftly to save himself from the snake. Here the cognition of the snake is false but the effects of it on him, the fear and the trembling, are all real. There was of course no snake. But the man somehow saw it there. This serpent superimposed on the rope caused him fear and trembling. Similarly the love that existed in the original character does not of course exist in the actor; but the spectator having first mistaken him for the original character now wrongly understands the love of the original character to exist in him. This gives him subjective pleasure which he actually enjoys".⁷

Bhaṭṭalollata's theory as exposed above is evidently based on his three assumptions. They are: (i) the spectator is always deluded into the belief that the actor himself is the original personage; (ii) subjective pleasure is realized through any invalid cognition; and (iii) it is always pleasure that we seek in poetry. If these assumptions were to correspond with reality or actual experience, there shall be nothing to hinder his theory from being established as absolutely correct and final. Let us examine his assumptions.

⁶ *Phil. of Aesth. Pleasure*, p. 75.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

We need not look very minutely at the first assumption to know whether it is correct or not, for it is wrong at the very face of it. It is only rarely and at moments that a spectator believes that what he is witnessing is reality and not a mere representation. Even the most sympathetic perceiver cannot have this delusion throughout a performance; and there are people who, without having this delusion at all, can realize the *Rasa* of a drama to its utmost.

The second assumption is still more absurd, and its absurdity is unveiled by the illustration given by Bhaṭṭalollāṭa himself. Every invalid cognition does not give rise to real pleasure, for the invalid cognition of the snake calls forth fear and trembling and not pleasure. Bhaṭṭalollāṭa has not differentiated the invalid cognition which one has while looking at the stage from that which one has in mistaking the rope for the snake. The effects in both the cases are real feelings, but he does not tell us how in the one they are pleasurable and in the other painful. The truth, however, is this that during the operation of a delusion the false cognition is believed to be true, and when it is so believed, it would produce the same effects as it would if it were really true. The false cognition of snake in a rope produces fear, trembling and the impulse to run away, because the perception of a real snake will also produce the same effects. In a similar way the false cognition that the actor himself is the original personage and that he possesses the emotions possessed by the original personage will produce in the mind of the spectator not pleasure, but those feelings which he should experience if the original personage with his original emotions were actually before him.

The third assumption also, viz., it is always pleasure that we seek in poetry, is not tenable. How it is so we shall see in detail afterwards in this very chapter. The falsity of even one of these assumptions was sufficient to break down Bhaṭṭalollāṭa's theory. But where will

it stand now when we have known that none of them is true ?

It will not be a digression if we examine here briefly some of the important charges levied against this theory by other critics, and see how they are superfluous and not at all to the point. It has been said that this theory violates the law of *Samānādhikaranyā* (the law which requires the cause and effect to coexist in one and the same person or object if causation is at all to take place), because it makes the emotion, which is superimposed in the actor by the spectator, the cause of the pleasure of the latter.⁸ The objection is obviously irrelevant, for, according to Bhaṭṭalollāṭa, it is not the emotion of the actor or the original character which is the cause of the pleasure of the spectator ; it is rather his deluded belief that the actor himself is the original character. The deluded belief is his, and the pleasure which it produces is his, and hence the law of *Samānādhikaranyā* is violated in no way. The other objection to this theory is this that it cannot explain the pleasure in pathetic scenes.⁹ This objection itself wrongly assumes that the end of all poetry is to please, and, therefore, it is useless to discuss it any further.

There is another objection to the view and it has been put forward by Bhaṭṭanāyaka. He says that the spectator, who has never seen Dusyanta or Rāma, has no right to superimpose on an actor the love of the former or the severity of the latter. This objection is there because Bhaṭṭanāyaka misses the very spirit of the theory of Bhaṭṭalollāṭa. He thinks that the superimposition of the emotion of the original character on the actor is a conscious and deliberate activity of the spectator. But it is not so. According to Bhaṭṭalollāṭa the spectator is deluded to believe that the actor

⁸ Vide *Phil. of Aesth. Pleasure*, p. 76.

⁹ Vide *ibid.*, p. 80.

is a real person and the part which he is enacting is not another's but his own. He does not know at all that the person whom he is seeing before him is merely an actor. He, as a matter of fact, does not differentiate between the original character and the actor representing him. To him the emotions and the feelings which he finds in the actor are the actor's. He need not know at all what were the actual feelings of Rāma or Dusyanta, and whether or not they ever existed. He, though under a delusion, takes for granted that real Rāma or real Dusyanta is before him. A similar objection has been raised to this theory also by Śaṅkuka. He says that a spectator cannot have the knowledge of the emotions of the original character, which he has to superimpose upon the actor, because at the time of a dramatic representation neither the character nor his *Vibhāvas* and *Anubhāvas* are before him. Śaṅkuka also, like Bhaṭṭanāyaka, misunderstands the meaning of the term Superimposition; for if he were to understand this term in the sense which has been elaborated above and which was intended by Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, his objection would not have been there.

After Bhaṭṭalollaṭa it was Śaṅkuka who took up the problem of poetic relish and who, criticizing the view of his predecessor, gave his own explanation of the realization of *Rasa*. He is known as the propounder of the theory of the Inference of *Rasa* (*Rasānumitivāda*), and his view is also gathered from the short review of his opinion in *Abhinavabhāratī*, wherefrom it has been more or less copied in all the later works that have referred to his theory which may be enunciated as follows in the words of Mammata (Trans. by Gaṅgānātha Jhā) and P. Pañcāpageśa Śāstrī :

“When an actor is personating Rāma, the spectator has with regard to him the idea that *this is Rāma himself*; but this idea is of a peculiar kind, being of the same nature as the idea of *horse* that one has in regard to the picture of a horse; it is different from all the four kinds of ordinary notions: (1) it is not of the nature of the ordinary right notion that one has in the case of the

real Rāma : 'Rāma is the person', which is also confirmed by the subsequent cognition 'this is Rāma himself'; (2) it is different also from the ordinary wrong cognition 'this is Rāma', which appears in regard to one who is not really Rāma, and which is sublated by the subsequent cognition 'this is not Rāma'; (3) nor it is of the same nature as the doubtful cognition 'this may or may not be Rāma'; (4) nor lastly it is of the nature of the cognition of mere similarity, 'he is like Rāma' .. ¹⁰

"The actor on the stage on account of his extraordinary simulating faculty, peculiar costume and other devices of stage-make-up is recognised by the spectator on the *Citraturaga* analogy as the original character. The actor by reason of his superior imitative faculty cleverly exhibits on the stage the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicārībhāvas*. The *Vibhāvas* and the rest exhibited by the actor are only artificial and unreal but not known to be so to the spectator. When the spectator witnesses the successful representation of the original character by the actor he forgets for the moment the difference between the actor and the original character and by means of the *Vibhāvas* and others exhibited by the actor he experiences through the process of a peculiar inference the *Bhāvas*¹¹ such as love as existing in the actor now known as the original character. If love in union is represented on the stage the inference of the spectator will be—"रामोऽयं सीताविषयकरतिमान्" and if love in separation is represented his inference will be "रामोऽयं सीताविरहवान्". This inference is peculiar and entirely different from the ordinary logical inferences (*Alaukika*) and it invariably causes delight".¹²

This theory of Śaṅkuka again, as reproduced above, has assumed the following propositions to be correct : first, the actor is always understood by the spectator as the original character on the *Citraturaga* analogy (or the analogy by which a horse in a picture is understood as a horse), and the emotions that are displayed

¹⁰ *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, pp. 49-50.

¹¹ According to Śaṅkuka the mental conditions thus inferred to exist in the actor are only the semblance of those which existed in the original character.

¹² *Phil. of Aesth. Pleasure*, pp. 105-106.

by the actor are not real but only a semblance of those that existed in the original character; second, the inference of *Rasa*¹⁸ or a semblance of mental conditions invariably causes pleasure; and third, poetry always pleases. The whole structure of Śaṅkuka's view, which stands on the basis of these propositions, will shatter and fall down if any of these were to be proved wrong. Let us, therefore, examine them carefully.

The first proposition assumed by Śaṅkuka asserts that the spectator takes the actor, who is a person of skill and experience in the art of acting, to be the original character whom he personates, and that the cognition of the spectator in thus taking the actor to be the original character is neither correct, nor false, nor doubtful, nor based on similarity—it is rather a peculiar kind of cognition analogous with that which one has when he understands a horse in a picture as a horse. It is worthwhile here to investigate into the nature of this peculiar sort of cognition which does not come under anyone of the four known kinds of it. A picture of a horse is presented before a person. He looks at the picture and has a cognition of it. What is the nature of this cognition of his? Does he actually understand it as a horse? He does not unless he is not a sane person and unless a picture is presented before him for the first time. His cognition is definite and he understands the picture as a picture of a horse. At times he may call it a horse, but then the only word *horse* will indicate the sense of the phrase *picture of a horse* to the speaker as well as to the hearer through the indication power (*Lakṣanā Śakti*) of the word, and the definite nature of the cognition of the speaker will remain unaffected. Suppose also for a moment

¹⁸ The term *Rasa* in Bharata's Sutra is interpreted by Śaṅkuka as the semblance of a mental condition, for he says—

“अनुकृतं स्थत्वेन लिखिततः प्रतीयमानः स्थायिभावो मुखरामादिगत-
स्थायित्वरूपः; अनुकरणरूपत्वादेव च नामान्तरेण व्यपदिष्टो रसः ।”

—A.B., p. 274.

that the person, before whom the picture is presented, is not very much accustomed to see pictures and is stupid, and that the picture is life-like and is kept at a distance. In this case, if the person is not able to have the right cognition that the object placed before him is the picture of a horse, he may be expected to believe either wrongly that it is a real horse, or doubtfully whether it is a horse or a picture. The fourth kind of cognition based on similarity may sometimes coexist with the first, for when observing the picture with appreciation a person remarks that it is like a real horse, he has full and definite knowledge of the fact that the object of his appreciation is the picture of a horse. So that we find that the *Citraturaga* cognition of Śaṅkuka is only a fiction and not at all an invention, and that its conception is included in the already known types of cognitions. The cognition on the *Citraturaga* analogy having been thus refuted, Śaṅkuka now must either fall back to the position of Bhaṭṭalollaṭa and assert that the spectator understands the actor as the original character under a delusion, or he must come forward and tell us what other kind of cognition the spectator has with regard to the actor. But his position cannot be safe in either case : if he resorts to the former, it has already been proved to be false, and if to the latter, it too cannot be true, because, as we have seen, there are some moments at least when a spectator is actually deluded into the belief that the object of his perception is a reality. The other part of the first proposition, viz., the emotions that are displayed by the actor are not real but only a semblance of those that existed in the original character, should also be examined with reference to the cognition of the spectator, for it is the cognition of the spectator which affects his feelings of poetic relish. But, as Śaṅkuka has himself said, the spectator "experiences through the process of a peculiar inference the *Bhāvas* such as love as existing in the actor" and "the *Vibhāvas* and the rest exhibited by the actor" are not known to be unreal to him. Moreover, while criticizing Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, Śaṅkuka said that

the spectator cannot have the knowledge of the emotions of the original character; and when he cannot have this knowledge, it is obvious, he cannot also know that the emotions which he is inferring in the actor are the semblance of those that existed in the original character. So even according to Śaṅkuka a spectator neither knows nor can ever know that the emotions displayed by the actor are not real, but only a semblance. In explaining the subjective phenomenon of the realization of *Rasa* by the spectator it is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary to assume what is neither cognised by nor cognizable to the spectator.

The second proposition of Śaṅkuka establishes that the inference of a semblance of mental conditions invariably causes pleasure. Mental conditions are always inferred, but evidently they are not always the cause of pleasure. A person who comes to us with a long tale of his sufferings never brings with him anything to please us. But will a semblance of mental conditions—a semblance which is known to the spectator as a reality and not as a semblance always produce pleasure? Śaṅkuka, while answering the objection as to how the mental conditions are inferred in an actor out of the probans all the three constituents (*Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *Vyābhicārībhāva*) of which are unreal, stresses that though the probans is artificial, the playgoer does not know it to be so. When the playgoer takes the probans to be real, it cannot be denied that the inference, which he shall make out of it, shall call forth those very feelings in his mind which it would if the probans were actually real. If the inference of real mental conditions does not always produce pleasure—and it does not as we have already seen—the inference of a semblance of them also cannot when the fact that they are only a semblance is not known to the spectator.

The third proposition of Śaṅkuka, viz., poetry always pleases is identical with the third of Bhaṭṭalollāṣa,

and is likewise untenable. So this is where the theory and argument of Śaṅkuka stand of which not one but all the three basic propositions have been wrongly assumed by him.

Coming to the objections put forth against this theory by other critics we notice that it again has been found defective for want of *Samānādhikārya* between the spectator's pleasure and its cause.¹⁴ It has been argued as to how the mental conditions, which are understood by the spectator as existing not in himself but in the actor on the boards, can be the cause of the pleasure which exists in the mind of the spectator. But the objector in raising this objection has missed the real cause which has been assigned by Śaṅkuka to the pleasure of the spectator. It is not the mental condition of the actor, according to him, which is the cause of the spectator's pleasure, it is rather the inference that the mental condition exists in the actor, and he has said it in clear terms. The consciousness of the inference, as well as that of the pleasure is in the mind of the spectator; and hence the argument does not at all offend against the law of *Samānādhikārya*. It is never from the want of *Samānādhikārya* that Śaṅkuka's theory suffers; it is, as we have already observed, from the want of truthfulness in the propositions, which have been assumed by him to be correct and upon which he has based his theory. The second objection to this theory, as it was to that of Bhaṭṭalollāṣa, is this that it cannot explain the pathetic pleasure.¹⁵ We can leave the objection here untouched as it shall automatically disappear when subsequently it shall be maintained in this chapter that the end of all poetry in general and that of the pathetic in particular is not to please the perceiver.

There is another objection to this theory and it has been raised by Abhinavagupta. He says that if

¹⁴ Vide *Phil. of Aesth. Pleasure*, pp. 106-107.

¹⁵ Vide *ibid.*, p. 107.

there is pleasure in the inference of a mental condition not actually existing in the actor, why and how it should not be in the inference of the real mental conditions.¹⁶ The objection is quite relevant and it rightly stands against the theory, but it has already been raised in denying the truth of the second proposition assumed by Śaṅkuka.

Rājacūḍāmaṇīdīkṣita comes forward to find another defect in this theory. "The champions of the inference theory", says he, "could never escape the blame of the momentariness of the *Rasa*-realisation. The explanation of *Rasa*-realisation for a couple of hours by accepting a series of inferences as Śrī Śaṅkuka has suggested cannot hold good; for, a series of inferences should be had on Śaṅkuka's own showing only by a desire for further inferences.....How can an absorbed spectator have the desire for further and further inferences which will only cause distraction to the mind and thus obstruct the realisation of *Rasa*".¹⁷ This critic, it seems, understands by *Inference* a lengthy and delayed process which would divide the attention of the spectator and hence would create gaps in his realization of the poetic relish. But the truth is not this. When we talk about the inference of a mental condition, *Inference* means an automatic process within the mind, the time which it takes being negligible. When an angry person appears before us, by his gestures we immediately infer that he is angry. We do not first reckon and think over his expressions and then, after a pause, conclude that he is angry. As soon as the fact that the expressions are there is conveyed to our consciousness, the experienced machine of our mind brings to the consciousness the emotion with which they are connected. Also a series of inferences does not mean a definite number

¹⁶ "ननु यथा. शंकुकादिभिरायधीयत, 'स्थाय्यव विभावदिप्रत्याय्यो स्य-मानत्वादस उच्यत' इति । एवं हि लौकिकेऽपि किं न रसः, असतोऽपि हि यत्र रसनीयता स्यात्तत्र वस्तुसतः कथं न भविष्यति ।"

—A.B., p. 285,

¹⁷ *Phil. of Aesth. Pleasure*, p. 110,

of inferences, because inferences of mental conditions cannot be identified individually. They are being modified by every changing environment and expression and are intermingled with each other in such a complex manner that they can be understood only as a compact whole. By a *desire for further inferences* is meant that the spectator who is finding himself interested in the consciousness of the inferences is not bored of them and does not want to run away from the theatre-hall. So that we find that the process of inference is a continuous process and that the pleasure which it affords, if at all it affords any as it does according to Śaṅkuka, is also continuous and not momentary. A desire for further inferences neither diverts the attention nor distracts the mind of the spectator, and, therefore, places no obstruction in the realization of *Rasa*. It is due to the misapprehension about the meaning of the term *Inference* that this objection has made its appearance.

Bhaṭṭatauta, the preceptor of Abhinavagupta, has offered a lengthy criticism¹⁸ against this theory. His main objections are two. Firstly, he denies that the emotion inferred by the spectator in the actor is a semblance of the emotion of the original character; and, secondly, he maintains that the knowledge *Rāmo'yaṁ* (This is Rama) of the spectator is either valid or invalid and that the conception of the *Citraturaga* cognition, which has been called by Śaṅkuka a peculiar cognition not included in the four recognized categories, is not different from that of the cognition of similitude. In elaborating his first objection he says that if the inferred emotion be merely a semblance, it should be, such from the standpoint either of the spectator, or of the actor, or of the critic; and subsequently he shows that it is not such from the standpoint of any of these. In refuting the second part of the first assumption of Śaṅkuka we have already shown that a spectator neither knows, nor can ever know that the emotions displayed

¹⁸ This criticism of Bhaṭṭatauta has been quoted in *Abhinava-bhāratī*, pp. 275-278,

by the actor are the semblance of those of the original character. Idea of the critic is evidently included in my term spectator, for it is the spectator who becomes critic when he sits down to analyse the nature of the phenomenon he has perceived. About the actor Bhaṭṭatauta rightly observes that it is through his learning and practice that he presents on the stage merely the external manifestations of the mental conditions, and that having seen no original he is conscious of the fact that he is not imitating anybody. The assumption of the *Citraturaga* cognition, which is questioned by Bhaṭṭatauta in his second objection, has been fully criticized by me while dealing with the first part of the first proposition assumed by Śaṅkuka. But there is a difference between the criticisms offered by Bhaṭṭatauta and myself. While Bhaṭṭatauta thinks that the *Citraturaga* cognition is the cognition of similitude, I have shown that the person, before whom the picture of a horse is presented, can have all the four types of cognitions. Similarly the cognition of the spectator of a dramatic performance also is not only either valid or invalid, as Bhaṭṭatauta thinks, but it may be any of the four sorts of it.

Having demolished the two theories on the realization of *Rasa* we now proceed to examine the third. It has been advanced by Bhaṭṭanāyaka and is known as the Enjoyment Theory of *Rasa* (*Rasabhuktīmata*). The chief source of its knowledge again is the famous commentary of Abhinavagupta on *Nāṭyāśāstra* where it has been quoted and criticized. The theory may be enunciated thus in the words of P. Pañcāpagesa Śāstrī :

“In a poem or a drama the primary connotative power of names and terms explain to us their meaning. These terms and names (*Vibhāvādayaḥ*) and the mental conditions associated with them (*Sthāyībhāvāḥ*) are then presented before us in an idealised impersonal way. The devices of the literary artist, his figures of speech and the like [in the *Kāvya* and the four types

of acting in the Drama]¹⁹ aid this process of idealising by purging for the time being the *Sahṛdaya*'s mind of his mundane prepossessions. This power is called *Bhāvakatva*. Then by a third power called *Bhogakṛttva* the *Sattvaguna* in the mind of the spectator is brought into prominence and his mind becomes steady and no more distracted by any outward object. It also shares the nature of happiness. Enjoyment of pleasure after this is inevitable to the spectator—whether the scene he beholds be erotic or pathetic or horrible or humourous or anything else....”²⁰

“.... This enjoyment differs from the enjoyment of pleasure in the ordinary world in that it is impersonal, while pleasure in the ordinary world is the result of the personal possessions and advantages. It is different also from the Yogin's supreme bliss (*Brahmānanda*)—though akin to it—in that the Yogin sees only the *Brahman* that is Bliss itself while the spectator at the theatre or the absorbed reader at the closet sees, and derives his enjoyment from objects like the parties to love and other emotions on the stage. In *Brahmānanda* there is complete detachment from the world; in the enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure, on the other hand, there is dissociation, no doubt, but the concentration on a plurality of objects like the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyābhicārībhāvas* makes for the incompleteness of the concentration. So the spectator's pleasure is not *Brahmānanda* itself—it makes only a near approach to it”²¹

Bhaṭṭanāyaka in establishing his view as above has clearly postulated the following: Firstly, the function named *Bhāvakatva*, which is aided by the literary devices of the artist (figures of speech and the like) and the skilful acting of the actor, presents the *Vibhāvas* etc. in a generalised form and purges the mind of the perceiver of his mundane prepossessions.

¹⁹ The matter in the brackets has been added by me for Bhaṭṭanāyaka's quotation both in *Abhinavabhāratī* (p. 278) and *Kāvyaṇuśāsana* (p. 73) runs as follows:

“...तस्मात्काव्ये दोषाभावगुणालंकारमयत्वलक्षणेन, नाट्ये चतुर्विधा-
सिनयरूपेण...”

²⁰ *Phil. of Aesth. Pleasure*, p. 143,

²¹ *Ibidi*, pp. 141-142.

Secondly, the function named *Bhogakṛttva* brings the *Sattvāgama* into prominence in the mind of the *Sahrdaya* and thereby makes it absolutely calm and steady ; and the mind brought into this state realises nothing but pleasure, whatever be the emotional quality of the object of its perception. And, thirdly, all poetry affords pleasure which is akin to *Brahmānanda*. It is on the correctness of these postulations of Bhāṭṭanāyaka that the correctness of his theory depends. Let us, therefore, proceed to examine them.

The first postulation, which assigns a special power called *Bhāvakatva* to the word in addition to its ordinary denotative (or connotative, as Śāstrī has translated the Samskr̥ta word *Abhidhā*) power, may be broken up into three parts, viz., (i) this power is aided by the literary devices in the *Kāvya* and by the four kinds of acting in the drama ; (ii) it makes the spectator lost in what he perceives and he does not think of anything else ; and (iii) the characters with their actions and mental conditions are presented before the perceiver in an abstract generalised way divested of all particularities through the operation of this power. The assumption of the power of *Bhāvakatva* is necessary, thinks Bhāṭṭanāyaka, to avoid the defect due to neutrality (*Tātaस्थ्यā*), from which the two theories of his predecessors suffer. It is the spectator, says he, who enjoys pleasure, and, therefore, the mental conditions, which are generated (according to Bhāṭṭalollāṣa) or inferred as existing (according to Śaṅkuka) in another person, cannot be the cause of the pleasure. But it is strange how he has supposed that the introduction of this new power would remove the said defect ; for the dramatis personae and their mental conditions in spite of being generalised remain entities different from and outside perceiver's own personality and mind. The spectator may understand the person on the stage representing Śakuntalā only as a lovely maiden ; and the person representing Dusyanta only as a great noble-minded hero (*Dhīrodātta Nākaya*), but he never understands

them to be a part and parcel of his own person. Similarly the emotions with their external manifestations displayed by the persons representing Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta may be understood by him not as existing in Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta or in the persons representing them, not even, suppose for a moment, as existing in a beautiful damsel and a valiant hero, but in their abstract general character as existing in the air; yet he cannot and does not understand them as existing in himself. And unless the spectator can do this, the innovation of the power of *Bhāvakatva* cannot remove the defect due to neutrality from the theory of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, if any such defect at all exists in the theories of his predecessors. Thus we see that the assumption of this power fails to serve the purpose primarily intended by Bhaṭṭanāyaka.

Out of the three parts into which we have divided the first postulation the third is the most important, because it tells us about the real function of *Bhāvakatva*, viz., generalisation or *Sādhāranīkaraṇa*. Let us, therefore, take it up first of all and discuss its nature and meaning. Generalisation, as we have already known, consists in understanding the characters of a drama or an epic and their mental conditions together with the external manifestation of the latter in the former in their universal and impersonal aspect as opposed to the particular and individual. Thus when generalisation has taken place a spectator at the theatre is not to understand by Śakuntalā, who stands before him represented by an actress, a particular lady, belonging to a particular place and a particular era, standing in particular relationships with particular persons and having a particular social status. He sees in her only a lovely maiden at the threshold of youth. He does not take her to be his wife, or even that of Duṣyanta; for, in the former case, he would feel shy to show his love to her in the presence of so many others, and, in the latter, he will grow indifferent to her. Likewise, in Duṣyanta, who again is represented by an actor, he recognizes only a

noble-minded and valiant character. The details that he is the king of a country, and is in love with Śakuntalā are of little importance to him. In this case if the spectator be a lady, she would indeed(!) be disinclined to take him to be the husband of Śakuntalā, for then she may grow indifferent to him and consequently indifferent to the play. But in this case for what reasons a male spectator will not admit him as Śakuntalā's partner, we do not know. May it be that he is able to calculate as an intelligent person that to make Duṣyanta Śakuntalā's is to make Śakuntalā Duṣyanta's. But this is not all. Mental conditions along with their external manifestations which suggest them are also to be understood in the universalised way by the spectator. He witnesses Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā, that is, the persons who are representing them, making love with each other. But the love thus manifested is not understood by him as existing between Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā, nor even as existing between a valiant hero and a beautiful damsel—for he has understood none of these characters as making love with each other—but as subsisting by itself in an idealised or generalised or abstract form without existing in any concrete person and divested of all particularities.

This is what has been understood by generalisation. But before we admit that such a function at all operates during our perception of a poetic phenomenon, it is but necessary that we should make a reference to our own experience and observation. As stage performance has grown to be a very rare activity in our times, I shall select my illustration from the screen. In the Hindī picture *Javābā* we find both Mīnā (Kānanabālā) and Revādevī (Jamanā) making love with Manojakumāra (Baruā). Both of these are young, beautiful and attractive and are in love with a youngman. Does the spectator understand them merely as lovely maidens and not as individuals, each having her own peculiarities of character, status and environment? Evidently he does not; for, if he did, how shall he differentiate between

them? He definitely understands in Mīnā (Kānanabālā) an innocent girl of a middle class family and every detail that he learns about her in the course of the whole picture modifies or vivifies his idea of her individual and particular character. Likewise in Revādevī (Jamanā) he sees a modern educated girl of an aristocratic family, experienced in the frolics of youth and courtship. If an effect as contemplated by generalisation of *Vibhāvas* were to be produced in the mind of the spectator, there shall be chaos in the world of his consciousness and he shall understand nothing out of a whole performance. Every character that is painted or represented and developed before him must be recognized by him as an individual. Even if in qualities of character two people are very much like each other, he must be fully conscious of at least their physical individuality. While reading *Rāmāyana* he comes across Sītā and her three sisters. All the four belong to the same family, are also brides of the same family and have almost equal graces of character and beauty. But he can never afford to confuse one with the other. He must know each by her particular name and particular actions and particular individuality, and not in the generalised form as only lovely maidens. He cannot also grow totally indifferent to the era and the country and the society to which a particular character belongs. If Śakuntalā were represented before him in a frock and Duṣyanta in an English suit, he would simply ridicule the performance. Similarly if an Arab is made to appear before him in a Kurtā and a Dhotī and a Christian as offering his oblations to the god Śiva, he would call the representation a sheer absurdity. This is how the *Vibhāvas* or the characters are generalised to the spectator. Now let us see how far the *Anubhāvas* and the mental conditions which they manifest are understood by him in the generalised way. Spectator's conception of a character, as we have already seen, is composed of his knowledge of all the details, which are conveyed to his consciousness, about that particular character. The emotions or the mental conditions together with their

expressions of course constitute the most important part of those details. But this process of generalisation would not permit the spectator to know those emotions as the emotions of the characters in whom they are manifested. It would like that he should understand them only in an abstract form not connecting them with the characters. But this is not what actually happens. As each character is understood by the spectator as a particular individual, so each emotion is understood by him as existing not in idea but in a particular character. He witnesses Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta making love with each other. Unless he clearly cognizes that it is love between Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta, he shall not at all follow the play all of which will only be Greek and Latin to him. Thus we find that the conception of generalisation or *Sādhāranīkaraṇa*, which has been said to be the real function of the assumed power of *Bhāvakatva*, is a mere fancy and that the office which has been assigned to it is never manifested.

Taking up the second part of the first postulation we find Bhaṭṭanāyaka asserting that the power of *Bhāvakatva* purges the mind of the perceiver of his mundane prepossessions and during his perception of the literary phenomenon he does not think of anything else. Disregarding that it is due to the operation of the power of *Bhāvakatva*, let us see if such a state of the mind is at all created whenever we relish poetry or its representation on the stage or the screen. There are moments, no doubt, when a perceiver is immediately conscious of nothing except of the object of his perception, viz., the literary phenomenon; but there are also moments, it cannot be denied, when the object of his perception evokes in him the memory of his own experiences. This is at least sometimes inevitable because the subject-matter of poetry includes human life in all its aspects. When a person is absorbed in solving a problem of Mathematics, or in making an experiment in Chemistry, it is possible for him not to remember anything out of his worldly affairs, because in Mathematics and

Chemistry there is hardly anything in common with the problems of life ; but when he is perceiving poetry, he cannot dispense with the occurrence of one outside idea or the other in his mind even if he makes a conscious effort to do so. But such evocations of the memory of his experiences are perhaps never unwelcome to him, except of course sometimes when the remembrances are pathetic^{2,2}, for they make his interest in the perception still deeper. If a youngman while perceiving a scene of love-making finds there something in common with his own happenings, he feels all the more interested. Moreover, there are species of literature, for instance satire and problem plays and novels, whose major interest consists in the thoughts they evoke. To cut short, it is sufficient for our purpose to note here that either through the power of *Bhāvakatva* or through any other power, known or unknown, it is not always possible for the perceiver not to think of anything else during his perception of the poetic phenomenon, and that the thoughts and the memories which are called up by the poetic phenomenon itself subsist almost always without diminishing and sometimes even intensifying the poetic interest of the perceiver.

The first part, which we have not touched as yet, of the first postulation lays down that the function of the power of *Bhāvakatva* is assisted in poetry by the absence of blemishes and the presence of *Alaṅkāras* and *Guṇas* and in drama by the four kinds of acting. We have already noticed that out of the two functions assigned to *Bhāvakatva* one (viz., generalisation) is never accomplished and the other (viz., purgation of the mind of the perceiver from the consciousness of any outside phenomenon) only sometimes. But even granting that they are always accomplished let us find out how far they are aided by the excellences of expression and acting. A beautiful expression, if the figures used in it are suggestive, if it is easily understood and if the words which compose it are such as are best

^{2,2} Though often even the pathetic remembrances are welcome:

suited to the occasion, presents before our vision a clear image of the thing, person, emotion, or situation which it depicts. And it is obvious that the more clear the image, the less it would help in generalisation, because the more it would particularise itself. Similarly in drama through the stage-devices, an impression of the environment and atmosphere is conveyed to the spectator and through the four kinds of representation²² or acting he knows and differentiates each character. To illustrate, in the picture *Citrālekḥā* it is through the settings and other stray activities that the spectator learns that the tale which is being screened before him is of a bygone era. Sāmanta Bijagupta and Brāhmacārī Śvetāṅga are understood by him not as his contemporaries, but as the persons living in the age of Candragupta. Each movement which they make, each word that they speak, each dress which they put on and each feeling which they manifest go to make them individual persons with their personal characteristics peculiar to themselves alone. So that the purpose which is served by the poetic excellences and the dramatic devices is not that of generalisation, it is rather that of particularisation. That they do not serve the other purpose of purgation also we shall see just now. Our interest, no doubt, is intensified by the excellences of a composition or representation. But the intensification of interest in a poetic phenomenon does not mean that the mind becomes unapt to become conscious of everything else, as it may if the object of interest be Mathematics or Chemistry, for, as we have already remarked, human life with its diversified vicissitudes is included in the subject-matter of poetry. However great may be the interest of a perceiver in his perception, yet when he comes across such situations as he himself

²² The four kinds of *Abhinaya* or acting are ;-(i) *Āṅgikā* or gestural, conveyed by bodily actions, (ii) *Vācika* or vocal, conveyed by words, (iii) *Āhārya* or extraneous, conveyed by dress, ornaments, decoration etc., and (iv) *Sātvika* or internal, conveyed by the manifestation of the internal feelings such as perspiration and thrilling etc.,

has passed through, it is impossible for him not to recollect his. To conclude this criticism of the first postulation of Bhaṭṭanāyaka let it be remarked that words possess no such power as *Bhāvakatva*, that generalisation of characters and their mental conditions is a psychological impossibility, that the perceiver, in spite of his great interest in the perception of the literary phenomenon, may sometimes think of something other than the object of his perception and that the beauties of expression and representation help neither in effecting generalisation nor in making the perceiver incapable of remembering or thinking of anything else.

We shall not entangle ourselves for long with the second postulation of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, which attributes another power called *Bhogakṛttva* to poetry, for the assumption of this power is based on such philosophical beliefs as evade any psychological testing. The realisation of *Rasa* to us is a worldly phenomenon, not transcendental, and we are to discuss and explain it here on the basis of psychology—on the basis of our everyday experience. We do not know what is *Sattvagūṇa*; we do not know how it makes the mind absolutely calm and steady and unapt to be distracted by any outward object; we do not know also how the mind in this state realizes nothing but pleasure or happiness; and, once again, we do not know in the mind of what spectator and how this *Sattvagūṇa* possessing such miraculous powers is brought into prominence. We know only this much, as we have already seen, that the mind of the spectator is always liable to become conscious of the outward phenomena, that the experience during our perception of poetry is an activity of the mind, and that it should, for this reason, be explainable by the science of mind, that is, psychology.

The third postulation of Bhaṭṭanāyaka differs from the third of his two predecessors only in this much that it has qualified Pleasure, which all poetry affords according to its assertion, as *akin to Brahmānanda*. This

new addition need not detain us, for, firstly, I have already promised to show that it is not pleasure of any kind or description that we always seek in poetry, and, secondly, it is as erroneous as it is fruitless to compare or liken an object with a phenomenon which is still more obscure and unrealizable.

Thus the Enjoyment Theory of Bhaṭṭanāyaka breaks down at the very roots, for the ground on which it stands is itself hollow. The functions which he has ascribed to the assumed powers of *Bhāvakatva* and *Bhogakerttva* are never manifested, and the pleasure akin to *Brahmānanda* is a mystery to the spectator who neither knows nor can realize what the latter is like. The criticism which has been offered to this theory by the other scholars is not at all important, for almost all of them have admitted that the functions attributed to *Bhāvakatva* and *Bhogakerttva* do actually operate. What they object to is only the invention of these new terms. "The importation", remarks P. Pañcāpagesa Śāstrī, "of these two functions (by *functions* Śāstrī means *functions by their new names*) is needless. And as no other author has even so much as mentioned them, they suffer from lack of recognition. They may be abandoned, though in themselves they are neither wrong nor harmful".²⁴ According to Abhinavagupta "Bhaṭṭanāyaka's recognition and employment of needless instruments like *Bhāvakatva* and *Bhogakerttva* are as unnecessary as unauthorised",²⁵ because the function of these two powers is done by *Vyañjanā* or Suggestion alone. Prabhakarabhaṭṭa believes "that Bhaṭṭanāyaka can dispense with the power of *Bhogakerttva*", because the function of *Bhāvakatva* consists not only in the presentation of things in their universalised aspect but also in the removal of distractions from the *Sahridaya*'s mind".²⁶ There is obviously nothing like real criticism of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's theory in the observations

²⁴ *Phil. of Aesth. Pleasure*, p. 158.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 161-162.

quoted above, and hence there is also nothing which we may take up here to recriticize—to justify or to refute.

The next theory on *Rasa*-realization, which has been more or less deemed satisfactory through as many as ten centuries by men of learning and intellect, and which has been accepted by even as modern scholars as Dr. Śyāmasundara Dāsa,²⁷ Dr. A. Sankaran²⁸ and P. Pañcāpageśa Śāstrī,²⁹ is that of Abhinavagupta and is known as The Revelation Theory of *Rasa* (*Abhivyaktivāda*). The following is an epitome of this theory as given by Śāstrī :

“All minds and especially those of trained critics of poetry are endowed with certain subtle and latent impressions (*Vāsanāḥ*) implanted in them at birth. These are called *Sthāyībhāvas* in poetic language. In a poem or in a clever representation on the stage, the *Vibhāvas* and the *Anubhāvas* first indicate to the reader or the spectator the mental conditions of the characters ; then the *Vibhāvas* and the mental conditions are understood by the reader or the spectator in a general way without any specific relation to any particular person in any particular circumstance. By these generalised *Vibhāvas* and the rest, the latent *Sthāyībhāvas* in the reader or the spectator are called into play and they also are understood only in a general way without any reference to himself as an individual. It is, of course, needless to say that these *Sthāyībhāvas* thus aroused in the cultured reader or the spectator exactly correspond to the *Vibhāvas* and the rest that call them into play. Now, the moment this perception takes place in the mind, which is already weaned from the distractions usual to it by the skill of the poet (or of the dramatist assisted by that of the stage-manager), it gets concentrated on the awakened *Sthāyībhāvas* and enjoys supreme pleasure”.³⁰

²⁷ The revised edition of his work entitled *Sāhityālocaṇa* appeared in 1938.

²⁸ His work entitled *Some Aspects of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit or the Theories of Rasa and Dhvani* appeared in 1929.

²⁹ His work entitled *The Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure* appeared in 1940.

³⁰ *Phil. of Aesth. Pleasure*, p. 168.

"Our *Sahrdaya*⁸¹, we know, is a man of trained intellectual powers. By reason of that, and by reason of the excellence of the actors and the scenic arrangements, no less by reason of the genius of the poet who invests his utterances with a many-sided charm (by the use of *Gunas*, *Alankāras*, *Vṛttis* and *Rītis*), he comes to see the persons before him not as particular individuals; he sees them, on the contrary, merely as men and women capable of giving rise to love and heroism; and so on in the abstract. *Dusyanta* is no more *Dusyanta*, but merely a man of parts. *Śakuntalā* is divested of her personal peculiarities and becomes a high class woman of beauty and virtue. What was their mutual love so far, is now love in general, love between man and woman in the abstract.

"A caution is necessary here. The generalisation spoken of here is to be understood as excluding the individuality not only of the characters in the piece but of the *Sahrdaya* himself, of his friends and of his foes. Why this is so is quite clear. If it does not exclude his personality, his own interest in guarding himself from observation, say, in love-making, is sure to interfere with his enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure; if his enemies are not excluded, his passion of hatred or anger or revenge will interpose itself between his mind and enjoyment of pleasure; if his friends are not excluded, his passions like joy at their success and sorrow at their failure will so interpose themselves. In one word, the enjoyment of aesthetic satisfaction is *Vīṭavighnā Pratītiḥ*".⁸²

Abhinavagupta has based his theory as exposed above on the following presumptions: Firstly, every human mind is endowed with certain latent impressions

⁸¹ Abhinavagupta has defined a *Sahrdaya* in *Locana* (p. 13) as follows.

"येषा काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवशाद्विशदीभूते मनोमुकुरे वर्णनीयतन्मयी-
भवनयोग्यता ते हृदयसंवादभाजः सहृदयाः ।"

or, a *Sahrdaya* is one who with his wide experience of the world and his constant acquaintance with the works of great artists has got a heart full of responsiveness to the situations described in poetry or on the boards and ready to identify himself with them. (English translation by P. Paṇḍitaśāstri).

⁸² *Phil. of Aesth. Pleasure*, pp. 175-176.

called *Sthāyībhāvas* in the language of poetics. Secondly, during the perception of a poetic phenomenon the mind of the perceiver remains free from all distractions, the *Vibhāvas* etc. being perceived by him in a generalised form. Thirdly, in the mind of the perceiver, which is free from all distractions, his own latent impressions are evoked at his perception of the generalised *Vibhāvas* etc. and they too are understood by him in a generalised way, and are the source of his pleasure. Fourthly, the end of all poetry is to please. Let us, once again, take up these presumptions, one by one, and find out how far they correspond with actual experience.

We need not dispute here on the first presumption of Abhinavagupta which asserts that there are certain latent impressions in every human mind and that they are apt to be kindled in the presence of adequate environment, for it is true at least in this much that the impressions enumerated by him with the name of permanent mental conditions or *Sthāyībhāvas* are experienced by us, whenever there is reason for it, in the form of the emotions. But whether he has rightly called only these mental conditions permanent and the rest transitory, we shall see in the next section of this work;⁸⁸ and whether such conditions are at all capable of being called forth in the mind of a perceiver in a generalised way, we shall discuss while dealing with the third presumption.

The second presumption of Abhinavagupta is exactly the first of Bhaṭṭanāyaka which we have already examined in exuberent details. We have seen that the generalisation of characters and their mental conditions is psychologically impossible, that it is not necessary that even an absorbed perceiver would not think of anything else during his perception of a literary phenomenon and that all the beauties and graces of expression and all the devices of representation, even added by the training of the *Sahṛdaya* as Abhinavagupta will

⁸⁸ Vide chapter IV of the second section.

have it, can effect neither generalisation nor undistractedness in the mind of the perceiver. The removal of the seven obstacles or barriers,⁸⁴ which this critic has spoken of, from the way to the realization of *Rasa* amounts only to the natural, adequate and unmisleading presentation of the probable events and the idealized *Vibhāvas* and *Bhāvas* before the spectator who should be made to forget his own joys and sorrows through music and other implements.

Thus finding Abhinavagupta's position with regard to his second presumption as unsecure as that of Bhaṭṭanāyaka was, we now proceed to examine his third which lays down that the perception of the generalised *Vibhāvas* and *Bhāvas* evokes in the mind of the perceiver his own latent impressions which too are understood by him in the generalised way and which, thus understood, are the source of his pleasure. It is at this presumption chiefly that Abhinavagupta has deviated from Bhaṭṭanāyaka and has introduced a novelty. Though this presumption itself is based on the second, which, we know, is false, yet, for the time being, let us grant that the mind of the perceiver is free from all distractions and that the things are presented before him in an idealised form. The presumption can be broken up in three parts, viz., (i) in the mind of the perceiver his own latent impressions are evoked when he perceives the generalised *Vibhāvas* and *Bhāvas*; (ii) the evoked impressions are understood by him not

⁸⁴ The seven obstacles are :

- (i) प्रतिपत्तावयोर्यता सम्भावनविरहः,
- (ii) स्वर्गतपरगतवनियमेन देशकालविशेषावेशः,
- (iii) निजसुखादिविवक्षीभावः,
- (iv) प्रतीत्युपायवैकल्य,
- (v) स्फुटत्वाभावः,
- (vi) अप्रधानता, and
- (vii) सैशययोगः ।

as pertaining to any individual but in their abstract form ; (iii) the pleasure of the perceiver consists in his concentration on the awakened impressions or *Sthāyī-bhāvas*. The first part presumes that the mind of the perceiver is like an unexposed film on which the depicted emotion in poetry is imprinted without any modification. We have taken for granted, it is true, that this mind is free from all distractions, but it means only this much that the focus of its attention or the object of its cognition is only the poetic phenomenon and nothing else. Abhinavagupta has not explained to us how the emotions, which are the objects of the cognition of the mind, are able to arouse in it its own latent impressions. The *Anubhāvas* etc. suggest that the emotions are there, but how are they able to pass them on to the perceiver? The *Vibhāvas* etc. are directly related to the *Āśraya* or the character in whom the emotion resides, and not to the perceiver. How are they able to kindle the same emotion in the perceiver? Such are the questions which relevantly make their appearance, but which remain unanswered in the present exposition of this theory. Also in actuality we do not find people experiencing the depicted emotions. If the attitude of a perceiver towards a particular character be sympathetic, he may feel amused when the character is in love-making with another, and he may feel pity when it is in distress. But he cannot feel love or *Rati* at an amorous scene, or pathos or *Śoka* at a pathetic one unless he is reminded of his own frolics in the former case and of the bereavement of his dearest in the latter. But this would not happen to him as his mind has been assumed to be free from all distractions. Besides, a perceiver is not in sympathetic relations with all the characters. There is the villain, for instance, with whom a perceiver in his emotional moods feels displeased or antipathetic. Whenever this villain even attempts to make love with the heroine, he feels offended and annoyed ; and whenever a misfortune befalls him, he feels a sort of satisfaction. Here if it be objected that when we have assumed that the *Vibhāvas* and the

Bhāvas are presented before the perceiver in a generalised form, our attitude can neither be sympathetic nor antipathetic towards any character, we should admit the objection. But then the generalised *Vibhāvas* and the *Bhāvas* will not at all command any emotional response in the mind of a perceiver who shall have merely an intellectual cognition of their existence. And when this would happen the presumption that the perception of the generalised *Vibhāvas* and *Bhāvas* evokes in the mind of the perceiver his own latent impressions would fall down at its defender's own hands.

After establishing that no latent instincts are evoked in the mind of the perceiver by his perception of a literary phenomenon the second part of the first presumption, which asserts that the evoked instincts are understood by the perceiver in their abstract form, gives way automatically, for when the instincts are not evoked at all, the question of their being understood in one way or the other does not arise. But granting once again that these instincts are evoked in the mind of the perceiver let us scrutinize whether and how they can be understood in their abstract form. They cannot be understood by him as his own, it has been maintained, because if they are so understood "his own interest in guarding himself from observation, say, in love-making, is sure to interfere with his enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure"⁸⁵. But from whose observation shall he guard himself? When he is dallying with his fair partner in his closet does he need this conscious and continuous guarding? Obviously he does not, because he is sure that nobody would intrude in their privacy. In the theatre-hall also, with a mind free from all distractions, with his absolute and undiverted attention fixed on the object of his perception, and with no knowledge of any outside phenomenon, there is the least reason for him to feel afraid of being perceived by anybody else. When his mind is already rid of all the obstacles, not to speak anything of his being

⁸⁵ Vide the epitome of Abhinavagupta's theory quoted supra.

interested in guarding himself from observation, he cannot even afford for a moment to become conscious of the possibility of being looked over by anybody. Thus we find that the reason which has been assigned to negate the possibility of understanding the evoked impressions as one's own does not stand. Let us now admit that they cannot be understood by the perceiver as those of his friends and foes, not because if they are, his joy, sorrow and hatred etc. would interpose between his mind and the enjoyment of pleasure, but because the perceiver's mind is not capable of, free from distractions as it is, ascribing them to any outside people. There is one possibility, however, that he may choose his friends and foes even from the characters of the world of poetry making noble characters his friends and wicked ones his foes. We had considered this possibility while dealing with the first part of this presumption, and there it was objected to as we had admitted that the *Vibhāvas* and the *Bhāvas* are presented before the perceiver in a generalised form. Here again it is nullified for this reason as well as for the reason that now the impressions have passed from the characters to the perceiver whose own dormant instincts have been evoked. Having denied all other possibilities we are now left with only two out of which not more than one can be correct. The evoked impressions should be understood by the perceiver either as his own or in their abstract or idealised form. Taking Abhinavagupta's position we have noticed that his objection against the first alternative is wrong. Referring to our experience and observation we find that if at all a perceiver's own emotion is aroused during his perception of a poetic phenomenon, it is always understood by him as his own. If the nature of his emotion is sympathetic, the sympathy is his; and if it is a genuine emotion called forth because of his remembering his own past incidents or events, then again the emotion is genuinely his. In neither case he is required to conceal himself from observation, for, in the former, sympathetic emotions are not to be concealed, and,

in the latter, the *Vibhāvas* etc. which call forth the emotion are manifested not outside his mind but only in his memory and imagination. So we can legitimately conclude that whatever dormant feelings are evoked in the mind of the perceiver at his perception of the poetic phenomenon, they are his, and are understood by him as such, and that it is impossible for him to understand the feelings thus evoked in an abstract generalised way.

Coming to the third part of the third presumption we find Abhinavagupta asserting that the pleasure of the poetic relish consists in perceiver's concentration on the awakened *Sthāyībhāvas*. But these *Sthāyībhāvas* in themselves are not much important. Abhinavagupta emphasizes over and over again that it is due to the absolute calmness (*Samvid Viśrānti*) of the mind and its perception which is free from all distractions (*Vita-vighnā Pratītiḥ*) that the pleasure is there. In advocating this view he is clearly following the teachings of the *Sāṅkhya* school of philosophy which maintains that from the repose of the mind results all pleasure and from its oscillation (*Samvid Avīśrānti*) all unhappiness (*Duhkha*). Abhinavagupta has himself pointed out that the perception of things in their individual character cannot be the source of our pleasure as such perception is full of barriers or obstacles (*Vighnabahulā Pratītiḥ*). To believe in this view of Abhinavagupta based on the *Sāṅkhya* tenet is to believe in its indispensable and immediate corollary that all the experiences of our actual life, which are necessarily particularised as they pertain to either particular things or particular individuals, are always coloured with pain and never with pleasure. If such an absurd position to which this theory of Abhinava leads inevitably were revealed even before him, we can feel cent per cent sure that he would have decidedly preferred to abandon his theory to sticking to this obviously incongruous position, for he himself has talked of both personal pains and personal pleasures.

The fourth presumption of Abhinavagupta has already been met with while dealing with all his three predecessors, and hence it does not require even a mention for the fourth time. To sum up our criticism of this theory we find that in spite of its recognition through a decade of centuries it remains as unsound and as ill-founded as are all those that precede it. A mind free from all distractions, the generalised *Vibhāvas* and the *Bhāvas*, the evocation of the *Sthāyībhāvas* or permanent mental conditions in the mind of the perceiver and the abstract form in which they are understood are the things which it talks of and which exist nowhere except in imagination. Lastly, the worst of it is its explanation of the aesthetic pleasure based on the *Sāṅkhya* tenet that leads to the obviously absurd conclusion, which nobody can admit, that all the experiences of actual life are always painful.

The problem of the relish of poetry or *Kāvya-Rasāsvādāna* was taken up even after Abhinavagupta by Dhanañjaya, Mammata, Viśvanātha, Jagannātha and others and some of them have given a very elaborate exposition of their views. But none of the later writers on this subject differs from Abhinavagupta in any essential point. In the whole range of Samskr̥ta poetics there is, however, one work, viz., *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*⁸⁶, the authors of which had the courage to maintain, even against the tradition, that the end of all poetry is not to please, and that the *Karūṇa*, *Raudra*, *Vīḥḥatsa* and *Bhayānaka Rasas* are the source of our pain and not of pleasure. According to them it is the skill of the artist and the actor in representing things in their natural form that attracts us towards drama and makes us admire it⁸⁷.

⁸⁶ *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* is a treatise on dramaturgy by Rāmacandra and Gunacandra, the former being a disciple of Hemacandra. The work is published in the Gaekwar Oriental Series, Baroda.

⁸⁷ "अतएव भयानकादिभिरुद्विजते समाजः । न नाम सुखास्वादादुद्वेगो घटते ॥ यत्पुनरेभिरपि चमत्कारो दृश्यते स रसास्वादत्रिरामे सति यथावस्थितवस्तुप्रदर्शकेन कविनटशक्तिकौशलेन ।"

—Quoted from *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* in *Phil. of Aesth. Pleasure*, p. 201.

This view is correct at least in this much that whenever there is a sympathetic response in the mind of the perceiver, the depiction of the pathetic emotion or the like does excite an unpleasant feeling in him. What are the feelings other than sympathetic, which are produced in the mind of the perceiver as a result of his perception of the poetic or dramatic phenomenon, we shall see in detail in the next chapter.

In the *Rīti* period of Hindī Literature we find a host of authors writing on *Rasa* and other subjects of poetics, but none of them has showed any ingenuity in explaining the process of the realization of *Rasa*. Truly speaking, they were poets and not critics and their contribution to literature consists in the beautiful stray stanzas which they composed to illustrate their definitions. Their explanation of *Rasa* is more or less a versified translation of the famous dictum of Bharata without any further elaboration³⁸. It was with the advent of the twentieth century, when prose had already grown to be the prominent medium of expression, that critical works on poetics began to appear in prose. But even such works were based on one or more of

³⁸ The following definitions of *Rasa* may be quoted here from some of the most important writers to support this statement ;

(i) "मिल विभाव अनुभाव पुनि, संचारी सुवनूप ।

व्यग करै थिर भाव जो, सोई रस सुखरूप ॥"

—Keśavadāsa, *Rasikpriyā*.

(ii) "जो विभाव अनुभाव अरु विभावारिनु करि होइ ।

थित को पूरन बासना, सुकवि कहत रस सोइ ॥"

—Deva, *Bhāvavilāsa*.

(iii) "मिलि विभाव अनुभाव पुनि, संचारिन के वृंद ।

परिपूरन थिर भाव यो सुरस्वरूप आनन्द ॥

ज्यो पय पाइ बिकार कछु ह्वै दधि होत अनुप ।

तैसे ही थिरभाव को बरनत कवि रसरूप ॥"

—Padamākara, *Jagadvinoda*.

(iv) "जहूँ विभाव अनुभाव विभिचारी देत प्रकास ।

थाई भावहि मोदमय सोई रस की रास ॥"

—Beni Pravīna, *Navarasa-Taranga*.

the existing Saṁskṛta works and displayed no originality worthy of its name. Dr. Śyāmasundara Dāsa while explaining and supporting the view of Abhinavagupta on *Rasa*-realization has gone to the extent of saying that the theory of *Rasa* cannot be understood on the basis of the western psychology,³⁹ and thus he has denied all possibilities of its reinterpretation and reformation making it static and final. Ayodhyā Sīmha Upādhyāya has observed with a great deal of gusto that all the *Rasas* afford nothing but pleasure to the perceiver on the strength of an illustration which his inventive mind could think of. He says that when we see a villain tortured, we do not sympathise with him in the least and feel only a sense of pleasure and satisfaction.⁴⁰ We have to admire, no doubt, the caution with which he has chosen this illustration, for nobody can dispute its truth with reference to his own experience. We do feel a sort of satisfaction when we see miseries befalling a character with whom our relations are antipathetic. But it is not always the villains who are tortured. Even men of noble character sometimes fall into the clutches of cruel fate and undergo the most heart-rending sufferings in the world of poetry and drama, just as they do in the world of reality. We do not know why a scholar of the eminence of Upādhyāya has evaded to tell us how even the perception of these distressing sufferings can be the source of our pleasure. Rāmacandra Śukla⁴¹ has given a new interpretation to *Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* (or generalisation) which is essentially his own. But he had not the audacity to admit it as his, and has wrongly attributed it to the Indian tradition of poetics. He has said that *Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* as conceived by Abhinavagupta cannot possibly be manifested, and according to him it consists in the presentation of the *Vibhāvas* etc. in such a form as they may arouse

³⁹ Vide *Sāhityālocana*, p 236.

⁴⁰ Vide R.K., pp. (Introduction) 31-33.

⁴¹ Vide his article *Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa aurā Vyaktivaicitryavāda* in *D. A. Grantha*.

in the minds of the perceivers those very feelings which they do in the minds of the characters of poetry. But he himself admits that the operation of *Sādhāranīkaraṇa* even in this sense of affecting oneness (*Tādātmya*) of the perceiver and the *Āśraya* (or the dramatic character) is a very rare happening when he maintains that the *dramatis personae* according to their individual dispositions are respected, loved, and hated by the perceivers. When this happens, says he, the perceiver does not find himself identified with the *Āśraya*, and he feels an emotion other than that of the *Āśraya*. This relish he calls inferior to that which one has when he feels identified with the characters of poetry. But as regards the cause of this distinction of superiority and inferiority between the two sorts of relishes he has totally left us in the dark.

Dr. Bhagavan Das⁴² has given us a peculiar interpretation of *Rasa* which, according to him, consists in our recollection of an emotion which we have experienced: *Bhāvasmaranam Rasaḥ* as he puts it. He says: When two men are fighting, they do not realize any *Rasa*; but having stopped fighting if one of them says to the other, "Will you fight even now?" he experiences *Raudra Rasa* or the furious sentiment. Here he has taken *Rasa* in the sense of emotion, for the man, who remarks as above after he has already fought, does not realize any *Rasa* or relish, but only becomes conscious of his emotion of anger. *Rasa* with this interpretation is entirely disconnected with the problem of the relish of poetry, and, therefore, in the present section of this work we need not enter into any further discussion on this view of Dr. Bhagavan Das.

Allardyce Nicoll in his work entitled *The Theory of Drama* has quoted explanations on Tragic Relief or Tragic Pleasure from a number of European scholars. He himself has established at the outset that the function of all poetry—even that of tragedy—is to please in

⁴² Vide his article *Rasa-Mīmāṃsā* in *D. A. Grantha*.

raising the question, "If tragedy thus deals with misery what pleasure do we gain from it?"⁴³ A complete system of *Rasa* like that of the east was not built up in the west, and, therefore, the problem of the relish of poetry has not been discussed there with reference to the *Vibhāvas* and *Anubhāvas* etc. in a general way. But the depiction of all the human emotions, painful and pleasurable alike, was there in the literature of the west, as it is in the literatures of all the countries. Believing, consciously or unconsciously, in the Hedonistic theory of art and finding people taking interest even in the representation of the painful emotions on the stage the western genius, not very much unlike the eastern, set itself to find out the secrets of the pleasure afforded by such pathetic representations. The scope of this essay does not permit to deal with all the views referred to by Nicoll in detail. We shall consider here very briefly only the most important ones.

Earliest is the theory of Katharsis (purgation) advanced by Aristotle and it "affirms that by arousing pity and fear tragedy affects a purgation of these and kindred emotions".⁴⁴ By Purgation P. Pañcapāgeśa Śāstrī understands the extraction of its painful element from an emotion. "The reason", continues he, "why this purging is effected only in the world of poetry and drama and not in the world of actuality is that in the first things are idealised".⁴⁵ Interpreting this theory in this light Śāstrī has taken it very close to the theory of Abhinavagupta of which he himself is a great champion. As we have already known the element of truth in the theory of Abhinavagupta, we need not take up here the whole discussion afresh.

The next theory which we shall consider here ascribes the function of purging away the painful

⁴³ *Theory of Drama*, p. 119.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁴⁵ *Phil. of Aesth. Pleasure*, p. 203.

element from a tragedy to its poetical effect. "There is", says this theory, "the presence of the creative artistic power of the dramatist himself, and, particularly in the Greek and Elizabethan plays, the rhythm of the verse, to leave away our minds for a moment from the gloomy depths of the tragedy"⁴⁶ While examining the first part of the first postulation of Bhaṭṭanāyaka we had seen that the graces and beauties of expression and presentation have nothing in them to aid any of the functions attributed to the power of *Bhāvakatva*. Here it may be remarked once again with emphasis that whenever the artist's selection of the rhythm, melody and diction would be consistent with the spirit of the tragedy he is producing, it must intensify, and not nullify or even minimize, the pathetic effect of his creation.

Next is the theory of Schopenhauer whose view has been represented by Nicoll as follows :

"Tragedy is the form of dramatic art in which this serious and miserable side of life is emphasized. All men vaguely, and wise men consciously, realize the utter vanity of living, and in tragedy we are given prime representation of the worthlessness of all things".⁴⁷

But here we are not told what pleasure we gain in realizing the utter vanity of living. Besides, *vanity of vanities* is not the emotion which results in the mind of all men, or even in that of all wise men, upon the witnessing of a tragedy. Particularly an Indian mind trained in the teachings of *Gītā* can never consider life to be worthless

Schlegel seems to have approached the problem more accurately. "When", says he,

"We contemplate the relations of our existence to the extreme limit of possibilities, .. when we consider that we are exposed in our weak and helpless state to struggle with the immeasurable powers of nature, ..

⁴⁶ *Theory of Drama*, p. 132.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

then every mind which is not dead to feeling must be overpowered by an inexpressible melancholy, against which there is no other protection than the consciousness of a destiny soaring above this earthly life..... We thus see that tragic poetry has its foundation in our nature, and to a certain extent we have answered the question why we are fond of mournful representations, and even find something consoling and elevating in them".⁴⁸

Schlegel is himself conscious of the incompleteness of his explanation, and he is honest enough to admit that he has answered the question only to a certain extent. The incompleteness of his explanation is two-fold. It is true that to take interest in the woeful tales of others is inherent in human nature. Yet during the perception of a tragedy it is not always that a perceiver really sympathizes with the *dramatis personae*. In spite of his close relationship with the world of feeling if the perceiver remains throughout fully conscious of the fact that the object of his perception is merely a representation, he shall relish it without himself being affected by the emotions depicted therein. Moreover, even when his consciousness that what he is perceiving is not real passes to the region of subconscious and he is sympathetically touched with the miseries of the characters moving before him, he need not necessarily feel that dejection and helplessness which he has been assumed to feel by Schlegel. This view, however, is unique in admitting that it is not pleasure which is produced in the mind of the spectator of a tragedy.

Timocles comes forward with another explanation and he declares that the spectator "at a tragic performance is reminded that all his calamities, which *seem greater than mortal man has ever borne*, have happened to others, and so he bears his trials more easily".⁴⁹ Timocles seems to be believing that man feels a sort of satisfaction or consolation when he finds others in misery.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 134.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 134-135.

But this is opposed to experience. Even in real life this kind of satisfaction is felt very rarely. In the world of poetry and drama, firstly, a perceiver does not meet with only those calamities which have befallen him, and, secondly, when he meets with the calamities he has undergone, he feels all the more sympathetic towards the unfortunate victim. Thus the theory of Timocles is doubly erroneous.

The last view which we shall consider here is that of Fontenelle and is expressed in his work entitled *Reflexions sur la Poetique*. According to this view pleasure and pain are sisters, and in meeting with one we discern the form of the other. "May be this psychologically is true", says Nicoll, "but it is difficult to agree that when an assembled audience in the theatre is swayed and torn by the brilliant performance of some terrible tragedy it extracts real pleasure in this way out of the painful scenes".⁵⁰ To this criticism I would add that the audience extracts pleasure from the pathetic representations neither in this way nor necessarily in any other, and that when it is actually swayed and torn at the spectacle, what it extracts is real pain.

Having considered the views on the subject of the relish of poetry of a number of the distinguished scholars of the orient and the occident, of the present and the past, I now proceed to put forward my own studies on the subject. But before coming to the main theme it is but proper that I should explain how and why I do not consider pleasure to be the end of all poetry, and why a startling majority of critics has believed it to be such even against experience. I have already pointed out in the beginning of this essay that the cause of this misguided belief is not the actual pleasurable experience of the perception of all poetic phenomena by anybody; it is rather the wrong pre-supposition that we undertake to do only pleasing

⁵⁰ *Theory of Drama*, p. 135.

things. The tears secreted during the perception of a heart-rending tragedy were realized by nobody to be the tears of joy, but they were inferred to be so, because, if they were not, it was thought, why should the perceiver have at all gone to the theatre voluntarily? Let us, therefore, first of all see that even in actual life it is not only the pleasure-giving activities that we voluntarily indulge in. Human mind is a complex phenomenon and its tendencies are not altogether egoistic. A man takes interest not only in himself, but also in other men, in their joys and sorrows. If these joys and sorrows are of such men as are closely related to us, our concern with them is very deep; but even if they are of such men as are totally unknown to us, our interest is still there with them. A father listens with the greatest possible interest to the sad story of the distressing sufferings of his darling daughter who comes to him bereft of her husband. The tale which he hears affords him nothing but intense pain, and yet he hears it and hears it voluntarily and anxiously. But, suppose, the girl who comes to him is not his daughter but a girl not known to him previously. Even in this case if the man is a gentleman and if he does not doubt that the girl has come to cheat him, will he not listen to her tale patiently and sympathetically and will he not shed tears—tears of real pain of course—at her tragic and irremediable plight? The answer must be in the affirmative. Let us take a simpler illustration. On a road an accident occurs. A handsome youth has been struck down by a rash motor-driver. His body is mutilated and is stained with dirt and blood presenting a pathetic and loathsome spectacle. Passers-by hear of this unpleasant accident and gather at the scene. They come voluntarily, and, it is obvious, they do not come to realize any pleasure. When they see the unfortunate victim cut short of his life in the bloom of his youth they feel sorry over the mishap; and when they learn that he is leaving a young widow behind whom he had married only a month ago, their sympathy and pain are still greater. And in spite of

all the pain that they are having they are still ready to welcome and to hear with interest any other detail about him, even though it may add to their sympathetic sorrow.

Thus we find that it is in the nature of man to take interest even in the affairs of others and to feel pain in sympathy if the others are in distress. He may make himself indifferent to the pleasures of others ; but he can hardly ever afford to turn a deaf ear to their miseries, though he knows full well that his association with the miseries of anybody will make him morose. He voluntarily invites this pain because his nature is such. If he finds or hears of a catastrophe, the like of which he has never known, befalling an unfortunate person, he painfully feels interested in it, because he cannot avoid to know what is misery ; if the calamity is such as he has observed even previously ; his sympathetic interest is all the more in its repetition ; and if he himself has undergone the suffering, laid down with which now he sees another person, his interest, sympathy and pain are all greatest, because he himself knows in this case the thrilling agonies and pangs which accompany that suffering. Here it may be objected that certain sights may be so pathetic and so horrible that a person may not like to witness them. The objection is true and must be admitted. But we shall see presently that even in the world of poetry and drama such scenes are not always relished by everybody.

So the proposition, on the basis of which pleasure was supposed to be the end of all poetry is proved to be wrong. Now we shall see how it is not pleasure that we realize at the sympathetic perception of the representation of an unpleasant situation. Let us import here the two illustrations of the widowed girl and the motor accident we have just examined. If the pen directed by the masterly mind of an artist has been able to depict the woes and miseries of the un-

fortunate girl in a picturesque language, and if the skill of the directors and the actors has been able to represent the accident on the screen in a realistic way, the sympathetic emotional reaction in the mind of the perceiver can for no reason be of a quality different from that of the reaction which was evoked when the scenes were real and not fictitious. It is, however, possible not to have a sympathetic response at all, for to have such a response it is necessary that the knowledge that the object of perception is a mere representation should shift from the focus of consciousness to its margin.⁵¹ But when this shifting has once taken place, nothing is left there to differentiate between the experiences of reality and its representation. Rather the experience of the representation is more intense than the experience of the reality, because our knowledge of the former is complete and in its context while that of the latter is not so. Let us explain this. In the case of the unfortunate girl really appearing before the old man, there is, firstly, the probability that he may doubt that the girl has come to cheat him. But even if this does not happen, it can never be possible for the girl, secondly, to acquaint the old man with all the aspects and details of her miseries. But when the character of this girl is taken up by a novelist and is presented before us, we feel as if we have been with the poor girl since the dawn of her life. We know how once she was rich and prosperous, how she married and lived happily with her husband who was gentle and affectionate, then how the cruel fate snatched away from her her most precious possession, how afterwards

⁵¹ "The focus and margin together make up the 'field of consciousness'. If I am sitting in a railway station waiting-room, reading a book which is interesting but not difficult, there may be continual noise from persons passing in and out and talking, from the arrival and departure of trains, from the street outside, and not only hearing but all senses are appealed to; but while I am intent upon the book, the ideas suggested by the printed words are in the focus of consciousness, and all the other experiences in the margin".

—*Elements of Psych.*, p. 77.

she was ill-treated by the other members of the family and was eventually made to leave the house, how and with what difficulties she protected herself from the ill eyes of the vicious world, and, lastly, how she has been roaming about with no shed to sleep under in the nights, with no clothes to guard herself from the biting blasts of the winter and going without food for days together. When we know all this from the graphic descriptions of the novelist, when the doubt that she might be there to deceive us does not attend us in the least, and when the knowledge that the tale is not real has passed to the margin of consciousness, obviously our sympathy with the girl will be far greater than that of the good old man before whom the girl had actually appeared, and consequently we shall realize a greater pain and feel a deeper sorrow. Let us now take up the other illustration also. The spectators of the accident had been able to know only this much that the deceased person was a youth and that he was wedded a month since. But the producer of the picture will tell us more. We shall see on the screen that the youth, who thus met an untimely death, was running to call a doctor for his wife who was ailing and who had been begging of him not to leave her as she was apprehending an evil beforehand. We shall further see that when the heart-breaking news reaches the ears of the lovely little thing, who had not yet attained full womanhood and whose visions of a long and happy life with her husband were falsified like a dream, the unlucky creature is mad with inexpressible agony. And when we shall see all this and a hundred other things, our heart will melt and our eyes will shed tears profusely. These tears and this melting of the heart can be regarded as connected with pleasure only by him who has no faith in his own experience and who relies for his knowledge either on an authority or on inference based on even false propositions.

This is how pleasure cannot be considered to be the end of all poetry. It has not been so considered

in practice even by others. If a generalisation as contemplated by Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta were possible and if pleasure had been the only resultant of our perception of poetry, nobody should have felt disgusted at the obscene erotic scenes, the doctors should not have advised their patients suffering from palpitation of heart not to see grim tragedies and other horrible representations, and the sanatorium authorities should not have passed only such literature to the consumptives as may inspire hope and be free from the spirit of melancholy. As a matter of fact it has been universally admitted that it is not pleasure that is always realized through the perception of the poetic phenomena ; but the genius of those who have tackled the subject of the relish of poetry in its technical aspect was blunted by the strong stone-wall of the great heritage and tradition of the Indian poetics in particular and by the misguided belief in the Hedonism in general.

What then is the secret of the relish of poetry ? It consists in our interest to perceive it, and I have indicated it already in the introductory paragraph of this chapter. But now is the proper occasion to understand its implications fully. James Drever describes Interest as a "feeling of worthwhileness".⁵² "The greater the interest", say Mellone and Drummond, "(whether painful or pleasurable) the greater the attention may be regarded as a self-evident truth".⁵³ According to McDougall "a man is said to be interested in a certain object or topic, even though he may be thinking of other things", because "if he is interested in it, his attention can readily be drawn to it and, when so drawn, will usually be sustained and keen, or, as we say, concentrated".⁵⁴ Thus it is our interest in a particular phenomenon that attracts us towards it and keeps us clung to it ; and we feel that our attach-

⁵² *Instinct in Man*, p. 130.

⁵³ *Elements of Psych.*, p. 131.

⁵⁴ *Outline of Psych.*, p. 274.

ment with it is worthwhile, even though it may 'afford us pain. Our interest in poetry means that our mind is so disposed that whenever⁸⁵ a poetic phenomenon is presented before it, it shall voluntarily tend to bring it into the focus of its attention, and when the phenomenon is so brought into the focus of attention, it shall stick to it and relish it. But the poetic phenomenon may be there in the focus of our attention even when we are not interested in it, as in the case of a student who has to read a poem, whether he wills or not, to prepare for an examination. In such a state of affairs we shall not relish the piece at all and our attention will tend to slide away from it.⁸⁶

The terms Interest and Relish are almost synonymous with each other with reference to poetry. Interest is comparatively a permanent disposition of the mind and becomes Relish when it is in action, and Relish is nothing but a manifestation of Interest. If a poetical piece interests us, we must relish it, and if we relish its perception, it must interest us. A caution, however, is necessary here. Poetry, as we have observed in the first chapter of this section, is a subjective phenomenon and it cannot be so called unless it is actually taken interest in as such. So interest in poetry should

⁸⁵ *Whenever* should not be misinterpreted to mean *at any odd time*, whether or not we are in the proper mood and have the proper leisure to perceive poetry.

⁸⁶ The tendency of the attention to slide away is weakened if even the derived interest in the perception of poetry is of a very high degree. To relish poetry means to perceive it with genuine interest. Genuine or immediate interest in poetry should be differentiated from the derived interests in it. If poetry is perceived because we are interested in the end to which its perception would lead us, or if it is perceived out of mere curiosity to see what is there, or because we expect to find there something which we may relish, our interest in the perception is derived and not genuine. While we perceive poetry with derived interest, we cannot relish it unless genuine interest is also created during its perception.

be taken to mean a permanent mental disposition of attachment, not towards any composition which objectively goes by the name of poetry, but towards only such compositions as may actually interest a particular perceiver as poetry.

I had pointed out that the theories on the realization of *Rasa* suffer from this common defect that they do not tell us how and why we relish even such poetry as does not come under the denotation of *Rasa*. The theory which has been established here is obviously free from this defect, for it explains our relish of poetry of any kind or description making our interest in it the cause of our attraction towards it. Why a particular person is interested to perceive only a particular class of composition or representation is the question which can be answered only by referring to the heredity and the environment of that person. But it is not within the scope of this work to study any number of concrete and particular cases in this light. I shall, however, attempt a classification of the feelings which constitute and the factors which determine our poetic relish or poetic interest in the next two chapters. But as henceforward the term Interest has not been used, it is necessary to note here that the elements of mood and understanding, talked of in the fourth chapter of this section as determining the form of our poetic relish, should be eliminated with reference to *poetic interest* which is a permanent mental disposition.

CHAPTER III

COMPONENT FEELINGS¹ OF POETIC RELISH

Poetic Relish is a mental phenomenon and is composed of the feelings which are evoked in the mind of the perceiver as a psychological reaction to his perception of poetry. Feelings thus evoked cannot always correspond with the emotion depicted in poetry. Besides, poetry does not solely consist in the depiction of one emotion or the other. Nature-painting and description of a cultural and social milieu may also be the independent subjects of poetry. But whether or not the subject-matter of poetry is a feeling or an emotion, its perception must evoke in the mind of the perceiver certain feelings. We shall see in this chapter what are the different types into which these feelings can be classified.

First of all there are *Sympathetic* feelings² which can be evoked only when the knowledge that the object of our perception is fictitious shifts to the margin of our consciousness. These feelings are not very much different from our those sympathetic feelings which we experience in the world of reality. The only mark of distinction is this that while we see a man being whipped on the screen we do not run to save him, for the consciousness that what we are perceiving is

¹ The term *Feeling* has been used here in its widest sense in which it is synonymous with any mental experience. For a fuller discussion on the meaning of this term refer to the first chapter of the second section.

² The theory of *Rasa* as exposed by Abhinavagupta and his followers seems to recognize only this class of feelings as the basis of poetic relish. Their conception of even these feelings was very crude for they identified the personality of the interested perceiver with that of the hero. (Vide S.D., p. 77).

merely a picture and not a reality is there in the margin and is called to the focus the very moment the idea of running occurs in the mind. Thus though we never actually run to save the person from being whipped, yet it cannot be doubted that we do, sometimes at least, feel like saving him. It should be carefully noted that to feel sympathy does not mean to feel the exact emotion of the person or the character with whom sympathy is felt. When we see a person in misery, what we mostly feel is pity and not miserableness. Similarly fear is felt not when we perceive a terrified character but when we find a noble character making some such blunder as may lead him to a tragic end. To illustrate, in the Hindī picture *Jhūlā* an anxious fear of this sort is felt at the scenes in which Sureśa-Rameśa (Aśoka Kumāra) and Gītā (Lilā Caṭanisa) are shown to be misunderstood by each other, the misunderstanding of one being not known to the other, for it is with these scenes that the romance of the hero and the heroine takes a tragic turn. Another important thing about these feelings is this that they can be made to disappear by bringing the fact that the object of perception is merely an imaginary creation of an artist to the focus of consciousness. Sometimes to get rid of the gloomy mood and to stop the secretion of tears it is useful to bring into prominence even wilfully the consciousness of the fictitious nature of the tragical poetic phenomenon under perception. I myself have to do it very often, for both as a reader and as a spectator I feel watery in my eyes at the perception of the least tragic phenomenon.

Allied to that of the *Sympathetic* is the class of the *Antipathetic* feelings^a which have in common with the former ones their two characteristics. They too

^a Rāmacandra Śukla recognized the experience of this class of feelings also in addition to that of the feelings of the previous class during the perception of a poetic phenomenon. Vide his article *Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa aurā Vyaktivaicitryavāda* in *D. A. Grantha*.

can be experienced only when the perceiver is not immediately conscious of the fact that what he is perceiving is not real, and they also can be made to vanish by becoming directly conscious of the true nature of the object of perception. But while *Sympathetic* feelings are called forth by the characters who are noble or viciously oppressed and with whom our relations are sympathetic, *Antipathetic* feelings are generally evoked by ignoble and villainous characters with whom our relations develop to be antipathetic. We feel only hatred and anger when we find the villain trying to win the love of the heroine by all fair and foul means, and laugh when he is slapped by the dauntless maiden chaste to her real lover. A sort of satisfaction is felt when a cruel oppressor or a tyrant falls into the grip of ill-fate or is vanquished by an intrepid and virtuous hero. Sometimes antipathetic feelings can be experienced even for no fault of a character. People who feel disgust at the erotic scenes and towards amorous descriptions for the simple reason that they are erotic and amorous are not extremely rare to be found. Likewise it is not very difficult to discover such people as feel abhorrence when the idea of renunciation is depicted.*

The third is the class of the *Recollectional* or *Reminiscential* feelings. We know that human life with its varied vicissitudes and diverse problems is included in the subject-matter of poetry, and also that we as human beings have lived a life and have gathered in our minds the latent impressions of our past experiences.

* A. F. Shand in *The Foundations of Character*, page 60, has described *antipathetic emotions* thus:—"... The sight of joy expressed on the face of the hated one awakens anguish, and the sight of sorrow, a hideous joy; and the expression of his fear awakens no responsive fear, but the hope that what he fears will be accomplished; and the expression of his hope awakens no hope, but the fear that what he hopes will be accomplished. The expression of his anger alone arouses a responsive anger; but one which is aroused against him and not on his behalf."

It is not improbable while perceiving the poetic phenomenon to meet with such situations as we ourselves have undergone ; and when we actually meet with such situations, our own latent impressions are brought into the focus of consciousness, our memories of the past are revived. When this happens our feelings remain no more merely sympathetic or even antipathetic, we rather feel a genuine emotion as our own fundamental determinants (*Ālambana Vibhāvas*) become available to us with the help of our memory.⁵ But it is not necessary that pleasurable situations should always remind us of our pleasant experiences and the unpleasant ones of the unpleasant. When an affectionate but unfortunate mother, who has lost her lovely darling child and who still hears the reverberations of its sweet voice in her courtyard, sees a woman on the screen merrily playing with her beautiful baby, she is reminded, no doubt, of the delight-giving activities of her own child. But the recollection of those activities now affords her only intense pain, for it is stained with the sorrow of the death of the child. In an analogous way if the sufferings of a character on the stage remind a perceiver of the sufferings of one of his worst antagonists, it can well be expected with reason that the reminiscence of the perceiver would afford him only pleasure and not pain.

Feelings pertaining to *Curiosity*⁶ form the next

⁵ "What is true of perceptual process, holds, *mutis mutandis*, of ideational. On the perceptual plane, the actual presence of a dangerous situation excites fear ; On the ideational, the ideal prevision of a similar situation has a similar effect. All the general characteristics of emotion, which we have already enumerated, apply equally to perceptual and ideational process".—G. F. Stout, *Manual of Psych.*, p. 699.

⁶ These feelings must not be confused with the curiosity which we have to read either the forthcoming work of a celebrated author, or even an already published work which is much talked of in the literary circles but which has not yet appeared before us. Such a curiosity is not a constituent part of the poetic relish, for it is not evoked as a reaction to the perception of the poetic phenomenon.

class. Such feelings are experienced in abundance when we are reading a detective novel, the relish of which consists almost solely in our curiosity to know how a mysterious murder or a cautious theft is traced to its original perpetrators. Every composition or representation which has a plot or a story must excite some curiosity in the mind of the perceiver, though its degree may range from very low to very high according to the natures of the excitor and the excited. It should be carefully borne in mind that the greater the importance of such feelings in the relish of a poetic phenomenon, the less it would be relished if perceived a second time, for in subsequent perceptions the feelings of curiosity cannot be experienced as what shall happen next is already known to the perceiver. This is why the reading of a novel or a story is generally not repeated unless the memory of the first reading has totally faded away, or unless there are some such qualities in the piece as may excite even other types of feelings which constitute our poetic relish.

The fifth class is that of the *Reflectional* feelings or of the feelings which set us to think about a problem connected with some aspect of life. Poetry, drama, novel and short story all present before us varied pictures of the complex phenomenon of humanity. Relishable perception of literature easily acquaints us with the problems with which we meet at every step while treading on the uneven path of life, and very often we begin to reflect upon them. When we see an unfortunate accomplished girl committing suicide to save her poor father from the burden of a heavy debt which he must take upon himself to afford the dowry he is required to pay to get his daughter married, we may grow critical towards this evil conventional practice of our society and may either feel a strong urge to root it out or brood over the problem to find an effective solution to it. Evocation of such feelings and the like has become very frequent in the modern times with the growth of such species in contemporary litera-

ture as problem and satire plays and novels, which either suggest to the perceiver a social, political or economical problem or ridicule a prevalent malpractice of the society.

The sixth and the last class of the feelings evoked by the perception of poetry is that of *Critical* feelings. At the time of experiencing these feelings it is in the focus of the consciousness of the perceiver that the object of his perception is a poetic phenomenon. Feelings pertaining to appreciation and depreciation fall within this class. While going through a piece any graphic description, any vivid characterization or any expression of a noble sentiment may appeal to us and we may like it. In a similar way a description which is clumsy, a characterization which is confusing or an expressed sentiment which is ignoble may be disparaged by us. A particular arrangement of words, the use of a particular poetic figure or some such other thing may be sometimes felt by us as excellent or worthless. Often a suggestion for improvement of the nature *if it were like this it would have been better* occurs in our mind. All these feelings and the like constitute the class under discussion.

It will not be a digression to consider here the important factors which affect our critical feelings. The foremost is our study and knowledge of the existing critical literature and the principles on which it is based. A perceiver, who has studied the figures of speech and who recognizes them as embellishers of poetry, will appreciate a piece in which *Mudrāṅkārā* has been employed. Another perceiver with the knowledge of the poetic blemishes will detest a composition which is full of them. An unpsychological characterization in a novel will offend the reader if he happens to be a student of psychology. While reading *Sāketa* one may feel in it the want of one definite hero, because it has been poured in his ears several times that there should necessarily be a hero in every epic or drama.

Often, our critical feelings are substantially influenced by the ethical, social and political environment in which we live. If we detest to read an obscene passage and if we hate to see a naked, shameless and lustful erotic scene, it is not because it is our innate nature to do so, but because the moral milieu of our society in which we have been brought up is such. The cause of the abundance of the poems of national awakening in the first half of this century and of the fact that they have been actually relished and appreciated by the general public is chiefly to be ascribed to the advent of a new era of political thought and activities in this country.

Sometimes the critical feelings are governed also by the tendency that our knowledge may not be taken to be shallow and we may not be understood as keeping ourselves behind the times. This tendency is most common among the people whose knowledge is actually shallow, but who wish to show that it is not so. Among the people who regard *Rāmacaritamānasa* as the best epic in Hindī Literature there are only a few who have been actually absorbed in it while reading it and who have really discovered some such thing in it as may justify their estimation of it. Likewise there is no scarcity of such people as consider *Chāyāvāda* to be the best form of expression merely on account of its newness and on account of the fact that it is the form which preponderates in the contemporary literature, and not because they are actually swayed by any *Chāyāvādī* poem, or because they have been ever able to forget their meals during its perception.

Besides these factors which influence our critical feelings there are others which affect not only these critical feelings, but also all other types of feelings of which our poetic relish is composed. We have called these factors the *determining elements of poetic relish* and shall consider them in detail in the chapter that follows. The three factors enumerated and dis-

discussed above form merely a part of the sixth determining element (viz., Personality of the perceiver—his nature and taste) discussed in the next chapter, for they tell us how our taste is developed and formed by the external influences.

Every feeling that is evoked by our perception of literature must be one of the six types into which we have classified all such feelings. Our poetic relish as we experience it is made up of these feelings and is not something different from them—unworldly, inexpressible (*Ālaukika* and *Anirvacanīya* as held by Viśvanātha)⁷ or supersensuous (*Para-pratyakṣa-gamya* as held by Śyāmasundara Dāsa).⁸ Before concluding this chapter it is important to point out that during our perception of a poetic phenomenon it is not necessary that we should experience the feelings of all the six types. But one critical feeling or the other must always be evoked, whether or not those of any other types are experienced by the perceiver. It should also be noted that the feelings of the sympathetic and anti-sympathetic classes can be experienced only when the poetic phenomenon under perception deals with some emotion, the feelings pertaining to curiosity only when it tells a story and the reflectional feelings only when it suggests, satirises or deals with some problem or evil of the society.

⁷ Vide *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, chap. III.

⁸ Vide *Sāhityālocaṇa*, chap. on *Rasa*.

CHAPTER IV

DETERMINING ELEMENTS OF POETIC RELISH

By poetic felish I mean to convey all its component feelings which have been dealt with in detail in the preceding chapter. It is no wonder if the Samskrita scholars of poetics, who had so narrow a view about these feelings as to recognize but one class of them (viz., *Sympathetic*), did not give us any information about the elements which determine such feelings. And what could have been the ground for them to imagine any other determining element except the subject-matter when they regarded the represented emotion and its reaction in the mind of an interested perceiver as identical.

In the history of the Indian science of *Rasa* there has been a controversy about the person in whom *Rasa* exists or resides. It has been said to exist by some in a hero,¹ and by others even in an actor² instead of the perceiver. The reason of this difference of opinion is not to be sought in the psychological fact that there is difference in opinion and difference in taste, but in the traditional mistake which disregards the psychological difference in the mental dispositions of the hero, the actor and the perceiver. The view of those who thought that *Rasa* resides in the mind of the hero was plausible in this light that the depicted fundamental and excitant determinants (*Ālambana*, and *Uddīpana Vibhāvas*) and consequents (*Anubhāvas*) stand in direct relationship with the hero and not with the perceiver, and that the receptacle for the corresponding feeling (*Bhāva*) is also the mind of the hero. In a similar way if the expressions of an emotion in a successful actor, on account of their being very near to those

¹ As for instance by Bhaṭṭalollata.

² As for instance by Śaṅkuka.

of the hero,³ attracted a few critics to affirm the existence of *Rasa* in the actor, it should be admitted to be natural. Viśvanātha, who supposed that the personality of an interested perceiver makes itself identical with that of the hero, tried to differentiate between their experience by imagining the supernatural function of generalization (*Vibhāvana* or *Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*).⁴ But this attempt of his was outside the province of psychology, and hence it could not correct the mistake referred to above.

At the time of the operation of an emotion, there must exist its permanent state (*Sthāyībhāva*), determinants and consequents, for these elements have been recognized in one form or the other even by the modern psychologists.⁵ But while dealing with poetic relish we discover that these elements do not affect the relisher or perceiver of poetry in the way in which they affect the hero. Man is an intellectual and rational being. The subject-matter of poetry serves merely as a fundamental determinant (*Ālambana Vibhāva*) for the way in which he relishes poetry and in which its ideas and thoughts affect him. As an exciting object singly cannot determine the nature and shade of an emotion, so a piece of poetry cannot indicate even approximately the type of interest or relish which it shall afford to a particular reader. Assuming the perceiver of poetry as the receptacle (*Āśraya*) of poetic relish and the poetry which is relished as the fundamental determinant, our object is to find out in this essay the other elements

³ "Mr. Wm. Archer, who has made a very instructive statistical enquiry among the actors, says that the emotion of the part masters them whenever they play it well".—*Psych. J.*, chap. XXIV.


⁴ Vide *S.D.*, chap. III.

⁵ "Emotions are relatively fixed psychoses (instinct-feelings) [*Sthāyībhāvas*] coincident with corresponding fixed co-ordinates of instinctive activities [*Anubhāvas*] arising upon the presentation of determinate objective conditions [*Vibhāvas*]" .—H. R. Marshall, *Pain, Pleasure and Aesthetics*, chap. II. Matter between the Square brackets has been suggested by me,

which in conjunction with each other give a definite shape to the relish of poetry.

Though, it is true, the receptacle and the exciting object (*Ālambana Vibhāva*) of a feeling tell us little about the feeling itself, yet the importance of these elements is undebatable, for they serve as a basis to proceed on to discover others. The subject-matter of poetry, before it becomes the object of our perception, assumes some form of prose, verse, drama, story, etc., and, in addition to this, we can perceive it either as a reader, or as a listener, or as a spectator. The environment and atmosphere in which poetry is perceived and created also affects its relish. Coming to the perceiver we can never disregard his nature and taste. Then the perceiver is not always in the same mood, and it is doubtless that poetry cannot be relished in the same way in different moods. Lastly, without knowing how far and in what way a particular piece of poetry has been understood by a perceiver it is not possible for us to imagine accurately his relish (*Rasa*). The undernoted table will make this classification of the determining elements of poetic relish clear. In the pages to follow we shall deal with each of these elements separately and in some detail.

Determining Elements of Poetic Relish



Subject-matter,⁶ in spite of being like a skeleton bereft of all finish and show, is neither repulsive nor dreadful like it ; for sometimes its attraction, independent of its expression, is so forceful that it cannot be deemed negligible. Often, the mere subject of the story of Rāma is sufficient to make the devotees absorbed in itself. Maithilīśarana Gupta has said in the beginning of his *Sāketā* :

“राम, तुम्हारा चरित स्वयं ही काव्य है ;

कोई कवि बन जाय, सहज सम्भाव्य है ।”

(Rama, your deeds by themselves are poetry ; anybody may easily become a poet by depicting them.)

Even if Gupta were to say so out of simple modesty, nobody can doubt the psychological truth to which these lines refer. In the opinion of the critics who could detect specimen of the highest art in the sayings of Kabīra, which are destitute of all beauties and embellishments of language and form, the importance of the subject-matter is far greater than its external appearance. Tulsīdāsa himself, whose scholarship and knowledge of poetic technique is admitted by the majority of the literary critics, has given a very extraneous importance to the expression in comparison with matter. According to him the usefulness of the speech consists solely in singing the praises of the Lord.⁷ Besides this in the circle of the spectators of cinema we often hear a talk about the lovers of the tragic, comic or stunt pictures. This also indicates the formation of taste on the basis of the subject-matter.

But every subject-matter before becoming a part

⁶ Hegel, a German philosopher of the 19th century, believed that Art consists in beautiful contents alone.

⁷ “जदपि कवित रस एकउ नाही । राम प्रताप प्रगट एहि माही ॥
सोइ भरोस मोरे मन आवा । केहि न सुसंग बड़प्पनु पावा ॥”

× × × ×
“कवि कोविद अस हृदयँ विचारी । गावहि हरिजस कलिमल हारी ॥
कीन्हें प्राकृत जन गुन गाना । सिर धुनि गिरा लगत पछिताना ॥”

—The *Kalyāṇa, Mānāsāṅka*, pp. 68-69.

of our consciousness adopts a form⁸ and a style without which we cannot feel its existence at all. Prose, verse, figures of speech, language, arrangement of words, metre, rhythm, diction, drama, short story, novel, and epic etc. are the different aspects of that form or style; and each of these has its own use and importance in estimating the nature of the produced effect. Verse often impresses more than prose; but in the present times, along with the development in the types of creative literature, the necessity of prose has been greatly increased. We like neither writing nor reading a short story or a novel or a drama in verse. Though in Hindī and Samskrta poetics both there has been a separate school which makes the presence of the figures of speech in poetry categorical, yet at least so much must be acknowledged even from the psychological point of view that their proper use can enhance the beauty of any composition; nay, sometimes by their employment such an effect can be produced as man otherwise is not capable of. History has not yet forgotten that *Dhā*⁹ of Bihārī which could bring out his King from his amorous abode and could divert his attention towards the affairs of the state, and that couplet¹⁰ of the minister

⁸ Herbart, a German philosopher of the 19th century, thought that the essence of Art is all in the beauty of its form. Benedetto Croce, the famous Italian critic, maintains that content cannot be separated from form. "It is certain", says he in *Essence of Aesthetic*, chapter II, p. 43, "that when a thought is really thought, the words run through our whole organism, soliciting the muscles of our mouth and ringing internally in our ears". That his contention is not teneble is evident from our discussion which shows content and form as two distinct elements in determining the form of the poetic relish.

⁹ "नहिं पराग, नहिं मधुर मधु, नहिं विकास इहि काल ।
अली कली ही सो वैध्या, आगे कौन हवाल ॥"

—*Bihārī-Bodhanī*, p. 126.

¹⁰ "कसे न माद कि दीगर ब तेगे नाज कुशी
मगर कि जिंदा कुनी खल्क रा ब बाज कुशी ।"

—*Gadya-Ratnāvalī*, p. 131.

(Nobody has survived the sword of your look; now let you remassacre the dead by bringing them back to life.)

of Muhammad Shah which impelled Nadir Shah to withdraw his order of general massacre at Delhi. To produce the desired mood in the perceiver it is necessary for the language to follow its sense. Especially strong and powerful feelings can never be aroused by feeble language. Similarly all metres and all dictions are not equally suited to convey all emotions. Several Hindī and Saṁskṛta scholars have classified metres on the basis of *Rasas* and attempts of this sort are generally scientific. Short story, novel and drama, etc. have each a flavour of their own which can be termed as short-story-flavour (*Kahānī-rasā*), novel-flavour (*Upānyasa-rasa*) and drama-flavour (*Nāṭaka-rasa*) etc. It is why the novel *Grāmīna-Samāja* and the drama *Rāma-Nāṭaka* of Śarat make no repetition to the interested readers in spite of their having been written on the same plot.

From the view point of the use of the sense-organs poetry can be relished in three different ways : through reading a manuscript or a printed book, through hearing a recitation, and through looking at the screen or the stage. Each of these ways has its own methods to increase the effect and to intensify the experience of poetry. The beautiful hand in a manuscript renders it more valuable in the eyes of a reader. Good printing, fine paper, attractive binding, and up-to-date get-up create some interest in a work by themselves. The endeavour to bring out a book, which is to be submitted either for a prize¹¹ or in an examination,¹² in its best form is an example of this psychological truth. At poet-gatherings the poems that are most applauded

¹¹ The first deLuxe editions of *Dulāre-Dohāvalī* and *Citrarekhā* were brought out, probably, as they were meant to be submitted for the *Deva-Puraskāra*.

¹² Dr. Dhīrendra Varmā once, while talking about his thesis *La Langue Braj*, remarked that though the works of this nature are generally published in bold type and with fine get-up, yet he himself had to look for a very small type for his thesis with a view to reduce the cost of publication.

are very often those which are recited in an enchanting melody. A composition full of pathos cannot extract tears from our eyes unless the music of the tone of its reciter be an echo of weeping. The description of a dreadful and thrilling scene can paralyse us only if the sound of the every word that it contains reverberates in the same fashion. The attraction of the stage and the screen depends upon the natural acting and the successful and proportionate harmonisation of their other devices. It would not be a digression if I mention in this context that the immediate effect of listening to a well-recited poem is more marked than that of reading it, and that of witnessing a successful acting is still greater, be it not so lasting. The attraction of the general public towards the poetry of Baccana and its imitation by many a adolescent poet was observed only after they had once heard him. In a similar way Bhagavatī Prasāda Bājapeyī, a well known figure in Hindī Literature, could take pride in copying the phrase *Hama xusā hue*¹³ in the dignified tone of Alaxander; and Sohanalāla Dvivedī was interested to repeat over and over again the line *Jīte deśa hamārā*¹⁴ from a cinema-song.

The intensity of an emotional effect is greatly heightened in a favourable environment. My friend Nirankāra Deva Sevaka once recited a poem at a function held in Bareilly College to accord farewell to Prof. Rāmāśraya Miśra. It is yet fresh in my memory that on hearing that poem I with most of the other listeners could not check secretion of tears. Afterwards when I read that poem again without its former surroundings, but remembering them pretty well, I was struck with wonder to find that not to speak of tears at all, even a slight pathetic feeling could not run across the heart. Without a clear background of the environment the emotional effect of any lyric or detached stanza (*Muktaka Racanā*), however complete and elaborate

¹³ Uttered by Alaxander in the Hindī picture *Sikandara*.

¹⁴ The first line of a song of *Sikandara*.

be the synthesis of the different constituents of *Rasa* in it, will be most insignificant. This is why the '*Chāyā-vādī*' poetry of modern Hindī, in spite of its being accompanied by a world of misery and pathos, is not able to command even an atom of the sympathy of the reader. I have never observed even a shadow of wateriness in the eyes of the most sentimental readers while going through *Āmsū* (=tears) of Jayaśaṅkara Prasāda. A narrative poem (*Prabandha Kāvya*) in comparison with a detached one is very much less dependent on the external circumstances for its emotional effect. The environment favourable to its spirit is created within it by the author himself. The most pathetic portion of *Jhūlā*, a Hindī picture, as it was experienced by myself and many others whom I happened to question, is the scene in which Gītā (Līlā Citanisa) while looking at the picture of Sureśa-Rameśa (Aśoka Kumāra) hears the radio singing *Mere bichure hue sāthī terī yāda satāve*. Handkerchiefs make their appearance in the greatest number when a reference, which indicates her own position, is made to the picture of the separated partner in the line *Phira bhī yaha tasvira tumhārī hama ko tarasāve*. Without being acquainted with the context, of which we are aware after having seen the picture upto this point, this song may give us a little amusement, but can never affect us with compassion. Mob-psychology has been studied in the west as an independent subject. It is very often noticed that the emotional effect of anything is more marked on a mob than it is on an individual in aloofness. An enthusiastic speech, if given in the presence of only one person, cannot so much infuse him with spirit as it would do him, along with many others, if made before a large crowd. Sometimes a poem recited among the applauses of a number of hearers excites a feeling of admiration in us, more distinct than that which it would if we hear it individually.

The environment in which an artist creates his art, if we take it into consideration, forms an important

factor in determining our relish.¹⁵ The royal road of the relish of poetry is distracted by the self-inconsistencies, difference of ideals, disharmony of thoughts, blemishes in expression and lack of truthfulness which we come across at every step during the perception of any composition. To tread over that road smoothly is needed that chariot of considerateness by which having a better regard for the individuality of the author we may look upon his work from his point of view, by which we may not attempt to examine the social and political currents, the poetical conventions (*Kavisamayās* or *Kaviprasiddhis*)¹⁶ and the literary ideals of his age with the standards of our time, and by which we may extend our utmost sympathy to him ignoring, as far as possible, his shortcomings and keeping in view his excellences. Here this fact should not be lost sight of that the movements of this chariot of considerateness are not limitless, and they cannot continue for long unless energized by the sparkling genius of the author. If the perceiver is a well-read intellectual, even the absence of originality in a composition makes his relish flavourless. Perhaps it is for the want of any extraordinary genius and originality that we find no mention of the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Rādheshyāma Kathāvācāka in the pages of the histories of Hindī Literature; though as far as the emotional effect is concerned, my own eyes have watered at several places while reading it.

According to the authors of *Sāhityadarpaṇa* and *Agṇipurāṇa* those rare persons, who are endowed with sinless souls and *Vāsnākhya Saṁskāras* (Latent Impressions of the feelings known as *Sthāyībhāvas*); and who are only one and two in thousands and millions, are

¹⁵ "Nobody can perceive a work completely unless he is closely acquainted with its social and religious background, and literary and national traditions".—A. Baramikov, *On Different Perceptions of Literary Facts*, in *D. A. Grantha*.

¹⁶ Vide the chapter entitled *Kaviprasiddhyām* in *Hindī Sāhitya kī Bhūmika* by Hazārī Prasāda Dvivedī.

fit to relish poetry.¹⁷ But it is not our end to veil poetry with such theoretical and unrealizable ideals. Our view point is psychological and practical, and any person who relishes any form of creative literature or its representation in any way is the object of our study and his experience is the phenomenon for our observation. Considering the question in this light we shall have to give the differences in individuality and taste of the perceivers of poetry their due importance, because in determining the form of poetic relish their role is very prominent. Though the principle of difference in taste and opinion has always been admitted by the intelligentsia of this country, yet unfortunately in the field of literary criticism we find people pitying each other's talent and understanding and sometimes using even abusive language on account of their differences in criterion and in its application. What reason other than the want of morality in all walks of our life can be ascribed to this reprehensible tendency? The points of view for relishing poetry are so many in number that it is simply impossible to count them ever. Each perceiver of poetry has something to demand of it, and the mystery of his relish consists in the gratification of his this demand. *What is his this demand?*—on the basis of the answer to this question we can, with some precision, assign him to the class of well-educated citizens or uneducated townsmen; but to measure the intelligence and understanding of the different members of the same class is beyond our capabilities. If Tulasīdāsa is not recognized as the best poet in Hindī Literature by someone, if the poetry of Kēśava is nothing but the laboured and artificial arrangement of words to the other, if the depiction of the agony of separation by Sūradāsa is most unnatural to another, then to consider any of these a fool for his individual taste and choice will indeed be our own greatest folly.¹⁸ Our aim ought to be to find out,

¹⁷ Vide S. D., chapter III, and *Agnipurāna*, chapter CCCXXXVII.

¹⁸ The readers are not to make out from these lines my view about any author.

as far as possible, the extents to which in the formation of taste in a particular individual his environment and innate tendencies (or the make up of his organs of consciousness)¹⁹ are separately responsible.

A very insignificant phenomenon sometimes changes our mood which, in its turn, entirely reforms our experience of the perception of poetry. Just this moment Mr. X was pleasing himself with the maddening erotic scenes on the stage. But suddenly he remembers his lovely and affectionate wife who is now no more. All that world of love and romance which was glittering before his eyes now becomes dreadful to him like a volcano and torments him like the simultaneous stings of a hundred scorpions. Our mood is our inner environment; and, in order to enable us to relish a piece of poetry in its right perspective, it is as necessary for it to be favourable as it is for the external environment about which enough has already been said. Māhatmā Gāndhī had once written to Tagore that the hungry millions of India need but one poem and that is invigorating food. These words of the Māhatmā indicate the psychological fact that a hungry person is not in the mood of relishing poetry. Sometimes we may appreciate all of a sudden a scene or an idea which does not at all correspond with our taste. This sort of appreciation, in the absence of a better name, can be termed *Fancy*; and it is but proper to mention it here. My friend Nūtana Deva presented an example of this sort of appreciation when while witnessing the picture *Khazānī* he exclaimed the words *very fine* only at the scene of Omer Khayyam.

The last element of poetic relish, which on this account is no less important than any other, is the understanding of the perceiver, or the sense which a

¹⁹ "People are unlike emotionally as they are unlike physically. We are born cold or affectionate, bold or timid and so on".
—Frederick H. Lund, *Emotions of Men*, chapter entitled *Physical Basis of the Emotions*.

poetic piece conveys to him. Words and scenes are symbols whose intended meanings and ideas are not always definite, static or limited. The indication (*Laksanā*) and suggestion (*Vjanjanā*) powers of the words create all the more complicity and confusion, and sometimes they lead the reader even beyond the sense which the author meant to express. But the perceiver cannot help relishing a composition on the basis of his understanding, in whatever way it may be related to the intended sense of the author. Difference of opinion in meaning has sometimes led to great literary controversies.²⁰ Often it is noticed that the repeated readings of a poem reveal each time a new sense and thereby afford a new relish.²¹ Some critics have regarded it an inevitable quality of good poetry.

Prejudice also may be admitted, if we like, to be an independent element in determining the form of poetic relish; although it is included, if it is momentary, in our conception of mood, and, if it is permanent, in our conception of individuality and taste. When it is at work it sometimes reverses or diminishes and sometimes exaggerates the natural psychological effect of the other elements. If a book, against which we are already prejudiced, is presented before us in an attractive get-up, our feelings for it grow still bitter. In a similar way while going through the new works of our most favourite and most disfavourite authors, even their shortcomings appear to us as their excellences, and vice versa respectively. But here this fact should not be lost sight of that sometimes the force of a particular blemish or merit may be so strong that it may break through the strongest rock of prejudice and appear before the mind unveiled and uncoloured. It is this

²⁰ For instance, the famous controversy on Deva and Bihārī between Mīśrabandhus and Bhagavāna Dīna.

²¹ "I ... read the poem again and again, to get near it. However, the more I penetrated into it, the more significant and higher in art did it seem".—Eckermann, *Conversation with Goethe*, p. 22.

special characteristic or nature of prejudice which differentiates it from mood and taste, and which, therefore, justifies its separate and independent treatment.

Though from the scientific point of view the comparative importance of these eight or nine determining elements of poetic relish is almost the same, yet it shall be a mistake to regard all of them equally active in the individual instances of poetic relish. With reference to the subject, the object and the moments of the perception of poetry, the proportionate prominence of these elements may assume any form. In the introductory paragraphs of this essay I had called the perceiver and the subject-matter of poetry the receptacle (*Āśraya*) and the fundamental determinant (*Ālambana Vibhāva*) of poetic relish respectively. Any reader might expect that before concluding this chapter I shall try to find out the likeness (*Upamāna*) of every element from the constituents of *Rasa*. But this attempt of artificial metaphorisation is not my end, which has already been achieved by clearly indicating the elements which determine the form of our poetic relish. Besides the fact that the Indian Universities, unlike those of the west, possess no psychological laboratories with up-to-date equipment, even the scope of this work does not permit us to go into any experimental details of these elements. Therefore, as it may be expected, the basis of the present study is chiefly my critical observation of the relevant psychological phenomenon in the available environment.

SECOND SECTION
RASA AS EMOTION

CHAPTER I

FEELING, EMOTION AND SENTIMENT

Rasa has been translated by Haas¹ as *Sentiment*. But the term *Sentiment* does not seem to have been accepted as equivalent to *Rasa* by any of the later authors,² who have written on this subject in English, for they have freely used the Samskrita term *Rasa* even in the midst of their English composition not substituting any English term for it. *Rasa*, as I have already said in the Introduction, has two distinctly separate senses quite detached from each other. While in the phrase *Rasa-theory* *Rasa* means *Poetic Relish*, with reference to its constituents (*Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* etc.) the term conveys the sense of *Emotion*. There is no single word in the English language which can denote both these senses. The term *Sentiment* evidently has got nothing to do with the former meaning of *Rasa*, viz., *Poetic Relish*. With the latter meaning, viz., *Emotion*, it is sometimes identified and confused. *Feeling* is another word which is very often used as a synonym to *Emotion*. It is worthwhile, therefore, to differentiate here between the meanings of these terms before discussing *Rasa* as *Emotion*.

Let us first of all take the term *Feeling*. It has been used in different senses by different psychologists who have tried to give to this word their own meaning irrespective of the sense in which it is used in the common speech. "Feelings proper", says Dr. Bhagavan Das, "are, as already stated, only pleasure and pain.....".³

¹ Vide his translation of Dhanañjaya's *Daśarūpa*.

² E.g., Dr. S.K. De, the author of *Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics*, and P. Pañcāpagaśa Śāstrī, the author of *The Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure*, etc.

³ *Sc. of Emotions*, p. 62.

McDougall points out that "pleasure and pain are, by common consent, the true types of feeling".⁴ To Wundt this only dimension of feelings, viz., *pleasantness-unpleasantness*, seemed insufficient and he added two others. The second dimension of feelings, according to him, is *excitement-numbness*; and the third is *tenseness-release* or *expectancy-release*.⁵ Woodworth thinks that this list can be further extended by adding the fourth dimension of *desire-aversion* and the fifth one of *familiarity-strangeness*.⁶ McDougall has enumerated as many as twelve feelings. They are: Joy, Sorrow, Chagrin, Disappointment, Surprise, Regret, Remorse, Confidence, Hope, Anxiety, Despondency and Despair. He gives the name of *Derived Emotions* to these feelings and differentiates them from *Emotions proper*.⁷ "An emotion of this class", says he, "is not constantly correlated with any one impulse or tendency, but rather may arise in the course of the operation of any strong impulse or tendency, the emotion being dependent upon or derived from the working of the impulse....." He further regards these derived emotions as "fundamental forms of feeling pleasure and pain".⁸ Stout accepts a wider application of this word and feels it "extremely inconvenient" to give the word the restricted sense of *pleasure-pain* for which he finds the use of the term *Feeling-tone* more convenient. But still he refuses to make it cover *Sensation* and *Thought*.⁹ Why he does

⁴ *Outline of Psych.*, chap. XII.

⁵ Vide *Psych. W.*, p. 335.

⁶ Vide *Ibid.*, p. 336.

⁷ McDougall's definition of *Emotion* has been quoted *infra* in this very chapter.

⁸ *Outline of Psych.*, chap. XII.

⁹ "We therefore agree with Professor James in giving a very wide application to the word *Feeling*. We must however steadfastly refuse to make it cover *sensation* and *thought* indifferently, as he appears to do. Only two words have this wide range, and these are the word *Consciousness*, according to its traditional use in English psychology, and the word *Experience*."—*Analytic Psych.*, p. 121.

so, he does not tell us. There is no reason why we should not agree with Professor James if he appears to make the term *Feeling* cover even *Sensation* and *Thought*. The existence of the words *Consciousness* and *Experience* cannot make the word *Feeling* lose the wide range of its sense which Usage and Convention have connected with it.

So to do full justice to the word *Feeling* it is but imperative that we should use it to denote any mental experience. By doing so we do not at all unreasonably extend its application, for the word is capable of being used and is actually used in this wide sense. *To feel sympathetic, to feel antipathetic, to feel an emotion, to feel a curiosity, to feel reflectional, to feel critical and to feel a sensation* are all appropriate and natural expressions. We cannot be idiomatic, it is true, if we say that *we feel a thought* or that *we feel an idea*.¹⁰ But if in these expressions the abstract terms *Thought* and *Idea* are replaced by their actual contents, no strangeness will be felt. Thus it would be quite natural for anybody to say that he feels that God is there, or that he feels that he should receive a very early reply to the letter he is posting. *Feeling* is sometimes confused with *Emotion* in common speech, because the former denotes the psychic side of the latter. *Emotion*, as we shall presently see, consists neither merely in its mental experience, nor merely in its expression. It is mental experience and physical change taken together. Whenever the psychic side of an emotion is meant to be stressed, the use of the word *Feeling* is quite proper. We generally say that Mr. X is feeling angry and not that Mr. X is experiencing the emotion of anger, for what is primarily experienced by the mind is not the whole emotion but only that part of it which affects the consciousness. In the third chapter of the first

¹⁰ "Thus we cannot say that we *feel a thought*, and it sounds somewhat strange to speak of *feeling ideas* or *perceptions*".
—*Ibid.*, p. 120.

section of this work I have called the first four constituent classes of poetic relish¹¹ the classes of feelings and not that of emotions, in spite of the fact that they are in reality the classes of emotions, not only because I wished to give a common name to every sort of mental experience had during the perception of poetry, but also because poetic relish itself, which is composed of the feelings of all these classes, is merely a mental phenomenon and as such with reference to it only the psychic side of the emotions, which the perception of poetry evokes, is relevant or important.¹²

Coming to *Emotion* we find that the modes of describing or defining this term have been far more varied and numerous than they were in the case of *Feeling*. "An emotion is", according to Dr. Bhagavan Das, "a desire plus the cognition involved in the attitude of one *Jīva* towards another".¹³ According to William McDougall "Primary emotions are essentially indicators of the working of the instinctive impulses".¹⁴ To R. S. Woodworth "Emotion is a moved or stirred up state of the organism. It is a stirred up state of feeling—that is the way it appears to the individual himself. It is a disturbed muscular and glandular activity—that is the way it appears to an external observer".¹⁵ William James considers it to be "a tendency to feel".¹⁶

¹¹ These four classes are of the *Sympathetic*, *Antipathetic*, *Recollectional* and *Curiositical* feelings.

¹² My conception of *Feeling* as elaborated above includes even sensations. But while classifying the feelings called forth by the perception of the poetic phenomena I have mentioned no such class as may comprehend sensational feelings. The reason is obvious. Sensational feelings are not comprised in the feelings which constitute poetic relish, because they are not evoked by the perception of poetry, they rather precondition perception.

¹³ *Sc. of Emotions*, pp. 59-60.

¹⁴ *Outline of Psych.*, chap. on *Emotion*.

¹⁵ *Psych. W.*, p. 338.

¹⁶ *Psych. J.*, chap. XXIV.

"Kulpe regards emotions as a fusion of feeling and organic sensation, Höfding as pleasure-pain in association with the idea of its cause, Sully as a mass of sensual and representative material with a predominant affective tone, Ward as complete psychosis involving cognition, pleasure-pain and conation".¹⁷ "According to some, emotion is essentially a kind of sensation due to general organic disturbance. According to others, it is the massive revival by association of past pleasures and pains. According to others, it is a tendency to behave in a particular way, and must be regarded as a mode of conative consciousness".¹⁸

It should, however, be noticed that this disagreement on the nature of *Emotion* is more verbal than it is real, for the disagreement on the actual denotation of this term is not so great. We have heard no psychologist with any odd definition maintaining that *Anger* and *Fear* are not emotions. William McDougall had the audacity to exclude Surprise, Regret etc.¹⁹ from the sphere of emotions giving them the name *Feelings*. But even he could not abandon the popular term altogether, for he has given them the alternative name *Derived Emotions*. Dreyer, while criticizing McDougall for "narrowing the application of the word Emotion... by excluding such experiences as Surprise and the like",²⁰ tries to limit the meaning of the term in another way. "If impulse", says he, "immediately realizes itself in appropriate action towards the situation, then there is no emotion in any strict sense of emotion".²¹

¹⁷ *Instinct in Man*, p. 158.

¹⁸ These definitions have been quoted by G. F. Stout in *A Manual of Psychology*, p. 405. He has not mentioned the names of their authors. Some of these may belong to the authors already quoted.

¹⁹ For the names of all the twelve emotions called *Feelings* by McDougall see *Supra* where the term *Feeling* has been discussed.

²⁰ *Instinct in Man*, p. 157.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

Thus according to him the person who is running away at the sight of a lion to save his life is not under the sway of the emotion of fear; he would be so only if he were unable to run. Drever himself does not seem to be very much sure of the ground on which he stands, for at the statement of Shand—"When the activity of the instinct is more sudden and unopposed, the emotion, if it be brought into activity at all, will be of low intensity and definiteness"²²—he remarks: "This seems incontrovertible, and in the limiting case the emotion may be considered entirely to disappear".²³ The limiting case to which Drever refers is never manifested. It is, however, possible, as Shand suggests, that the emotion may not be called forth at all; for it is not the lion or any other object that can call forth fear, it is the idea of danger that accompanies the object. Without this accompanying idea of danger fear cannot be excited; and the stronger the idea, the more intense will be the resultant emotion. A person who can run away from a lion feels less afraid, because his fear is lessened by the hope that he might be able to save himself, than the person who cannot run away, because he knows that the danger to his life is imminent and that he cannot save himself from it. Hence criticizing Drever, McDougall rightly points out that the realization or the check of the impulse to action "is merely a matter of degree of intensity of the emotional excitement".²⁴ The person who is running away from the lion must continue feeling afraid until he has reached a place where he may confidently feel himself out of danger.

In the midst of the conflicting and inconsistent definitions of *Emotion* Stout and Drever have refrained from defining the term; and, instead of it, have tried to give the characteristics which are common to all

²² *The Foundations of Characters*, p. 370.

²³ *Instinct in Man*, p. 159.

²⁴ *Social Psych.*, p. xiv.

emotional experiences. Stout could discover as many as six such characteristics. They are :

“(1) There is one prominent fact about emotion which confronts us at the outset—its wide range. From the lower forms of perceptual consciousness upto the higher forms of ideational and conceptual activity the same typical kinds of emotion are everywhere present. Anger may arise in connection with the pain of a wound or the smart of a blow,.... A man will become angry if you fail to understand his argument or if you unfavourably criticize his book.

(2) Closely connected with the wide distribution of emotion is the varied nature of conditions that arouse it. Any kind of thwarting or opposition may excite anger. Any kind of danger may excite fear. It is a certain general kind of situation, not a specific class of objects, which excites a certain kind of emotion.

(3) Emotions may arise in connection with definite perceptions or ideas, as when good news excites joy; on the other hand they may be primarily conditioned by organic changes, such as those which follow the use of alcohol or other drugs.

(4) An emotion involves a certain general trend of direction of activity, which particularises itself in whatever way it can, according to circumstances

(5) The fifth feature of emotion is what we may call its parasitical character. So far as emotions are excited by general situations, and not merely by general organic changes, they are usually secondary phenomenon, and presuppose the existence of more specific tendencies. This is true of all but the simplest and more primitive emotional states. The anger produced in a dog... by interfering with its young presupposes the specific tendency to guard and tend its offspring.

(6) In all the more intense phases of emotion, organic sensations form an important constituent of the total state of consciousness. This is true whether the emotion has been primarily introduced by organic changes, or whether it has in the first instance arisen in connection with definite perceptions or ideas”.*

* *Manual of Psych.*, pp. 405-409,

According to Drever the following five features characterise all emotional experiences :

"(a) In the first place, emotion always involves an affective relation to an object either perceptual or ideal.

(b) In the second place, the pleasure-pain colouring is nearly always pronounced. One might in fact maintain that Emotion, as popularly understood, always involves this accentuated pleasure-pain factor, so much so, that a considerable number of psychologists have taken it as the essential characteristic of experience.

(c) In the third place, *organic resonance*, as it has been called, is in general well marked. Again certain psychologists, the most notable being James, have taken this as the essential characteristic, but it has been recognised as a prominent characteristic from Descartes and Malebranche onwards.

(d) In the fourth place, emotion involves a feeling-attitude of such a kind, that actions of a special sort, and these alone, appeal to us. Our consciousness is, as it were, narrowed, and also specialised, the emotion affecting cognition and action both by way of inhibition, and by way of reinforcement. This again has been taken as the fundamental fact by some psychologists.

(e) In the fifth place, emotion involves an impulsive force, a source of driving power, so to speak, which, in the more marked cases, tends to suspend the higher mental process, and to overwhelm purposes, resolutions, and principles, by its irresistible urgency towards immediate action".²⁶

Let us examine these essential characteristics of emotional experiences one by one.

The wide range of *Emotion*, which Stout points out as its first characteristic, is hardly disputable. But it should be carefully borne in mind that Stout has mentioned these characteristics as "distinctive of"²⁷ emotions, and hence we should scrutinize each one of them in this light. Thus if the wide range of *Emotion*

²⁶ *Instinct in Man*, pp. 158-159.

²⁷ *Manual of Psych.*, p. 405.

be one of its distinctive characteristics, it should not characterise any other kind of experience. But even contrary to our wish and expectation it does. Like emotions thoughts are also evoked both on the perceptual and the ideal planes ; and this fact is so simple and so self-evident that it does not seem to require any further elaboration with the help of illustrations. Actual perception of a definite objective phenomenon may suggest us a topic to contemplate over ; so may even an idea.

In the second characteristic of *Emotion* Stout tells us what excites it. Surely, it is not the object which excites it ; it is not even "a certain general kind of situation" as Stout puts it. It is rather a particular sort of idea which calls forth an emotion. I leave this point here unexplained and unillustrated, as I shall take it up again while giving my own view about *Emotion*.

Stout's third characteristic of *Emotion* points out that besides perceptions and ideas even the use of alcohol and other drugs may arouse emotions. This is hardly acceptable. It is for the abnormal psychology to study the insane behaviour and the abnormal mind of the drunken person ; *Emotion* is essentially a subject of the normal psychology and hence it is manifested only in the normal mind. Stout seems to have confused the activities of a person under the effect of alcohol with the expressions of an emotion.

The fourth characteristic of *Emotion* as given by Stout seems to have been deduced directly from McDougall's definition of *Emotion*, which excludes the twelve emotions (Surprise, Regret etc.) enumerated by him under the head of *Feeling*. But as there is no justification in excluding these twelve phenomena of experience from the world of *Emotion*, this characteristic of *Emotion* becomes too narrow. In Surprise and the like, which we have admitted as emotions, no distinct

impulse to action is felt ; and hence a feature, which does not characterise every emotional experience, cannot be taken as a common characteristic of *Emotion*.

Stout's fifth and sixth characteristics of *Emotion* we can summarily reject, for about them he himself points out that they do not qualify every emotional experience. About the fifth he admits that it is not true of the simplest and more primitive emotional states, and the sixth he attributes only to the more intense phases of *Emotion*.

Coming to Drever we find him asserting, in the first place, that during every emotional experience we must feel an affective relation to an object either perceptual or ideal. But this is not what always happens. When we are angry with a person, he is the perceptual object to which we feel an affective relation ; when we are sorry to remember the scene of the death of one of our beloved friends, the object to which we feel an affective relation is ideal. But take the case of a person feeling afraid in darkness. Surely, darkness is not the object which has frightened him. There is no other perceptual object to have called forth the emotion ; there may not be even an ideal one. The simple idea of danger without being accompanied by any object, either perceptual or ideal, might have excited fear in him. And thus if an emotion can be excited without an object, it is obviously wrong to hold that it should always involve an affective relation to an object.

Giving the second feature of *Emotion* Drever says that the pleasure-pain colouring is *nearly* always pronounced. *Nearly* shows that Drever is himself conscious of the fact that there are instances when a person under emotional experience feels neither pleasure nor pain. Taking the practical aspect of the question, when we are under the sway of an emotion, we are evidently not always conscious of the pleasure-pain colouring.

From the theoretical point of view, even if pleasure-pain be admitted to be an essential dimension of all emotional experiences, there must be cases when an emotion can be located at the zero or central point at which it would be neither pleasurable nor painful.

Drever's third feature lays down that organic resonance is in general well-marked in an emotional experience. To this I have to say, firstly, that organic changes brought about during the experience of an emotion form a part of that emotion and are not merely a resonance, and, secondly, that the organic changes are there always, whether or not they are well-marked. This point shall be elaborated in my own exposition of *Emotion*.

The fourth and the fifth features, which according to Drever characterise all emotional experiences, tell us how *Emotion* is related to *Cognition* and *Action*. So far as the relation between *Emotion* and *Cognition* is concerned, we may agree with Drever. But to go farther than this and to speak of an indispensable relation between *Emotion* and *Action* is to accept McDougall's definition of *Emotion* which Drever himself has rejected on the ground of its being too narrow in excluding "affective experiences—as, for example, Surprise".²² After admitting as emotions the twelve affective experiences, which are not correlated with impulses and which on this account have been placed under the head of *Feeling* by McDougall, Drever contradicts himself in making an emotion necessarily involve an impulsive force.

Having thus examined the characteristics of *Emotion* as given by Stout and Drever and finding them unsatisfactory I now proceed to elaborate my own view on this phenomenon of experience; it consists in the answer which I shall give to the following two questions: (1) What excites *Emotion*? and (2) What are the contents of *Emotion*?

²² *Instinct in Man*, p. 156.

An emotion is excited by a particular idea occurring in the consciousness of the person in whom the emotion is excited. The idea itself is potent enough to call forth the emotion ; it may or may not be accompanied, though generally it is, by an object, either perceptual or ideal. Emotional experience is essentially a subjective phenomenon²⁹ and hence it cannot be conditioned solely by an external object. Stout correctly admits that it is "not a specific class of objects, which excites a certain general kind of emotion". But he is wrong in maintaining that "it is a certain general kind of situation",³⁰ for even an objective situation cannot always excite the same emotion in every person. He does not himself seem to hold this theory, which makes a general specific kind of situation the cause of a particular emotion, very steadfastly, for elsewhere he says, "The symptoms of fear arise only when the sight of a bear startles a man, either because it is a strong and big animal approaching, or because previous experience has taught him to apprehend it as dangerous.....In any case it is not the visual perception, as such, but its startling character which is essential".³¹ This startling character is nothing but the idea of danger which accompanies the visual perception. Stout, when he wrote the lines cited above, was surely tacitly conscious of the fact that beyond an object or an objective situation there is some subjective phenomenon also which determines an emotion and that it is this subjective phenomenon which is most important. But he confused this subjective phenomenon with *Startling*

²⁹ "In the presence of the same object, the emotional experiences of different persons may be very different, and even those of the same person on successive occasions may vary widely with changes in the general condition. Hence, while the sensory qualities are commonly said to be objective, or significant of the nature of the object, the emotional qualities are said to be subjective, or significant of the nature of the subject".—*Outline of Psych.*, chap. on *Emotion*.

³⁰ *Manual of Psych.*, p. 406.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 413.

which is merely a reflex action⁸² and does not necessarily involve an emotion. We can be startled even by an unexpected loud noise without experiencing any emotion at all. "Let Professor James", says Ward criticizing William James's theory of Emotion, "be confronted first by a chained bear and then by a bear at large; to the one object he presents a bun and to the other a clean pair of heels".⁸³ It will be wrong to attribute the cause of the difference of behaviour in the two instances to the difference of situations, for such persons are not impossible to be conceived as can meet gallantly even *a bear at large*. But evidently we can never conceive a person who either can feel afraid without the idea of danger or can avoid feeling so when the idea of danger is there in his mind.

The contents of an emotion are twofold: (1) Psychic Affection and (2) Organic Changes. The latter again consists of visceral and glandular or internal changes on the one hand and of bodily or external changes on the other. The word *Affection* is the proper term to differentiate *Emotion* from all other sorts of experiences on the psychic or the feeling side. The term *Affective Life* has been used by Ribot⁸⁴ to denote the life of emotional experiences. Drever has also maintained that an affective relation to an object is an essential characteristic of *Emotion*.⁸⁵ It is the psychic

⁸² "Reflex actions are due to the excitement of a peripheral nerve, which transmits its influence to certain nerve-cells, and these in their turn excite certain muscles or glands to action; and all this may take place without any sensation or consciousness on our part, though often thus accompanied".
—*Exp. of Emotions*, p. 7.

⁸³ Cited by Stout, *Manual of Psych.*, p. 413.

⁸⁴ *Psych. of Emotions*, p. 1.

⁸⁵ It should be noted that while criticizing Drever for giving this characteristic of *Emotion* I have not denied the affective element in an emotion; I have criticized him only for holding that the presence of an object is necessary during every emotional experience.

affection which is important from the view point of the person who is experiencing the emotion, for he is not always conscious of the organic disturbances which are occurring in and outside his body. Whenever a person is under the full sway of an emotion, he is hardly ever conscious of any of his organic changes. Even when the emotional influence is light, it is impossible for him to be conscious of all the changes of his organism. Stout, as we have seen, has pointed out in his sixth characteristic of *Emotion* that "organic sensations form an important constituent of the total state of consciousness". But even when the consciousness of the organic sensations is there, it is in no way an important constituent of the total state of consciousness of the person under the sway of an emotion, because the consciousness of the organic changes is not a constituent of the emotion. The person, who is experiencing an emotion, must have the corresponding changes in his organism. But whether or not he is conscious of these changes, it affects him or his experience of the emotion little.

If the consciousness, it may be questioned, of the organic changes in an emotion does not matter to the person who is experiencing the emotion, what is their importance and how do they form one of the two classes of the component factors of *Emotion*? The answer is clear. Though the consciousness of these organic changes matters little, yet the changes themselves are not at all insignificant. They are the essential constituents of an emotion, because without them no emotion is possible. Nobody can disagree with James when he says that grief cannot be there "without its tears, its sobs, its suffocation of the heart, its pang in the breast-bone".⁸⁶ The importance of the visceral changes, some of which are imperceptible and some of which manifest themselves even externally, consists in their affecting the constitution of the person in whom the changes take place. A person cannot

⁸⁶ *Psych. J.*, chap. XXIV.

digest his food when he is melancholy or angry. The importance of the bodily changes is self-evident, for without them one can never be able to know the emotions experienced by the other. Besides, the bodily manifestations sometimes may affect even the person who displays them in the form of a reaction. If *A* feels angry with *B*, *B* may give *A* a nice blow in return.

It should, however, be carefully noted that while on the psychic side an emotion has got a clear differentia, on the organic side it has none. "Under ordinary conditions, to be sure, a certain organic state is present in fear and anger.....This same organic state occurs in strenuous muscular activity such as running a race, though the runner is neither frightened nor angry, but may be quite cool and calculating".⁸⁷ Similarly it is not always necessary that the actor, who is displaying the bodily changes in an emotion, would feel the emotion. Wm. Archer's enquiry to which James has referred⁸⁸ says that an actor is mastered by an emotion whenever he plays it well. But the actor is brought under the sway of an emotion, not because he plays it well. He rather plays it well and is brought under its sway, because the idea which calls forth the emotion dominates in his consciousness and appears to him as if it were genuinely his.

Thus though an emotion cannot always be distinguished on the organic side, particularly on the visceral,⁸⁹ yet it cannot be doubted that even the organic side is an essential and indispensable constituent of an emotion and that the emotion is incomplete without it. This view finds support in modern psychologists

⁸⁷ *Psych W.*, p. 358.

⁸⁸ Vide *Psych. J.*, chap. XXIV.

⁸⁹ From the bodily expressions sometimes we are able to discern an emotion even when it is suppressed wilfully, and sometimes when an emotion is pretended, the expressions disclose to us the fact that there is no genuine emotion at all,

like Woodworth⁴⁰ and Ribot.⁴¹ The common-sense theory of emotions, as it has been termed by James, disregards this fact, and makes merely the psychic side of an emotion the whole emotion. Not admitting the organic changes as the constituents of *Emotion*, it makes them the effects of *Emotion*, calling *Emotion* their cause. But even James's theory of emotions,⁴² which we have not considered so far and to discuss which now is the proper occasion, disregards the same fact and makes the organic changes the cause of *Emotion*. Here are the vital points of his argument:

(1) "If we fancy some strong emotion and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no mind-stuff out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains".

(2) "The best proof that the immediate cause of emotion is a physical effect on the nerves is furnished by those pathological cases in which the emotion is objectless".

(3) "If I were to become corporeally anæsthetic I should be excluded from the life of the affections, harsh and tender alike, and drag out an existence of merely cognitive or intellectual form".⁴³

⁴⁰ Vide Woodworth's definition of *Emotion* cited *supra* in this chapter.

⁴¹ "Every kind of emotion ought to be considered in this way: all that is objectively expressed by movements of the face and body, by vaso-motor, respiratory, and secretory disturbances, is expressed subjectively by correlative states of consciousness, classed by external observation according to their qualities. It is a single occurrence expressed in two languages".—*Psych. of Emotions*, p. 112.

⁴² The theory is better known as the James-Lange theory of the Emotions. It was put forward by the American psychologist James and the Danish psychologist Lange, independently of each other, about the year 1880. But as I have not read the work of Lange, and as the present quotations are only from James, I have named the theory only after James.

⁴³ *Psych. J.*, chap. XXIV,

In the first point James lays down that the mind-stuff of an emotion consists of merely the consciousness of the sensations of the organic changes. But it is not so. A person, who is under the full sway of an emotion, is never directly conscious of the organic sensations that he is receiving. And even when he is directly conscious of these organic sensations, the consciousness has got nothing to do with his experience of the emotion. Stout has rightly pointed out that if James's thesis were true, its inversion also ought to be correct, which it is not. "Certainly not all organic sensation is emotion", says he, "hunger and stomach-ache are not emotional experiences.....The experience of a cold douche, or of being shampooed after a Turkish bath, ought on this theory to be emotional".⁴⁴ Woodworth has mentioned an experiment⁴⁵ which shows that the feeling of fear may be absent even when the organic state of fear is there.

The second point which is best in James's argument according to himself refers to the 'pathological cases in which emotion is objectless. But, as I have already shown, an emotion can be objectless, for it is not an object which excites an emotion. Even in such cases

⁴⁴ *Manual of Psych*, pp. 410-411.

⁴⁵ "In an experiment of quite a different type, the blindfolded subject was seated in a mechanical chair which was suddenly tilted backward into a horizontal position. Apparatus registered his breathing and heartbeat which were much disturbed. The subject made a movement to save himself and experienced the feeling of fright. He returned on another day and was seated in the same chair. As he now anticipated the sudden drop he took it without any overt movement to save himself, but his heart and respiration again betrayed some internal disturbance though less than on the first day. The subject reported that he did not experience fear on this second occasion. Here we have the organic state of fear, occurring when the subject was so well adjusted to the situation that he made no overt escape movement; and the feeling of fear was absent. About twenty subjects gave concordant results".—*Psych. W.*, p. 357.

if the emotion is there, it cannot be without an exciting idea. If a person is feeling afraid, the idea of danger must be there in his mind. It is not impossible for an emotion to be objectless ; what is impossible for it is to be idealess. Besides, here again on the strength of the results obtained by experiments Woodworth tells us that when the organic state characteristic of an emotion is artificially produced in a subject, what he feels is not an actual emotion, but only an emotional mood. If the organic state produced in him is that of anger, he does not feel that he is angry ; he rather feels "as if he were angry".⁴⁶

Perhaps James did not put forth the third point of his argument on the basis of his actual observation, for the truth of it has been disproved by the observations and experiments that have been carried on since the publication of his thesis. Dr. Berkeley's observations and Sherrington's experiment are cited below :

"Dr. Berkeley has reported in *Brain* (iv, 1892) two cases of general anæsthesia, cutaneous and sensory. the subjects are apathetic, but the presence of shame, sorrow, surprise, fear and repulsion (the last named as a substitute for anger) has been observed".⁴⁷

"Sherrington attempted a physiological examination of this question. He took a dog that had been in the laboratory for months, and that showed a marked emotional temperament, affectionate towards some individuals and hostile to others, and performed certain nerve-cutting operations which deprived the animal of nearly all sensation from the interior to the trunk. This loss of sensation produced no obvious change in the dog's behaviour. Her anger, her joy, her disgust, and when provocation arose her fear, remained as evident as ever. A visitor who had previously awakened her anger was again received with signs of rage—wide-open eyes, dilated pupils, vicious growls—while the attendant who fed her was received with all signs of joy."⁴⁸

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 357.

⁴⁷ *Psych. of Emotions*, p. 96.

⁴⁸ *Psych. W.*, p. 356.

Having thus discussed and defined the nature and contents of *Emotion* let us now proceed to consider the term *Sentiment*. There is no marked difference of opinion on the meaning of this term among the psychologists. The term was being used vaguely and with indefinite connotation until it was defined by A. F. Shand in his article *Character and the Emotions*, published in the *Mind*, N.S., vol. V. But since the publication of the said article the use and application of the term has been more or less in a uniform sense, for Shand's specialization of the word has been adopted by almost all the psychologists.⁴⁹ Thus according to McDougall "a sentiment is an organised system of emotional dispositions centred about the idea of some object".⁵⁰ "The distinction", says Stout, "between emotion and sentiment is to a large extent a distinction between dispositions and actual states of consciousness"⁵¹..... "An emotional disposition is a persistent tendency to feel a certain kind of emotion in the presence of a certain object".⁵² Woodworth points out that "this term is used in psychology to refer to any complex emotional attitude towards an object, person or situation, an attitude built up in the course of experience".⁵³

While discussing *Emotion* we have observed that a particular emotion is called forth by a particular idea, and not by a particular object or a particular situation. But *Sentiment*, as it has been defined above by the different

⁴⁹ McDougall admits in his *Social Psych.* (p. 105) that he owes his conception of *Sentiment* to Shand. But in his Introduction to the same work (p. viii) he asserts that his is a rival doctrine to that of Shand. I have disregarded the difference between the two doctrines, for it is irrelevant for our purpose, as I have discussed *Sentiment* only to differentiate *Emotion* from it

⁵⁰ *Social Psych.*, p. 137.

⁵¹ *Manual of Psych.*, p. 701.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 418.

⁵³ *Psych. W.*, p. 354.

psychologists, necessarily presupposes the existence of a definite objective phenomenon. And also a sentiment is only a mental disposition and not an actual state of consciousness, for whenever it develops into an actual state of consciousness, it ceases to be *Sentiment* and becomes *Emotion*. A child, which feels afraid of a person by whom it is frequently tortured, bears towards him the sentiment of fear. But when the person is present before the child and when the child is actually feeling afraid, what it is experiencing is not the sentiment of fear, it is rather the emotion of fear. Does it then come to this that an emotion can be excited uniformly by the same objective phenomenon? No, it does not; for even in the case in which a definite objective phenomenon excites uniformly the same emotion it is not the object which is important in exciting the emotion, it is the idea which uniformly accompanies the object. The importance of the accompanying idea is further proved by the facts that the idea would call forth the emotion even when it accompanies another object or no object at all, and that the object would fail to call forth the emotion if the idea ceases to accompany it, as it may. To illustrate, the child would feel afraid of any other object which is accompanied by the idea of danger, and it would not feel afraid even of the person, who has been the object of his fear so far, only if instead of torturing it he begins to give it sweets. So whenever an actual affected state of consciousness is there, it must have been brought into existence by the idea, the presence of which is necessary to excite that particular state. A *Sentiment*, to define it in the terms in which I have described *Emotion*, is merely a latent but subsisting feeling of attachment of a particular idea exciting a particular emotion with a definite objective phenomenon. The feeling of attachment, it may be added, is formed on account of the recurring concurrence of the objective phenomenon and the idea; and once it is formed, the objective phenomenon ceases to appear in the consciousness without the idea which excites the emotion.

Our discussion on the nature of *Feeling*, *Emotion* and *Sentiment* and on the difference between the meanings of each other is now complete. A more elaborate and detailed treatment of these terms is not within the scope of this work. Before concluding this chapter it is, however, necessary to point out that I have not aimed in these lines at advancing any new theories on the denotation, use, application or function of any of the above-mentioned psychological terms. My object is not to deviate from the modern psychologists, it is rather to examine *Rasa* and its constituents in the light of their studies. But to do this amidst the vital differences among the psychologists it was but necessary to form such a conception about the meaning of each of these terms as may be clear and definite and may be adhered to in all future discussions. And in forming such conceptions, it would be noted, I have asserted nothing which is not either directly admitted or, at least, indirectly suggested by one psychologist or the other. My conception of *Feeling*, as Stout has pointed out, was already admitted by James, though not in as clear terms. My view on the denotation of *Emotion* is more or less a synthesis of the views of McDougall and Drever. That beyond an objective phenomenon there is also something subjective which determines an emotion is suggested even by the writings of Stout and McDougall, and I have indicated it at its proper place. Furthermore I have shown that Ribot and Woodworth agree with me in maintaining that *Emotion* consists neither in a mental affection nor in an organic disturbance, but in the conjunction of these two phenomena. And lastly, my definition of *Sentiment* has been directly deduced from the description of this term by other psychologists, the difference being only in wording and not at all in meaning.

CHAPTER II

STHĀYĪ AND SANĀRĪ BHĀVAS AS MENTAL AFFECTIONS

Bharata has defined *Bhāvas* as the elements that make us realize the main import of a poem.¹ Evidently this definition of a *Bhāva* cannot help us in studying *Rasa* as Emotion. But elsewhere in making *Vibhāvas* the causes and *Anubhāvas* the external manifestations of the *Bhāvas* he has clearly suggested that a *Bhāva* is a particular mental condition, a definite state of consciousness, a feeling.² This sense of the term *Bhāva* is further confirmed by the use and application of the term in Saṁskṛta poetics and by the attempts of Bharata³ and Hemacandīa⁴ to show how *Sāttvikabhāvas* are indicative of mental conditions.

So *Bhāvas* are the actual states of consciousness brought into existence by the *Vibhāvas* and manifested by the *Anubhāvas*. They are not merely the dispositions or the tendencies to experience certain feelings in the presence of some definite objective phenomena. A *Bhava* when depicted in poetry means that it is being experienced at the moment by a person, and not that it is liable to be experienced under proper circumstances by a person. A sentiment, on the other hand, is not an actual state of consciousness; it is merely a disposition or a tendency to feel a mental condition at the presentation of an object with which experience has connected the idea that calls forth the mental condition. Thus, as it is obvious, a *Bhāva* cannot be a sentiment. Far less can a *Rasa* be a sentiment, for while

¹ "काव्यार्थान् भावयन्तीति भाव ।"

—N.S., chap. VII.

² "विभावेनाहृतो योऽर्थस्त्वनुभावेन गम्यते ।

वागङ्गसत्त्वाभिनयै स भाव इति सञ्ज्ञित ॥"

—N.S., VII. 1.

³ Vide N.S., p. 379.

⁴ Vide K.A., pp. 118-120,

the former includes in its conception both a state of consciousness and its external manifestations, the latter has got nothing to do with any organic changes and is entirely a mental phenomenon. It has already been shown in the preceding chapter that whenever a sentiment, at the presentation of the object it involves, develops into an affected state of consciousness, which is always accompanied by a set of organic changes, it ceases to be a sentiment and becomes an emotion. Gulābarāya has suggested that the latent impressions of the *Sthāyībhāvas* assumed to exist in the mind of an interested perceiver by Abhinavagupta and others are sentiments.⁵ In forming a view like this perhaps he has been misled by the term *Sthāyī*, which means permanent or subsisting, in the expression *Sthāyībhāva*, for otherwise there is nothing common in the conception of a sentiment and that of a *Sthāyībhāva*. A *Sthāyībhāva* is a latent impression in the mind of the perceiver and is called forth when he perceives a poetic phenomenon suggesting that particular mental state with the help of the *Vibhāvas* etc.; a sentiment is a latent feeling of attachment of a particular idea exciting a particular emotion with a definite objective phenomenon. If we transfer the *Sthāyībhāva*, as we are actually to do in this section in considering *Rasa* and its constituents apart from their relish, from the perceiver to the poetical character, to whose mental state it refers in truth,⁶ even then it cannot be likened with sentiment. A sentiment necessarily presupposes the existence of a definite object, in the presence of which a particular emotion is liable to be called forth, while a *Sthāyībhāva*, without presupposing the existence

⁵ "हमारे यहाँ रस की अनुभूति के लिए प्राकृत और नवीन संस्कार माने हैं। ये संस्कार Sentiment के निकट आ जाते हैं। ये रस नहीं बरन् रस के स्थायी भाव के संस्कार हैं जो सहृदय सज्जनों के मन में रहते हैं। मनोवेग (Emotion) और भाववृत्ति (Sentiment) के अन्तर को लेकर रसों का अनुसंधान बहुत फलप्रद होगा।"

—*Rasa aur Manovijñāna, Sāhitya-Sāndeha*, vol. V, p. 8.

⁶ See next paragraph.

of any such definite object, indicates only this much that the person in whose mind it latently exists is susceptible to a particular feeling.

Having thus established that the *Bhāvas*, whether *Sthāyī* (=permanent) or *Sañcārī* (=transitory), are not sentiments, we may now proceed to discover whether or not they are related with emotions. It is difficult, as it has already been observed in the preceding chapter, to differentiate emotion on the organic side from other sorts of experiences. But on the psychic side an emotion is clearly an affected state of consciousness. Now it shall be easy for us to conclude that the *Bhāvas* are the psychic sides of emotions only if we are able to show that the mental conditions to which they refer are the affected states of consciousness. The simple and the only way to do this is to take up and scrutinize each *Bhāva* separately. But before we take up this individual scrutinization of the *Bhāvas* it is, however, necessary to point out that we cannot attribute the *Sthāyībhāvas* to the perceiver of a poetic phenomenon. The feelings which are called forth in the mind of a perceiver at his perception of poetry have already been considered independently in the third chapter of the first section of this work. If we come across the picturesque description of an angry person, the feeling of anger, or the *Sthāyībhāva Krodha* as a scholar of the Samskr̥ta poetics would put it, suggested therein would directly pertain to the depicted character and not to us. Even when a perceiver is able to experience the depicted emotion, the suggested feeling or *Sthāyībhāva* remains related with the poetical character and not with the perceiver, for it is essentially the poetical character and not the perceiver in respect of whom the emotion has been depicted.

Bharata has mentioned the following forty-one *Bhāvas* out of which, according to him, the first eight are *Sthāyī* and the rest are *Sañcārī*: 1. *Rati*, 2. *Hāsa*, 3. *Utsāha*, 4. *Vismaya*, 5. *Jugupsā*, 6. *Bhaya*, 7. *Krodha*,

8. *Śoka*, 9. *Nirveda*, 10. *Glāni*, 11. *Śaṅkā*, 12. *Śrama*, 13. *Dhṛti*, 14. *Jadatā*, 15. *Harṣa*, 16. *Dainya*, 17. *Ugratā*, 18. *Cinta*, 19. *Trāsa*, 20. *Asūyā*, 21. *Amarṣa*, 22. *Garva*, 23. *Smṛti*, 24. *Marāṇa*, 25. *Mada*, 26. *Supta*, 27. *Nidrā*, 28. *Vibodha*, 29. *Vṛidā*, 30. *Apasmāra*, 31. *Moha*, 32. *Matī*, 33. *Alasatā*, 34. *Āvega*, 35. *Tarka*, 36. *Avahitthā*, 37. *Vyādhi*, 38. *Unmāda*, 39. *Viśāda*, 40. *Autukya*, and 41. *Capalatā*. Let us consider these one by one.

1. *Rati* is the feeling of sexual love.⁷ The sexual emotion⁸ spoken of by Ribot is based on this feeling. It is quite unnecessary to show here that this feeling is a mental affection, for this fact is self-evident to every person who has attained the age of sex-sensibility. Besides, it can be further confirmed by looking at any of the many thousand stanzas that have been written or cited to illustrate this feeling in the works on poetics.

2. The feeling of *Hāsa* or mirth, which is brought about by the perception of erroneous actions and mutilated dressing and speech etc.,⁹ must also be an affected state of consciousness, for otherwise in the normal course no lack of harmony can amuse us. Bharata has divided this feeling into six shades on the dimension of intensity ranging from a gentle smile to a convulsive laughter.¹⁰ The first two shades (viz., *Smita* and *Hasita*) he attributed to the higher, the next two (viz., *Vihāsita* and *Upahāsita*) to the middling and the last two (viz., *Apahāsita* and *Atihasita*) to the lower characters. McDougall¹¹ in calling smile beautiful and laughter ugly has said almost the same thing. Perhaps he is right in pointing out that the smile,

⁷ "स्त्रीपुंसयोरन्योन्यालम्बन. प्रेमाख्यचित्तवृत्तिविशेषो रतिः स्थायिभावः ।" —R.G., p. 38.

⁸ *Psych. of Emotions*, p. 15.

⁹ "विकृताकारवाग्वेशचेष्टादे कुहकादभवेत् ।" —S.D., p. 158.

"विकृताकृतिवाग्वेशः.....हासः स्यात् ।" —*Daśarūpaka*, p. 108.

¹⁰ Vide N.S., chap. VII.

¹¹ *Outline of Psych.*, pp. 166-170.

"which is the natural expression of the satisfaction that attends the success of any striving", is distinct from laughter, "which always involves some maladjustment, something inappropriate". But he goes too far in entirely disconnecting smile from laughter and in not admitting it at all as a less intense shade of laughter, for the gentle external manifestation of the feeling of mirth and amusement can be nothing but a smile.

3. *Utsāha* is the feeling of spiritedness.¹² The infusion of spirit in any person causes in his constitution the release of the extra reserved energy which renders him capable of doing such acts as he cannot perform in the ordinary state of his consciousness. The soldier fighting on the front gathers new courage and is able to face his opponents more briskly when he hears the spirited words of his commander who is a brave woman and who herself is playing her part most gallantly in the struggle. Thus *Utsāha* is also an affected state of consciousness.

4. *Vismaya* is the feeling of astonishment called forth by the perception of some extraordinary or supernatural phenomenon.¹³ The automatic and involuntary manifestations of this feeling in "exclamations of surprise, weeping, trembling, sweating and stammering"¹⁴ show clearly that the mental condition of the person experiencing this feeling is affected. McDougall has called Surprise a derived emotion.

5. The feeling of *Jugupsā* or disgust is produced at the perception or idea of some unwholesome or dirty object;¹⁵ and is expressed externally by the contraction of the nose and eyebrows etc. McDougall

¹² "कार्य करने में आवेश होने को उत्साह कहते हैं ।" —K K., p.155.

¹³ "Modification incomplete de l'âme produite per le vue, la contact ou le souvenir de quelque chose d'extraordinaire. Expansion de l'esprit à propos de choses surnaturelles".
—*La Rhs. Sasm.*, p. 325.

¹⁴ *Daśarūpa*, p. 145.

¹⁵ "दोषेक्षणादिभिर्गर्हा जुगुप्सा विषयोद्भवा ।"
—S.D., p. 145.

has called disgust an emotion and has based it on the instinct¹⁶ of repulsion.¹⁷ The affected character of consciousness during the experience of this feeling is clearly evinced by the felt impulse to remove the offending object from the focus of experience.

6. & 7. The feelings of fear (*Bhaya*) and anger (*Krodha*) as the affected states of consciousness are so common both in experience and observation that no elaborate analysis is needed to show how they are mental affections. Ribot has mentioned that chronologically the emotions of fear and anger are the first to appear in a child,¹⁸ and he has dealt with each of these independently in separate chapters.¹⁹ Stout in his *Manual of Psychology*²⁰ has selected only these emotions for analysis. McDougall in arranging instincts and emotions in the descending order of complexity of bodily adjustments has placed fear and anger at the upper end of the scale.²¹ The feeling is so well affected and the organism is so much disturbed during the experience of fear or anger that perhaps there has been no psychologist and no commoner who has refused to admit these phenomena of experience as emotions.

8. *Soka* or sorrow is experienced when something cherished and adored is destroyed.²² There can be no doubt about the existence of mental affection during

¹⁶ ".....An instinct is an innate or inherited mode of behaviour. For example, in a dangerous situation we instinctively seek safety, and we might therefore talk of the instinct of escape"
—*Educational Psychology*, p. 56.

¹⁷ Vide *Social Psych.*, p. 47.

¹⁸ Vide *Psych. of the Emotions*, pp. 13-14.

¹⁹ Vide *ibid.*, chaps. I. & II in the second part.

²⁰ Vide Book III, chap. V.

²¹ Vide *Outline of Psych.*, chap. on *Emotion*.

²² इष्टनाशादिभिश्चेतोवैकल्यं शोकशब्दभाक् ।” —*S D.*, p. 145.

“अहित लाभ हित हानि तें, कछु जो हिये दुख होत ।

सोक सु थाई भाव है, कहत कविन को गीत ॥”

—*Jagadvinoda*, p. 196.

the experience of this feeling, for the external expressions which accompany this feeling are able to affect the consciousness even of the onlookers. Absolute sympathetic absorption can be commanded only by the pathetic emotion. Perhaps it is on this account that *Karuna* has been regarded by Bhavabhūti as the only *Rasa*²³ and by Anandavardhana as the sweetest of all.²⁴

9. *Nirveda* is the feeling of self-abasement blended with complete indifference towards worldly objects.²⁵ It is neither a cool and calculating attitude towards self or an external object nor a logical determination to renounce the world. It is rather an unpleasant state of feeling wrought either in the mood of despondency or in a hot temper. The mental affection which it involves is thus obvious.

10. *Glāṃ* is the feeling of utter exhaustion due to intercourse, exertion, mental worry, pangs of thirst and hunger, or the like.²⁶ It is merely the consciousness of the organic sensations and not a mental affection. While discussing emotion in the preceding chapter I have said that though the organic changes are the essential constituents of an emotion, yet their consciousness is immaterial in an emotional experience, and that the organic changes by themselves cannot excite an emotion. Trembling and change of colour etc., which have been called the expressions of *Glāni*, do not constitute the organic side of any emotion, they are only the external bodily changes manifested

²³ "एको रसः करुण एव.....।" —*Uttararāmacarita*, III. 47, p. 97.

²⁴ "शृंगारे विप्रलम्भाख्ये करुणे च प्रकर्षवत् ।
माधुर्यमार्द्रता याति यतस्तत्राधिक मनः ॥" —*D.A.*, p. 96.

²⁵ "तत्त्वज्ञानापदीष्यदिनिर्वेदः स्वावमाननम् ।" —*Daśarūpaka*, p. 79.

"विपत्ति, इर्षा और ज्ञानादि के कारण अपने शरीर अथवा सांसारिक विषयो में जो विराग भाव उत्पन्न होता है उसे निर्वेद संचारी कहते हैं"
—*R.K.*, p. 29.

²⁶ "रत्यायासमनस्तापक्षुत्पिपासादिसंभवा ।
ग्लानिर्निष्प्राणताकम्पकार्यानुत्साहतादिकृत् ॥" —*S.D.*, p. 143.

in an exhausted state of organism of which the feeling of *Glāni* is the mental registration.

11. *Śaṅkā* is the feeling of apprehension called forth by the anticipation of a great 'misfortune.'²⁷ Parching of the mouth, trembling and anxious looks etc. in which this feeling externally manifests itself clearly suggest the affected nature of consciousness at the time of experiencing the feeling.

12. *Śrama* is the feeling of fatigue caused by some bodily exertion.²⁸ It is again, like *Glāni*, merely a consciousness of the organic sensations and not a mental affection. The difference between *Glāni* and *Śrama* appears to be only of degree and not of kind, for both of them are the feelings of weariness produced as a result of the consumption of energy, the former being experienced when this consumption is extraordinarily great and the latter when it is moderate.

13. *Dhṛti* is the feeling of contentment springing from the attainment of the desired object, knowledge or power.²⁹ It cannot be called a mental affection when it denotes the steadiness of the mind. But when it is expressed in a smile or the like, it does involve a mental affection, for then along with contentment it suggests also the delight of attaining the cherished end or object. However, as there is another feeling, viz., *Harṣa* or joy, which denotes this sort of delight and which we shall consider presently, it is but proper to disagree with the view, which makes smile etc. the external manifestation of the feeling of *Dhṛti*, and to agree with Bharata and Jagannātha according to whom the feeling denotes only a calm and composed state

²⁷ "किमनिष्ट मम भविष्यतीत्याकारश्चित्तवृत्तिशेषः शका ।"

—R.G., p. 98.

²⁸ "Grand epuiseinent resultant d'un effort".

—La Rhe. Sans., p. 332.

"श्रमः स्वेदोऽध्वररत्यादेः ।"

—Daśarūpaka, p. 80.

²⁹ "ज्ञानाभीष्टागमाद्यैस्तु संपूर्णस्पृहता धृतिः ।

सौहित्यवचनोल्लाससहसप्रतिभादिभूतः ॥"

—S.D., p. 142.

of consciousness.⁸⁰ Thus *Dhṛti* is an unemotional feeling involving a pacific state of consciousness.

14. *Jadatā* or stupor is not a feeling by itself, but it presupposes the existence of a feeling or a *Bhāva*. According to Dhanañjaya it is "incapacity for action, caused by seeing or hearing something agreeable or disagreeable"; and "in this state one gazes with unwinking eyes, remaining silent and the like".⁸¹ Consciousness is dynamic in nature, one idea being quickly succeeded by another. In stupor whatever feelings or ideas are in the focus of consciousness, they stick there for sometime. It is not something to which mind can attend, it is rather a durational fixation of the attention at the phenomenon being attended to. So stupor is the static quality of consciousness and not a state of it. The question, therefore, whether or not it is a mental affection does not arise at all.

15. *Harsa* is the feeling of joy called forth at the attainment of the desired object.⁸² McDougall has called it a derived emotion. I have already pointed out while discussing *Dhṛti* that this feeling is a mental affection. Weeping, sweating and stammering etc., in which *Harsa* externally manifests itself, further indicate unequivocally the affected nature of consciousness which it involves.

16. *Dainya* is the feeling of depression due to misery, misfortune and the like.⁸³ The person affected with this feeling becomes downcast, loses confidence in himself and speaks of his deplorable condition in a

⁸⁰ "चापलाद्युपशमोऽनुभाव ।"

—R.G.

"प्राप्तानाम् उपभोग अप्राप्तैः न शोकः ।"

—N.S., chap. VII.

⁸¹ *Daśarūpa*, IV. 13.

⁸² "इष्टप्राप्त्यादिजन्मा सुखविशेषो हर्षः ।"

—R.G., p. 94.

⁸³ "दौर्गत्याद्यैरनौजस्य दैन्यम् ।"

—S.D., p. 133 and *Daśarūpaka*, p. 82.

"दुःखदारिद्र्यापराधादिजन्ताः स्वापकर्षभाषणादिहेतुश्चित्तवृत्तिविशेषो दैन्यम् ।"

—R.G., p. 99.

touching tone, a tone which would excite sympathy and melt any heart if it is not a stone. The affected state of consciousness of a miserable person is too obvious to require a proof.

17. *Ugratā* denotes a state of consciousness which is brought forth by the infliction of some insult or abuse. The person under the sway of the feeling of *Ugratā* becomes cruel and is liable to punish the inflictor of the insult with as great a sentence as that of death. It involves an affected state of consciousness for it is nothing other than the feeling of anger, the only point of difference being this that, while the latter feeling is permanent or *Sthāyī*, the former one is transitory or *Sañcārī*.⁸⁴

18. *Cintā* is the feeling of painful meditation aroused by the non-attainment of the desired object.⁸⁵ The symptoms of vacant looks, sighs and feverishness, in which the feeling externally manifests itself, clearly indicate that it is a mental affection.

19. *Trāsa* is only a synonym to *Bhāya* or fear. As a *Sañcārībhāva*, however, it has been differentiated from *Bhaya*, the former being accompanied by a sudden startling or trembling and the latter being called forth after some consideration.⁸⁶ But in spite of this difference the affected nature of consciousness involved in fear remains unaffected during the experience of *Trāsa*.

20. *Asūyā* or envy is the feeling of unpleasantness due to another's prosperity.⁸⁷ The existence of this feeling certainly involves an affected state of conscious-

⁸⁴ "अधिक्षेपापमानादिप्रभवा किमस्य करोमिइत्याद्याकारा चित्तवृत्तिरुग्रता ।
..... वधेच्छानुभाव ।... नाप्यसौ कोधः तस्य स्थायित्वेनास्याः
संचारिणीत्वेनैव भेदात् ।" —R. G., pp. 108-109.

⁸⁵ "ध्यान चिन्ता हितानाप्तेः शून्यताश्वासतापकृत ।"
—S. D., p. 143 and *Daśarūpaka*, p. 82.

⁸⁶ Vide K.K., p. 149.

⁸⁷ "परोत्कर्षदर्शनादिजन्यः परानिन्दादिकारिणीभूतश्चित्तवृत्तिविशेषोऽसूया ।"
—R. G., p. 114.

ness, for, if it were not to do so, censure, contempt, frowning and wrathful gestures etc. could not have been its external manifestations.

21. *Amarṣa* or the feeling of indignation is only a less intense degree of anger³⁸ which, as already shown, is a mental affection.

22. *Garva* or the feeling of pride has been recognized by McDougall as a primary emotion. He has called it the emotion of elation and has based it on the instinct of self-assertion or self-display.³⁹ It is an affection of consciousness due to one's idea of his superiority in might, beauty, education, descent and the like.⁴⁰

23. *Smṛti* is recollection of a past experience called forth by the perception or idea of some associated phenomenon⁴¹. It is not a mental condition or a state of consciousness; it is merely a mental process, the process of transference of an idea from the unconscious to the focus of consciousness.

24. *Marana* or death again is not a feeling or a *Bhāva*, for the person who is no more living cannot have the consciousness to feel death.⁴² Even if agreeing with Jagannātha we understand by *Marana* the state of swooning precedent to death it cannot be called a *Bhāva* for the state of swooning also implies negation of consciousness.⁴³

25. *Mada* or intoxication does not refer to any particular feeling. It is the cessation of the normal functioning of the mind due to drinking. There

³⁸ Vide K.K., p. 144.

³⁹ Vide *Social Psych.*, p. 57.

⁴⁰ "गर्वो मद. प्रभावश्रीविद्यासत्कुलतादिज ।" —S.D., p. 136.

⁴¹ "सदृश वस्तु के अवलोकन तथा चिन्तन, विहारस्थल के परिदर्शन आदि से जो पूर्वानुभूत बात याद हो आती है, उसे 'स्मृति' कहते हैं ।" —R.K., p. 46.

⁴² "शराद्यैर्मरण जीवत्यागोऽङ्कपतनादिकृत ।" —S.D., p. 136.

⁴³ "रोगादिजन्या मूर्च्छारूपा मरणप्रागवस्था मरणम् ।" —R.G., p. 109.

seems to be no justification in attributing to it any excess of joy as it has been done by a majority of the Hindi and Saṁskṛta scholars of poetics.⁴⁴ Poddāra, therefore, has rightly disconnected *Mada* with any sort of joy or happiness.⁴⁵

26. *Supta* or dreaming is the abnormal state of consciousness during sleep in which ideal images appear as percepts. By itself it is not any particular feeling or *Bhāva*, but the person who is dreaming is liable to experience all those feelings which he can in his normal state of consciousness when he is awake.⁴⁶

27. *Nidrā* or sleeping is "cessation of the activity of the mind".⁴⁷ It cannot be a *Bhāva* or a state of consciousness, for it implies negation of consciousness. That sleep is opposed to consciousness is confirmed by Professor Ladd who has described consciousness as "what we are when we are awake, as contrasted with what we are when we sink into profound and perfectly dreamless sleep....., what we are less and less, as we sink gradually down into a dreamless sleep.....".⁴⁸

28. *Vibhodha* or awakening is regaining normal consciousness after sleep.⁴⁹ Yawning and rubbing the eyes, which have been said to accompany *Vibhodha*, are not its external manifestations; they are rather the instinctive impulses to restore activity in one's organism which had been inactive for some time. If imperatively we are to find a connection between yawning etc. and awakening, we may call the latter the consciousness of the sensations of the organic changes of which the former are the external expressions.

⁴⁴ "हर्षोत्कर्षो मदः ।"

—*Daśarūpa*, p. 85.

⁴⁵ Vide K.K., p. 128.

⁴⁶ "निद्रामग्नस्य विषयानुभवः स्वप्नः कोपावेगभयग्लानिसुखदुःखोदिकारकं ।"

—S.D., p. 135.

⁴⁷ *Daśarūpa*, IV. 23.

⁴⁸ Cited in *Text book of Psych.*, p. 52.

⁴⁹ "विबोधः परिणामादेस्तत्र जृम्भाक्षिमर्दने ।" —*Daśarūpa*, p. 85.

29. *Vṛidā* is the feeling of shame or bashfulness. It is one of McDougall's primary emotions and has been called by him the emotion of subjection or negative self-feeling. In women it is called forth at the sight of men and in men by the idea of their misconduct or defeat.⁵⁰ It "expresses itself in a slinking, crest-fallen behaviour, a general diminution of muscular tone, slow restricted movements, a hanging down of the head and sidelong glances".⁵¹ The affected nature of consciousness during the experience of shame is proved by its external manifestations which otherwise cannot be accounted for by merely a cold cognition of objects or ideas.

30. *Apasmāra* or epilepsy is a disease and not a feeling. Its symptoms are "falling to the ground, trembling, sweating, drooping, frothing at the mouth and the like".⁵² This state may be brought during the operation of any strong emotion. By itself it is neither an emotion nor even a feeling. The person who has been attacked with epilepsy is most apt to be unconsciousness. But if the attack is mild and a slight degree of consciousness is there, it may be either the consciousness of the organic sensation or the psychic side of the emotion which has called forth the attack. *Apasmāra*, a disease as it is, has been dealt with in better details in the works on medicine⁵³ rather than in the works on poetics.

31. *Moha* or distraction is either an unconscious state of the mind⁵⁴ or an abnormal state of consciousness

⁵⁰ "स्त्रियो को पुरुष के देखने आदि से और पुरुषो को प्रतिज्ञाभग, पराभव एवं निन्दित कार्य करने आदि से वैवर्ण्य और अधोमुख आदि करनेवाली लज्जा ही व्रीडा है ।"
—K.K., p. 134.

⁵¹ *Social Psych.*, p. 55.

⁵² *Daśarūpa*, IV. 25.

⁵³ Vide *Mādhavandāna*, pp. 137-138.

⁵⁴ "मोहो विचित्ता भीतिदुःखावेगानुचिन्तनैः ।
मूर्च्छनाज्ञानपतनभ्रमणादर्शनादिकृत् ॥"

—S.D., p. 135.

in which mind is not able to perceive things in their right perspective.⁵⁵ Obviously, it cannot be a *Bhāva* in the former case. In the latter too it is merely a distortion of the normal functioning of the mind due to some intense affection.

32. *Matī* is an unsceptic decision reached after considering the views of the *Śāstras* and the like.⁵⁶ It is thus a cool and unaffected state of consciousness, an unemotional *Bhāva* or feeling.

33. *Alasatā* or indolence, which is the feeling of "inactivity from weariness, pregnancy and so on"⁵⁷ cannot be a mental affection, for it is, like *Glāni* and *Śrama*, merely the consciousness of some organic sensations.

34. *Āvega* is the feeling of confused⁵⁸ and quickened action⁵⁹ resulting from the sudden and unexpected appearance of something desirable or undesirable.⁶⁰ The mental affection which this feeling involves is self-evident.

35. *Tarka* denotes a discussive state of the mind due to doubtfulness or uncertainty.⁶¹ By itself it is purely a cognitive and unemotional feeling. But when at the time of experiencing this feeling the consciousness is already affected with some emotion, it may also assume an emotional character.

⁵⁵ भयवियोगादिप्रयोज्या वस्तुतत्त्वानवधारिणी चित्तवृत्तिर्मोहः ।"

—R.G., p. 97.

⁵⁶ "शास्त्रादिविचारजन्यमर्थनिर्धारणं मतिः ।"

—*Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁵⁷ *Daśarīpa*, IV. 27.

⁵⁸ "आवेगः स भ्रमः ।"

—S.D., p. 132.

⁵⁹ "प्रिय अप्रिय देखे सुनें, गात पात से वेग ।

होय अचानक भूरि भ्रम, सो वरनै आवेग ।"

—B.V., p. 43.]

⁶⁰ "Emotion resultant de l'apparition subite et inattendue de quelque chose que l'on désire ou que l'on redoute".

—*La Rhet. Sans.*, p. 337.

⁶¹ "तर्को विचारः सन्देहात् ।"

—S.D., p. 143.

36. *Avahitthā* or the feeling of dissimulation expresses itself in the voluntary attempt to conceal the expressions of an emotion.⁶² It is the cognitional realization of the inappropriateness in expressing certain gestures at a particular occasion. Thus obviously it is an unemotional feeling.

37. *Vyādhi* is sickness due to physical derangement.⁶³ On the psychic side it may denote the consciousness of some organic sensations.

38. *Unmāda* or insanity is an abnormal state of the mind in which reason ceases to function. It is brought forth either by a physical derangement⁶⁴ or by the action of some strong emotion.⁶⁵ It is not any particular *Bhāva* by itself, but the person affected with it is liable to experience most of the feelings.

39. *Viṣāda* is the feeling of helplessness and despair occasioned by the lack of success in some undertaking.⁶⁶ It is one of McDougall's derived emotions. Heaving and drawing of the sighs and the like in which this feeling is expressed show clearly that it involves an affected state of consciousness.

40. *Autsukya* is the feeling of impatience in respect of getting the desired object without any lapse of time.⁶⁷ The restless state of the mind during the experience of this feeling indicates unambiguously that it is a mental affection.

⁶² "व्रीडादिभिर्निमित्तैर्हर्षाद्यनुभावाना गोपनाय जनितो भावविशेषोऽवहित्यम् ।"
—R.G., p. 108.

⁶³ "वातपित्तकफसन्निपातप्रभवः । तस्य ज्वरादयो विशेषा ।"
—N.S., chap. VII.

⁶⁴ "अप्रेक्षाकारितोन्मादः सन्निपातग्रहादिभिः ।" —*Daśarūpaka*, p. 89.

⁶⁵ "चित्तसमोह उन्माद कामशोकभयादिभिः ।" —S.D., p. 138.

⁶⁶ "उपायाभावजन्मा तु विषादः सत्त्वसक्षयः ।" —*Ibid.*, p. 141.

"प्रारब्धकार्यासिद्ध्यादेर्विषादः ।" —R.G., p. 89.

⁶⁷ "अघ्ननैवास्य लाभो ममास्त्वित्तीच्छा औत्सुक्यम् ।" —R.G., p. 111.

41. *Capalatā* or inconstancy is not a feeling by itself ; It rather presupposes the existence of some other feelings.⁸⁸ It is the dynamic quality of consciousness as opposed to the static denoted by *Jadatā*. When the consciousness is *Jada* or static, the tendency of the attention is to remain fixed at an object for an unusual period of time ; when it is *Capala* or inconstant, the tendency of the attention is to slide away with unusual hurry.

Besides the forty-one *Bhāvas* of Bharata discussed above five more have been added to the list by the later writers on poetics. They are :—

- (i) *Śama*, the *Sthāyībhāva* of the *Śānta Rasa*,
- (ii) *Sneha*, the *Sthāyībhāva* of the *Preyaś Rasa*,
- (iii) *Vātsalya*, the *Sthāyībhāva* of the *Vatsala Rasa*,
- (iv) *Bhakti*, the *Sthāyībhāva* of the *Bhakti Rasa*,⁸⁹
- (v) *Chala*, the thirty-fourth *Sañcārībhāva* as assumed by Deva.

Let us scrutinize these *Bhāvas* also and see whether or not they are mental affections.

- (i) *Śama* or tranquillity of the mind, as indicated by its very name, cannot be an affected state of consciousness. It is, therefore, an un-emotional feeling.
- (ii) *Sneha* is the feeling of friendly affection. It cannot be anything other than mental affection

⁸⁸ “मात्सर्यद्वेषरागादेश्चापत्य त्वनवस्थितिः ।” —S. D., p. 142.

⁸⁹ “Bharata mentions only eight *Rasas*, Udbhata and a more ancient author Kohala add one more, namely *Śānta* ; Rudraṭa adds one more, *Preyaś* or *Sneha*. Dharmasūri informs us that there are authors who accept another *Rasa* called *Vatsala* ; and others who accept another called *Bhakti*”.

—Definition of Poetry or Kavya, pp. 50-51.

when it is manifested in flowing of⁷⁰ tears, looking with wide open eyes and the like.⁷⁰

(iii) *Vātsalya* or parental affection is the tender emotion of McDougall which he has based on the parental instinct.⁷¹ The mental affection which this feeling involves is, for obvious reasons, more intense in degree than the friendly affection.

(iv) *Bhakti* or the feeling of devotion is an extremely affected state of consciousness. The person genuinely affected with this feeling manifests his love for the Lord generally in one of the worldly relations. *Bhakti Rāsa* has been regarded as the King of *Rasas* by Hariaudha,⁷² Poddāra⁷³ and others.

(v) *Chala*, as revealed in the illustration given by Deva,⁷⁴ is a trickful device to avenge one's grievance. On the psychic side it denotes a thoughtfully worked out plan. Hence it is an unemotional feeling.

⁷⁰ “स्नेहप्रकृति प्रेयान्सगतशीलार्यनायको भवति ।
स्नेहस्तु साहचर्यात्प्रकृतेरुपचारसंबन्धात् ॥
निर्व्यजिमनोवृत्तिः सनर्मसद्भावपेशलालापाः ।
अन्योन्य प्रति सुहृदोर्व्यवहरोऽयं मतस्तत्र ॥
प्रस्यन्दिप्रमदाश्रुः सुस्निग्धस्फारलोचनालोकः ।
आर्द्रान्तिःकरणतया स्नेहपदे भवति सर्वत्र ॥”

—*Kāvya-lankāra*, p. 166.

⁷¹ Vide *Social Psych.*, p. 56.

⁷² Vide his article *Vātsalya Rāsa* in *Nāgarī Prācārini Patrika*, vol. X.

⁷³ Vide his *S.S.I.*, vol. II, pp. 89-96.

⁷⁴ “स्याम सयाने कहावत है कहौ, आजु को काहि सयानु है दीनो ।
देव कहै दुरि टेरी कुटिर मैं, आपनो बैर बधू उहि लीनो ॥
चूमि गई मुंह औचक ही, पटु लै गई पै इन बाहि न चीन्हो ।
छैल भले छिन ही मे छले, दिन ही मैं छबीली भलो छल कीन्हो ॥”

—*B.V.*, p. 60.

Having thus examined the forty-six *Bhavas* we discover the following facts :—

- (a) All the eight *Sthāyībhāvas* of Bharata are mental affections ;
- (b) Out of the thirty-three *Sañcārībhāvas* of Bharata fourteen are mental affections,
- (c) Four are unemotional feelings,
- (d) Five are feelings of organic sensations, and
- (e) The rest ten cannot be termed as feelings or *Bhāvas* ;
- (f) Out of the four *Sthāyībhāvas* added by others three are mental affections,
- (g) One is an unemotional feeling ; and
- (h) The thirty-fourth *Sañcārībhāva* mentioned by Deva is an unemotional feeling.

We were to consider in the present section of this work *Rasa* as Emotion. The *Bhāvas* which have been shown to be mental affections are obviously emotions if viewed in conjunction with the respective bodily and visceral changes that accompany them. But there are others which are not mental affections. How can we make *Rasa* mean *Emotion* when they are there? Here is an answer. Among the *Sthāyībhāvas* only *Śama* is an unemotional feeling. But the corresponding *Rasa*, viz., *Śanta*, has not been recognized by all the writers on poetics.⁷⁵ The unemotional feelings among the *Sañcārībhāvas* can, however, be experienced with the emotional ones, for the emotional and the unemo-

⁷⁵ "The author of *Daśarūpa*, however, contends that there can be no such *Sthāyībhāva* as *Nirveda* or *Śama*, for the development of that state (if it is at all possible to destroy love, hatred and other human feelings) would tend to the absence of all moods ; and in the Drama, the object of which is to delineate and inspire passion, it is inadmissible".

—*Hist. of Poetics*, vol. II, chap. VIII.

tional experiences of the mind are interdependent.⁷⁶ Moreover, if unemotional feelings were to be intentionally included among the *Bhāvas* as independent units of experience, their number ought to have been infinitely greater than four or five, for every thought or reflection is an unemotional feeling. Besides this the *Vibhāvas* and the *Anubhāvas*, which are among the constituents of *Rasa*, are distinctly available only in connexion with the emotional feelings. The fact that the unemotional feelings have not been eliminated from the list of the *Bhāvas* since they were once included in it is to be accounted for by the tendency to stick to the convention.⁷⁷ The feelings of the organic sensations are, as we have already said, merely the automatic mental registrations of the internal sensations arising out of the changes in the organism. Hence in spite of being mental experiences they cannot be called feelings proper in this context, for primarily they denote the states of the organism rather than the states of the mind. The ten so called *Bhāvas*, which are not at all feelings, may sometimes either precede as *Vibhāvas* or succeed as after effects an emotional experience. *Smṛti* or recollection, for instance, is the ideal presentation of a *Vibhāva*, and *Marana* or death may be the effect of a very strong emotional excitement. Thus we may safely conclude that *Rasa*, apart from its relish and with reference to its constituents is essentially emotion, the nonemotional *Bhāvas* being there only as subsidiaries to the emotional experiences.

⁷⁶ "In distinguishing the cognitions, feelings and conations, it is not to be supposed that these phenomena are possible independent of each other. In every modification of mind, knowledge, feeling, and desire or will go to constitute the mental state; and it is only by a scientific abstraction that we are able to analyse the state into elements, which are never really existent but in mutual combination"

—Hamilton, Cited in *Text Book of Psych.*, p. 93.

⁷⁷ "एव सक्षेपेण निरूपिता भावाः । अथ कथमस्य संख्यानियमः ।
मुनिवचनानुपालनस्य संभव उच्छृङ्खलताया अनौचित्यात् ।"

—R.G., p. 118.

CHAPTER III

VIBHĀVAS AND ANUBHĀVAS

Every emotion, as we know, involves three elements: the excitant cause, the psychic or mental affection and the organic changes. The factors in *Rasa* are four: *Sthāyi* and *Sañcārībhāvas*, *Vibhāvas* and *Anubhāvas*. We have already examined the *Sthāyi* and *Sañcārībhāvas* in the preceding chapter and have found them to be the mental affections forming the psychic sides of the emotions. The *Vibhāvas* and the *Anubhāvas*, with which we are to deal in the present chapter, correspond exactly to the excitant causes and the organic changes respectively; thus making *Rasa* congruous with Emotion.

The term *Vibhāva*, according to Bharata, is synonymous with Cause.¹ With reference to *Rasa* it is the cause of a *Bhāva* or a mental condition, for a *Bhāva*, says Bharata while defining the latter, is called forth by a *Vibhāva*.² But we can no longer take a *Vibhāva* to be the cause of merely the psychic affection involved in an emotion, for both the psychic affection and the organic changes that accompany it are the effects of a common cause. While discussing Emotion in the first chapter of this section we had discarded the common-sense theory of the emotions, which makes a mental condition the cause of the bodily changes along with that of James, which inverting the popular theory makes the bodily changes the cause of a mental condition. Even in Samskr̥ta poetics an explicit notion of cause and effect does not seem to be present between a *Bhāva* and an *Anubhāva*, the latter having been called only the external manifestation or the indicator of the

¹ "विभावः कारण निमित्त हेतुरिति पर्यायः ।" —N.S., chap. VII.

² "विभावेनाहृतो यः.....स भावः ।" —N.S., VII. 1.

former.³ The reason of the fact that the scholars of poetics have established no relation between a *Vibhāva* and an *Anubhāva* appears to be this that they have taken these terms merely as subservient to the realization of *Rasa* or poetic relish and have not discussed them as interrelated elements of an emotional experience.⁴ We can, therefore, safely, without deviating from its traditional usage, make the term *Vibhāva* mean the Excitant Cause of a whole emotion, of the psychic affection or the *Bhāva* and of the accompanying organic changes or the *Anubhāvas*.

Vibhāva has been broken up in two parts : *Ālambana* and *Uddīpana*. *Ālambana Vibhāva* refers to the person or the object in respect of whom the emotion is experienced and whose appearance, ideal or perceptual, is directly responsible for the evocation of the emotion⁵; *Uddīpana Vibhāva* refers to the situation or the environment in which that person or object is placed and which is helpful in intensifying the emotional experience⁶. It will be noticed that the *Ālambana Vibhāva* thus defined corresponds with the object to which, according to Drever, an emotion always involves an affective relation⁷, and the *Uddīpana Vibhāva* with a certain general kind of situation which, according to Stout, excites a certain kind of emotion⁸. I had

³ "योऽर्थस्त्वनुभावेन गम्यते.....स भावः ।" —N.S., VII. 1.

"अनुभावो विकारस्तु भावसंसूचनात्मकः ।" —*Daśarūpaka*, p. 77.

⁴ This contention is further confirmed by the fact that by the Dhvanikāra (Vide *D.A.* and *Lecana*, p. 78) and his followers *Rasa* has been regarded as an *Asamlakṣyākrama Vyangya* or a suggestion in which the order of sequence of the direct and the suggested meanings is not well perceived.

⁵ "आलम्बनो नायकादिस्तमालम्ब्य रसोद्गमात् ।" —*S.D.*, p. 91.

⁶ "उद्दीपनविभावास्ते रसमुद्दीपयन्ति ये ।" —*Ibid.*, p. 128.

⁷ Refer to Drever's first characteristic of *Emotion* quoted in the first chapter of the present section.

⁸ Refer to Stout's second characteristic of *Emotion* quoted *ibidem*.

criticized, it may be recalled, both Drever and Stout for giving these as essential features of all emotional experiences, the former because I upheld that an emotional experience does not necessarily involve an object, and the latter because I maintained that an emotion is excited by a particular idea and not by a certain general kind of situation. I still cleave to my former position. A *Vibhāva* or an object with the complex objective situation in which it is placed can never be the true cause of an emotion ; for, if it be such, it should always be able to excite its relative emotion by its presence, which it does not. A person cannot always feel the sexual emotion in the presence of his young and beautiful wife even if privacy, a fine breeze and some of the other conventional *Uddīpana Vibhāvas* be available to him. Similarly every thwarting or opposition need not always excite anger in the mind of every person.

What, then, is the position and the importance of the *Vibhāvas* in relation to the emotions? If they are not the immediate causes of the emotions, are they so related with the ideas that call forth the emotions? Let us attempt to answer these questions. An emotion is called forth by an idea. But the idea, in its turn, must have something to account for its occurrence. What can that something be? Surely, the *Ālambana* and the *Uddīpana Vibhāvas* cannot constitute the whole of that something, for if they do, their presence should always be able to evoke the relative idea and consequently the corresponding emotion. But the *Vibhāvas*, without doubt, do constitute a part of the cause of an idea, the other part being the nature, disposition, and attitude of the mind in which the idea occurs. Here is an illustration to make the point clear. Two friends are out on a walk. They meet a long snake creeping slowly across the gate of a park they are about to enter. Immediately after seeing the reptile one of them is overcome with fear and withdraws himself backwards ; the other judiciously aims his stick at the hood of the animal and is able to lay it dead. The object and the

external situation or the *Ālambana* and the *Uddīpana Vibhavas* are the same for the two persons, but the idea of danger has occurred in the mind of only one of them, who, on this account experiences the emotion of fear. The reason of this difference in feeling and behaviour is obviously the difference in the mental dispositions of the two persons. Thus the complete cause for the occurrence of an idea is made up of an objective situation⁹ plus a subjective disposition of the mind. When by the combination of the two phenomena the idea has occurred, the emotion is bound to be experienced. The incompleteness of the *Vibhāvas* as a cause for the excitation of an emotion has been recognized even by the writers on poetics, for they have admitted that a *Vibhāva* by itself cannot suggest a definite emotion.¹⁰

But the importance of the *Vibhāvas*, in spite of their falling short as an immediate and complete cause, is great in the delineation of an emotion. The subjective mental disposition, in conjunction with which the *Vibhāvas* are able to evoke the idea causing the emotion, is vague and evades all verbal description. It cannot be expressed even in clumsy language by the person who himself is experiencing an emotion. The mention of the idea that calls forth the emotion is needless, for the emotion to be delineated presupposes its existence. The only thing that can either be put down with accuracy in black and white or be perceived or realized with ease by an onlooker are the *Vibhāvas*. Hence from the relevant and practical point of view of depicting the emotions in poetry and drama it is quite in the fitness of things to call the *Vibhāvas* the causes of the emotions. But from the prominence that has been assigned to the *Vibhāvas*, which are

⁹ The objective situation need not always be perceptual; it may be either perceptual, or ideal, or both.

¹⁰ Refer to Abhinavagupta's seventh obstacle in the realization of *Rasa*, viz., *Samśayayoga*, dealt with in *Theories of Rasa and Dhvani*, p. 108, and in *Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure*, p. 190.

objective phenomena, it should not be concluded that the subjective dispositions of the mind are altogether negligible. Their importance is of much more permanent value in as much as they are taken to be the indicators of character. But for this difference in the mental dispositions all men should have been feeling and acting alike in similar situations, and there should have existed no difference between one person and another except that of physical twoness.

Before concluding this discussion on the *Vibhāvas* a mention, however, should be made of the subject known as *Nāyaka-Nāyikā-Bheda* or the Classification of the Heroes and the Heroines. Men and women, particularly the latter, as *Ālambana Vibhāvas* of the sexual emotion or *Śrngara Rasa* have been divided and redivided into classes and subclasses on the bases of age, behaviour, situation and mutual relationship. Not only the two parties in love have been dealt with under this topic, but also their respective assistants—the companions (*Sahāyaka Sakhā*) of the hero and the friends (*Sakhī*) and the messengers (*Dūtī*) of the heroine. The exuberant details and elaborateness with which this subject has been treated make it an independent theme for study not comprisable in the present work.

Anubhāvas, as we have already noted, are the external manifestations of the *Bhāvas*. The term *Anubhāva* should be analysed not to mean what occurs after a *Bhāva* but to mean what suggests or indicates a *Bhāva*.¹¹ According to Bharata *Anubhāvas* are divisible into three classes: *Vācika* or those that are expressed by words, *Āṅgika* or bodily, and *Sāttvika* or those expressions that result from some internal organic changes.¹² The organic changes that form a part of an emotion are only of two kinds: the external bodily changes including

¹¹ Jagannātha has analysed the term in both ways:

“अनुपश्चाद्भाव उत्पत्तिर्येषाम् । अनुभावयन्तीति व व्युत्पत्तेः ।”

—R.G., p. 39.

¹² “वागङ्गसरवाभिनयैः स भाव इति सञ्ज्ञितः ।”

—N.S., VII. 1.

facial gestures, and the internal visceral and glandular changes. A comparative study of the above two types of divisions of the accompaniments of the *Bhāvas* or the mental conditions reveals that while the class of the external bodily changes has been commonly recognized, *Anubhāvas* are unique in including in their conception even the words that are uttered by the person under an emotional influence and in excluding all the internal changes. The *Sāttvikabhāvas*, which under *Anubhāvas* form a separate class, are included in the conception of bodily modifications. This difference in the literary and the psychological conceptions of the *Anubhāvas* or the organic changes in an emotion should not be distressing to us, for it can easily be accounted for by the difference in the point of view of an artist and that of a scientist. It is never the task of a poet to sit down in a well equipped psychological laboratory and to note with the help of instruments the changes that are undergone by the viscera and the glands of a person who is emotionally affected. Nor can he ever afford to neglect either the wrathful words of an angry person or the passionate sentences of a young couple in love ; for he has to pen them, together with the bodily manifestations, to make the picture vivid, to make the context clear, and to link what he has said with what he shall say.

Though it can never be possible to number the external manifestations of the emotions, yet an attempt has been made by the writers on poetics to fix the number and the names of certain special *Anubhāvas*, some of them being peculiar only to women as *Ālambana Vibhāvas* of the *Śṛṅgāra Rasa*, and the others being common to men and women both. The former have been called the *Sāttvika Alankāras* of a *Nāyikā* and the latter the *Sāttvikabhāvas*. The *Sāttvika Alankāras* or the Natural Graces of a Heroine are twenty according to Dhanañjaya. They are : 1. *Bhāva* or Feeling, 2. *Hāva* or Emotion, 3. *Helā* or Passion, 4. *Sobhā* or Beauty, 5. *Kānti* or Loveliness, 6. *Dīpti* or Radiance,

7. *Mādhurya* or Sweetness, 8. *Pragalbhatā* or Courage, 9. *Andārya* or Dignity, 10. *Dhairya* or Self-control, 11. *Līlā* or Sportiveness, 12. *Vilāsa* or Delight, 13. *Vicchiti* or Tastefulness, 14. *Vibhrama* or Confusion, 15. *Kilakñcita* or Hysterical Mood, 16. *Mottāyita* or Manifestation of Affection, 17. *Kuttamita* or Pretended Anger, 18. *Vivvoka* or Affected Indifference, 19. *Lalita* or Lolling, and 20. *Vihṛta* or Bashfulness.¹⁸ Out of

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- ¹⁸ "1. Feeling is the first touch of Emotion in a nature that was previously unaffected
 2. Emotion is ardent love which produces a change in eyes and brows.
 3. That (i.e. Emotion) is Passion, when it is a very plain manifestation of the Emotion of Love.
 4. Beauty is bodily adornment due to handsome form, passionateness and youthfulness.
 5. Loveliness is the name given to the touch of beauty imparted by love.
 9. Radiance is higher degree of loveliness
 7. Sweetness is a quality not very intense.
 8. Courage is the quality of not becoming agitated.
 9. Dignity is courteous bearing at all times.
 10. Self-control is a state of mind not affected by inconstancy and free from boastfulness.
 11. Sportiveness is the imitation of a lover in the actions of a fair-limbed maiden.
 12. Delight is an immediate change in appearance, actions and the like at the sight of the beloved, etc.
 13. Tastefulness is an arrangement, though slight, of adornment so as to increase loveliness.
 14. Confusion consists in misplacing ornaments in haste on some occasion.
 15. Hysterical Mood is a combination of Anger, Weeping, Joy, Fear and the like.
 16. Manifestation of Affection is being absorbed in thought of him (i.e. one's lover) at a mention of him and the like.
 17. Pretended Anger is said to exist when a maiden, although inwardly filled with joy, is angry at her lover's touching her hair or her lip.
 18. Affected Indifference is neglectful behaviour even toward one that is loved, because of haughtiness due to pride.
 19. Lolling is graceful pose of one's fair form.
 20. Bashfulness is not speaking, because of modesty, even when there is opportunity".—*Daśarūpa*, pp. 58-65.

these the first three have been termed *Angaja* or Physical, the next seven (from *Sobhā* to *Dhairya*) *Ayatnaja* or Coming of their own Accord, and the rest *Svabhāvaja* or Arising from one's Disposition. To the class of the *Svabhāvaja Alaṅkāras* Viśvanātha has added eight more¹⁴ bringing the total number to twenty-eight. By the writers on poetics in the Ritī period of Hindī Literature though this number was reduced to even ten,¹⁵ twelve¹⁶ or thirteen,¹⁷ yet some of them recognized a new *Sāttvika Alaṅkāra* by the name of *Bodhaka* and another

¹⁴ They have been defined as follows in *S.D.*, (pp. 122-125) :—

1. *Mada*—

मदो विकारः सौभाग्ययौवनाद्यवलेपजः ।

2. *Tapana*—

तपन प्रियविच्छेदे स्मरावेगोत्थचेष्टितम् ।

3. *Mangdhya*—

अज्ञानादिव या पृच्छा प्रतीतस्यापि वस्तुनः ।
वत्तलभस्य पुरा प्रोक्तं मौग्ध्यं तत्तत्त्ववेदिभिः ॥

4. *Viksepa*—

भूषणामर्घरचना मिथ्या विष्वगवेक्षणम् ।
रहस्याख्यानमीषञ्च विक्षेपो दयितान्तिके ॥

5. *Kutūhala*—

रम्यवस्तुसमालोके लोलता स्यात्कुतूहलम् ।

6. *Hasita*—

हसितं तु वृथाहासो यौवनोद्भेदसम्भवः ।

7. *Cakṣita*—

कुलोऽपि दयितस्याग्रे चकितं भयसंभ्रमः ।

8. *Keli*—

विहारे सहक्रान्तेन क्रीडितं केलिरुच्यते ।

¹⁵ Matirāma, Deva and Bihārīlāla Bhaṭṭa have accepted only ten *Sāttvika Alaṅkāras* under the name of *Hāva*. They are the ten *Svabhāvaja Alaṅkāras* of Dhanañjaya. Vide *Rasarāsa*, p. 344, *Bhāvavilāsa*, p. 70, and *Sāhityasāgara*, p. 310. (Note—Bihārīlāla Bhaṭṭa is a contemporary author).

¹⁶ Padmākara has accepted twelve adding *Helā* and *Bodhaka*. Vide *Jagadvinoda*, pp. 173-174.

¹⁷ Keśava has admitted thirteen adding *Mada* to the twelve of Padmākara. Vide *Rasikapriyā*, chap. VI.

by the name of *Uddīpāna*¹⁸ mentioned neither by Dhanañjaya nor by Viśvanātha. It should, however, be noted that out of these thirty *Hāvas* or *Alankaras* all the seven which have been enumerated under the sub-head *Ayatana* and which have not been mentioned by most of the Rītikālīna writers on poetics, cannot be called *Anubhāvas*. Some of them are bodily excellences, while the others are qualities of character. The bodily excellences can serve only as *Uddīpāna Vibhāvas*, the *Nāyikā* in whom they exist being the *Ālambana Vibhāva*. The qualities of character ought to form the subjective part of the excitant cause of an emotion, if the emotion is being experienced by the person possessing these qualities. But if such person be the *Ālambana Vibhāva* of the emotion, these qualities would determine and guide his behaviour, which, as *Uddīpāna Vibhāva*, is responsible for intensifying the emotional experience.

Bharata has enumerated the following eight *Sāttvikabhāvas*: 1. *Stambha* or Paralysis, 2. *Sveda* or Sweating, 3. *Romāñca* or Horripilation, 4. *Svarasāda* or Sinking of Voice, 5. *Vepathu* or Trembling, 6. *Vaivarṇya* or Change of Colour, 7. *Āśru* or Tears, 8. *Pralaya* or Fainting¹⁹. To these have been added the ninth *Sāttvikabhāva Jṛmbhā* or Yawning²⁰ and the tenth *Stanyāsrāva* or Flowing of Milk from the Breast out of Motherly Affection.²¹ The thing which startles us

¹⁸ *Bodhaka* has been recognized by Gulāmanabī, Padmākara and Keśava, and *Uddīpāna* by Gulāmanabī according to whom the total number of the *Hāvas* is thirty. The definitions of *Bodhaka* and *Uddīpāna* are noted below:—

Bodhaka—

“ठानि क्रिया कछु तिय पुरुष बोधन करें जु हाव ।

रस-ग्रथन मे कहत है तासो बोधक हाव ॥” —*Jagadvinoda*, p. 174.

Uddīpāna—

“बातन को विस्तार जहँ उद्दीपन कहि ताइ ।” —*Rasaprabodha*, p. 91.

¹⁹ Vide N.S., VII. 93.

²⁰ Vide *Jagadvinoda*, p. 163, and *Rasarāja*, p. 343.

²¹ Vide *Kalyāna, Sāadhanāṅka*, p. 520. (*Gṛindranārāyaṇa Mallika, Pañcadhā Bhakti*).

at the outset about this class of *Anubhāvas* is the attribution of the term *Bhāva* or mental condition to it, for as *Anubhāvas* these are only the external manifestations of mental conditions and not mental conditions by themselves. The explanations that have been offered by Bharata,²² Bhoja²³ and Hemacandra²⁴ to show that these are *Bhāvas* are unconvincing as they do not confirm with the psychophysiology of the day. That they were not convincing also to the scholars of Samskṛta poetics is indicated by the fact that while Viśvanātha stressed that *Sāttvikābhāvas* are essentially external expressions of the mental conditions,²⁵ Mammata²⁶ did not think it worthwhile even to mention them separately. Moreover, if *Sāttvikābhāvas* were themselves mental conditions, each of them should not have been said to arise out of several other mental conditions.²⁷ The reason of this wrong attribution of the term *Bhāva* to this class of *Anubhāvas* is, however, not far to seek. The general muscular activities which form a part of an emotion are, in spite of being manifested involuntarily, subject to our voluntary control; they may be suppressed even when the emotion is being experienced and may be enacted even without any emotional experience. But *Sāttvikābhāvas*, unlike the general *Anubhāvas*, cannot be exercised upon a voluntary control. They are conditioned by the visceral and glandular changes which occur inside the organism simultaneous with a mental affection. In an extreme fit of anger, for instance, it may be possible for us not to strike the object that has enraged us, but *Vēpathu*

²² Vide N.S., p. 379.

²³ Vide S.K.A., V. 20, p. 556.

²⁴ Vide K.A., pp. 118-120.

²⁵ Vide S.D., p. 130.

²⁶ Vide his *Kāvya prakāśa*.

²⁷ Rūpagosvāmī has given for every *Sāttvikābhāva* as many clear illustrations as there are mental conditions to accompany it. For instance he has shown Horrification to accompany Wonder, Joy and Fear. Vide his U.N.M., pp. 328-340.

or trembling cannot be done away with unless, of course, we are able to suppress the emotion. In a like manner though we can easily pretend anger by clenching our fists and talking hotly, yet without an emotional excitement we cannot possibly horripilate, perspire or shed tears at will except by affecting our organism in some other way²⁸ to undergo these modifications. So it is on account of this dependence of the *Sāttvikabhāvas* on the internal organism, which is not under the control of the will, that they have been differentiated from the general *Anubhāvas* which are controllable by the will. But in spite of the validity of this differentiation there is not the least justification to call these particular kinds of *Anubhāvas* mental conditions, for even according to Bharata *Sattva* merely arises out of the mind²⁹ and is not a state of it. We can, however, call with reason an *Anubhāva* of this class a *Sāttvikānubhāva*.³⁰

A critical glance at the list of the so-called *Sāttvikabhāvas* seems to be necessary. It suffers from the lack of scientific revision as much as does the list of the *Bhāvas*, which we have already examined, because of the tendency to stick to convention. *Pralaya* or fainting, which has been included in this list, obviously cannot be an *Anubhāva* of a *Bhāva* or feeling, for while *Bhāva* necessarily implies consciousness, *Pralaya* indicates its negation. It can, however, be the after-effect of an emotional excitement. Blushing³¹ in shyness and reddening of the eyes and brightening of the face in anger also result from the internal functioning of the organism and must be included in this list.

²⁸ E.g., we can bring out perspiration by doing any hard muscular work.

²⁹ "इह सत्त्वं नाम मनःप्रभवम् ।"

—N S., p. 379.

³⁰ F. H. Lund has described the internal working of the organism involved in some of the *Sāttvikānubhāvas* such as Erection of the Hair, Perspiration of Hands and Feet, and Tears. Vide *Emotions of Men*, chaps. V & VI.

³¹ Blushing can hardly be included in *Vaivarnya*.

Another defect in the treatment of this class of *Anubhāvas* in the Indian poetics is the association of even the non-emotional stimuli with it. Tears, for instance, have been said to arise out of smoke.⁸² Though lacrimation is certainly caused by smoke also, yet such a lacrimation can never be included among the *Anubhāvas*; for how can we call anything the external manifestation of a feeling when no feeling is there. A distinction should be made, therefore, as has been done by some of the modern psychologists⁸³, between the manifestation of the *Sāttvikānubhāvas* in emotional situations and their occurrence as reflex reactions to chemical and mechanical stimulation.

A passing reference may be made here also to the general laws of expression discovered by Darwin and Wundt. According to Darwin the principles which "account for most of the expressions and gestures involuntarily used by man and the lower animals under the influences of various emotions and sensations"⁸⁴ are three :

1. The Principle of Serviceable Associated Habits,

⁸² "अश्रु—यह . . . धुआँ—रोगादि से उत्पन्न होता है ।"

—K K., pp. 122-123.

⁸³ Lund in making such a distinction has mentioned the following non-emotional stimuli for tears :

- "1. Irritation of the eyeball and lids through contact with foreign objects.
2. Irritation of the mucous membrane of the nose through inhalation of strong vapors or through some form of mechanical stimulation.
3. Violent laughter, coughing, retching, sneezing, and yawning.
4. Stimulation of the retina with infra-red or ultra-violet rays.

To these might be added a group of semi-emotional conditions capable of inducing tear secretion. Of such conditions increased tension under pain is perhaps most familiar. The effectiveness of a stinging switch on the face or a blow on the nose is also well known".—

Emotions of Men, p. 133.

⁸⁴ *Expression of the Emotions*, p. 4.

2. The Principle of Antithesis, and
3. The Principle of the Direct Action of the Nervous System.⁸⁵

Wundt has substituted his own principles for those of Darwin. They are :

1. The Principle of Direct Modification of Innervation,
2. The Principle of the Association of the Analogous Sensations, and
3. The Principle of the Relation between Movements and Sensory Representations.⁸⁶

A critical examination of the validity of these laws or principles is, however, not within the scope of this thesis which essentially aims at studying only such matter as is comprised in the subject of *Rasa* in the light of modern psychology.

⁸⁵ For a detailed exposition of these principles see *Expression of the Emotions*, chaps. I to III.

⁸⁶ Vide *Psych. of Emotions*, chap. IX.

CHAPTER IV

A CLASSIFICATION OF THE *BHĀVAS* AND *RASĀDI*

Bharata has divided *Bhāvas* into the classes of *Sthāyī*, *Vyabhicārī* or *Sañcārī*, and *Sāttvika*. We have already discussed in the two preceding chapters that the *Sthāyī* and *Sañcārībhāvas* are the mental affections or the psychic sides of the emotions, and that the *Sāttvika-bhāvas* are not *Bhāvas* at all. Thus this division of the *Bhāvas* amounts only to a twofold classification of the emotions, one class having permanent feelings on the psychic side and the other transitory. Let us find out in how many ways the terms *Sthāyī* and *Sañcārī*, which form the differentiae of these two species of feelings have been defined or interpreted and scrutinize whether the difference indicated by any of them at all exists in reality.

The first interpretation of these terms comes from Abhinavagupta. According to him the nine *Sthāyībhāvas*¹ exist permanently in every human mind in the form of latent impressions. They are evoked and developed by adequate causes and in proper circumstances, and when these causes and circumstances are withdrawn, they get back to their dormant conditions. *Sañcārībhāvas*, on the contrary, exist only so long as the exciting causes are there. When these causes are no more, the *Bhāvas* also cease to exist without leaving any trace (*Samīśakāra*) behind. Abhinavagupta clarifies this difference by giving an illustration. "When", says he, "the statement is made '*Glano'yam*', the question that at once arises is '*why?*' ; when, on the contrary, the statement is '*Utsāhasaktimānayaṃ Rāmaḥ*', the question that arises is '*in whose presence?*' The first question

¹ The eight of Bharata and *Sama* or Tranquillity the ninth,

relates to the cause that gives rise to exhaustion (*Glāni*) and second to the agency that brings out what already exists".*

By looking closely at the lists of *Bhāvas* of both the classes we can easily discover that the above contention of Abhinavagupta is absolutely groundless. Both classes of *Bhāvas* are called forth by certain *Vibhāvas*; and when the *Vibhāvas* are withdrawn, the *Bhāvas* also disappear. There is no evidence to suppose that it is in the case of the *Sthāyībhāvas* and *Sthāyībhāvas* alone that they exist in the mind in a latent form when not manifested. A *Samiskāra* or an impression of a *Bhāva* in a person may, at best, mean that the person is susceptible to that *Bhāva*—he is liable to experience it when placed in the proper circumstances. And keeping this meaning in view we can speak of *Samkāras* of all the *Bhāvas* whether *Sthāyī* or *Sanicārī*. We can say that a man is susceptible to joy (*Harsa*) with the same propriety with which we say that a man is susceptible to sorrow (*Soka*). The illustration cited by Abhinavagupta in the defence of his thesis, though cleverly chosen, cannot help him too far, for the test, which he has given us to differentiate between a *Sthāyī* and a *Sanicārībhāva*, fails when applied to many other *Bhāvas*. If the question 'why?' does not arise when the statement 'He is angry' is made, how can it appear when the statements 'He is feeling *Amarsa*' and 'He is feeling *Ugratā*' are made?† If we can put the question 'why?' at one's feeling joy, why can we not repeat it at his feeling sorrow? The question 'in whose presence?', as a matter of fact, constitutes only an incomplete inquiry about any emotional experience, for in reply to it we get only the person (or the object) in respect of whom (or which) the emotion is experienced. The

* *Phil of Aesth Pleasure*, p 172. Vide *ibid*, pp 169-172, and *A.B.*, p 284

† *Amarsa* and *Ugratā*, though placed under the class of *Sanicārībhāvas*, are almost synonyms to the *Sthāyībhāva Krodha* or Anger,

person or the object, as we have already discussed in the preceding chapter, while dealing with *Vibhāva* does not make even the full objective cause which comprises also the situation and environment in which the object is placed. So to make an enquiry complete about the cause of an emotion, whether having a permanent or a transitory feeling for its psychic side, the appearance of the question 'why?' is inevitable. It should also be marked here that *Glāni* or the feeling of exhaustion, which has been selected by Abhinavagupta for his illustration from the list of the *Sañcārībhāvas*, is only the consciousness of the organic sensations which are produced as the after-effects of an exertion and which have no concomitant phenomenon as their *Vibhāva*. It is on this account that the question 'in whose presence?' does not arise in connection with *Glāni*. Otherwise this question, in one form or another, should properly make its appearance and be satisfactorily answered with respect to any *Bhāva*, for every feeling, rightly so termed, must have something occurring simultaneously, may it be merely an idea, to account for its presence.

A second interpretation of the terms *Sthāyī* and *Sañcārī* can be gathered from the definitions of the two classes of *Bhāvas*. A *Sthāyībhāva* has been defined as one which cannot be subdued by another *Bhāva*, whether compatible or incompatible, and which subsists in the mind for a long time*. *Sañcārībhāvas*, on the contrary, are fleeting in character and they appear and disappear during the experience of a *Sthāyībhāva*.* Before admitting the difference suggested by these definitions let us first analyse them and find out how far they are consistent with truth.

The first essential character of a *Sthāyībhāva* is said to be this that it cannot be eclipsed by any other *Bhāva*.

* Vide *S.D.*, p. 144, and *R.G.*, p. 37.

* Vide *S.D.*, p. 131, and *K.K.*, pp. 123-124.

This position is obviously ridiculous. There is no such inherent miraculous power in any *Bhāva* by the dint of which it can irremovably exist in a mind. A *Bhāva*, as we know, needs a *Vibhāva* or a cause to be called forth and to continue to exist. As soon as the *Vibhāva* is withdrawn, the *Bhāva* must disappear. As soon as one *Vibhāva* replaces another, a *Bhāva* corresponding to the succeeding *Vibhāva* must be substituted. How, then, can it be held that the *Bhāvas* placed under the class of *Sthāyī* are not overcome by other *Bhāvas*. A millionaire engaged in an amorous pastime with a wanton suddenly hears the news that he has lost his fortunes and has been reduced to a beggar. The feeling of sexual love, which has been classed permanent, immediately vanishes, and the poor unfortunate creature sets himself to painful meditation (*Cintā*).

The second characteristic of a *Sthāyībhāva* is again as meaningless as it is inadmissible. Considering it in comparison with the first of a *Sañcārībhāva* we find it maintained that certain specific *Bhāvas* are permanent and the others transitory, because the former subsist for a longer period of time than the latter. I for myself do not know if there can be a more absurd statement than to say that a man cannot feel envy (*Asūyā*) and pride (*Garva*) as long as he can feel disgust (*Ghrṇā*) and wonder (*Vismaya*), or that joy (*Harṣa*) cannot be felt as long as mirth (*Hāsa*) can be felt. What rational man can have the audacity to deny that hours, nay days and sometimes even months and years, are spent in anxiety (*Cintā*). Even such *Sañcārībhāvas* as are not *Bhāvas* at all cannot be shown to be fleeting in nature. Sleep (*Nidrā*) and intoxication (*Mada*) last for hours, sickness (*Vyādhī*) and insanity (*Unmāda*) may last for days or months, and death (*Marana*) lasts for ever. As a matter of fact the question of the duration of a *Bhāva* can never be made self-dependent. It is the *Vibhāva* which causes and sustains a *Bhāva*, and, therefore, the duration of a *Bhāva* depends upon the duration of its *Vibhāva*. A *Bhāva* even from the list

of the *Sthāyī*s will appear and vanish immediately if its exciting cause operates but lasts only as long as a lightening-flash; and a *Bhāva* even from the *Sañcārī*s will subsist indefinitely if the phenomenon which causes it does not withdraw itself.

The second characteristic of a *Sañcārībhāva* can hardly be called its distinctive feature, for even the *Bhāvas* classed permanent may appear for a short time during the experience of another predominant feeling.⁶ And not only this, also the *Sañcārībhāvas* can be experienced or depicted as independent feelings. Mammata tells us that the "occasional predominance" of the *Bhāvas* classed transitory "is like that of the King's servant whose marriage is attended by the King (who, for the time being, occupies a position subordinate to that of the servant)".⁷ But when the *Bhāvas* of the one class can be both superior and subordinate to those of the other, there is little justification in calling some permanent and the rest transitory. There is, however, one point which may be put forward in the defence of this classification. The *Bhāvas* placed under the class of permanent feelings are to be termed *Sthāyībhāvas* only when they develop into *Rasa* with the support of the *Vibhāvās* etc.⁸ But a *Bhāva* of the transitory class also, when supported by the *Vibhāvās* etc., makes a genuine emotion; and hence again there cannot be the least propriety in saying that only some *Bhāvas* are fit to develop into *Rasa* while the others are not.

Closely connected with the second is also a third interpretation of the terms *Sthāyī* and *Sañcārī*. According to this interpretation certain *Bhāvas* are to be called

⁶ "रत्यादयोऽप्यनियते रसे स्युर्व्यभिचारिणाः ।" —S.D., p. 143.

⁷ *Kāvya-prakāśa*, p. 65.

⁸ ".....संबध्यन्तेऽनुबन्धिभिः ।

रसत्वं ये प्रपद्यन्ते प्रसिद्धाः स्थायिनोऽत्र ते ॥" —R.G., p. 37.

permanent because of their existing throughout a poetical narrative (*Prabandha*).⁹ Thus the *Sthāyībhāva* in *Rāmāyaṇa* is sorrow (*Śoka*), and in *Mahābhārata* it is tranquillity (*Śama*).¹⁰ It is, however, difficult to conjecture whether the authors of this view ever set themselves to think out its full implications, for in making a *Sthāyībhāva* synonymous with the predominant feeling of a long composition they automatically eliminate many *Bhāvas* from the list of the permanent feelings while actually they do not. The feelings of Anger (*Krodha*), Fear (*Bhaya*), Disgust (*Ghrṇā*) and Wonder (*Viśmaya*), though classed permanent by them, can never attain the status of a *Sthāyībhāva*, for evidently none of them can be the predominant feeling of a whole work.

Thus we see that all the points of difference between a *Sthāyī* and a *Sañcārībhāva* are unreal and that it is impossible to have an absolute classification of the *Bhāvas* of this nature. In concrete instances of complex emotional experiences it may, however, be sometimes possible to name the predominant emotion; and, as it has been admitted even by the writers on poetics, such predominance may be acquitted also by any of those emotions which have the so-called transitory status on the psychic side.¹¹ It is strange how this classification of the *Bhāvas* inaugurated by Bharata, or perhaps by even a more ancient author, has been admitted for over a score of centuries by the literary scholars of this country in spite of its being based on such false grounds. In the whole range of Sanskrit and Hindī poetics there seems to have been only one critic, viz., Rudrata, who had the courage to stand against the great authority of Bharata and to declare that even the *Sañcārībhāvas* make as good *Rasas* as do

⁹ "तत्र आप्रबन्ध स्थिरत्वादमीषा भावानां स्थायित्वम् ।" —*Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹⁰ Vide *S.D.*, p. 145.

¹¹ Refer to Mammata's view on the predominance of the *Sañcārībhāvas* quoted supra.

the *Sthāyīs*.¹² But his view was entirely disregarded by the succeeding generations of the literary critics. The reason of the neglect of this view, which was intelligently formed, and hence was at least worth consideration, is to be sought partly in the excessive influence exercised by Bharata and his great champion Abhinavagupta and partly in the fact that Rudraṭa did not take pains to support his thesis by any strong arguments based on a psychological analysis.

Rasa as a kind of *Asaṃlakṣyakrama Vyaṅgya* (Suggestion in which the order of sequence is not perceptible) in the scheme of *Dhvani* has got seven other coordinate species. They are: *Rasābhāsa*, *Bhāva*, *Bhāvābhāsa*, *Bhavāsānti*, *Bhāvodaya*, *Bhāvasandhi* and *Bhāvaśaivalatā*. All the eight kinds of *Asaṃlakṣyakrama Vyaṅgya*, *Rasa* being the most prominent among them, are often denoted by the term *Rasādī* meaning 'Rasa and the like'. *Rasa*, as we have already established, is congruous with Emotion. Let us find out here what are these seven other phenomena which can stand in coordination with *Rasa*.

Rasābhāsa or the Semblance of *Rasa* is Emotion improperly manifested.¹³ Depiction of anger towards elders and of sexual love with the wife of a preceptor are examples of the semblances of the *Raudra* and *Śṛṅgāra* *Rasa* respectively. In the term *Rasābhāsa* we cannot make *Rasa* mean Emotion, for what is indicated by the term is a genuine emotion and not a mere semblance of it, may it be experienced in respect of a person not fit to be so behaved. But even if we make *Rasa* mean Relish, the phrase *semblance of relish* can hardly signify anything relevant. In poetry and literature are portrayed characters both noble and villainous. We may condemn the villain for his immoral love,

¹² "रसनाद्रसत्वमेषां मधुरादीनामिवोक्तमाचार्यैः ।

निर्वेदादिष्वपि तन्निकाममस्तीति तेष्वपि रसाः ॥"—*Kāvya-lankāra*, p. 150.

¹³ Vide *Kāvya-prakāśa*, p. 62, S.D., p. 172, and R.G., p. 118.

but if the portrayal of his character has been natural and psychological, the piece must command our real interest. It is possible, however, that sometimes, for one reason or the other, we may fail to relish it; but in between these two cannot exist a third possibility of relishing the piece, and, yet, relishing it only in semblance. So the innovation of *Rasābhāsa*, either as a coordinate species to Emotion or as a type of Relish, is as unnecessary as it is meaningless.

A *Bhāva*, according to Viśvanātha, is either a predominant *Sañcārī*, or love towards gods and the like, or an undeveloped *Sthāyī*.¹⁴ We have already discussed in this very chapter that the *Bhāvas* cannot be classified into permanent and transitory, and have thereby shown that a twofold classification of the emotions suggested by this classification of the *Bhāvas* is an impossibility. So a *Bhāva* from the list of the *Sañcārīs*, if developed fully, makes a genuine emotion and hence is nothing different from *Rasa*. Likewise love or affection for anybody, if shown to have been manifested both mentally and physically, would afford an instance of Emotion and Emotion alone. It may be recalled here from the second chapter of this section that certain authors have already admitted parental, friendly and Godly affections to be permanent feelings capable of being developed into *Rasas* or emotions. An undeveloped feeling, not only from the list of the *Sthāyīs* but also from that of the *Sañcārīs*, can certainly be called a *Bhāva* with full justification, for, as we know, an emotion or a *Rasa* is not merely a mental condition but the conjunction of a mental condition and the accompanying organic changes. Thus though there has been no mistake in calling a bare feeling a *Bhāva*, yet, a constituent of Emotion as it is, its mention as a coordinate species to *Rasa* is in no way defensible.

¹⁴ "संचारिणा प्रधानानि देवादिविषया रतिः ।

उद्बुद्धमात्रः स्थायी च भाव इत्यभिधीयते ॥"

—S.D., p. 170,

Bhāvābhāsa or the Semblance of a *Bhāva* has been defined to be an aberration or an improper manifestation of a *Bhāva*. Shyness in a prostitute affords an example. The conception of *Bhāvābhāsa* is doubly erroneous. Firstly, as it was in the case of *Rasābhāsa*, there exists no such phenomenon as can rightly be termed 'semblance of *Bhāva*'. Secondly, when *Bhāva* itself is merely a constituent of Emotion, how can its *Ābhāsa* or semblance stand in coordination with *Rasa*?

Bhāvaśānti and *Bhāvodaya* are respectively allayment and evocation of feelings or emotions.¹⁵ They are only the essential stages of an emotional experience, and neither a kind nor a coordinate species of it.

Bhāvasandhi is the conjunction of two and *Bhāvaśabalatā* is the admixture of more than two emotions.¹⁶ This mere numerical plurality of the *Bhāvas* and the *Rasas* again cannot give rise to a new phenomenon fit to constitute a separate class, either coordinate with or subordinate to the class of the emotions.

Thus we see where the Indian science of poetics stands with reference to a classification of the emotions. Its only classification worthy of the name is the twofold division of the *Bhāvas*, which are emotions on the psychic side, into permanent and transitory. But there too it fails to find out a clear differentia. In modern psychology we do not come across a classification of the emotions parallel to that of the Indian poetics. There are, however, some other types of classifications given by the contemporary psychologists. But to consider and criticize them here in detail is not possible for obvious reasons. We should; therefore, content ourselves with the following remark of Th. Ribot made on such classifications :

¹⁵ Vide *Kāvya-prakāśa*, p. 63, etc.

¹⁶ Vide *ibid.*, p. 63, etc.

".....A true classification of the emotions—*i.e.* a distribution into orders, genera and species, according to the dominant and subordinate characters—is impossible. Every classification, if not purely empirical, expresses a general theory of affective life, a *system*, and consequently a hypothesis. More than this it can never congratulate itself on having exhausted its matter, for every emotion, simple or compound, admits of innumerable varieties determined by the individual, the race, the epoch, and the course of civilisation; some are extinct, others again of recent origin. Lastly the existence of the mixed emotions—which are numerous—is a fatal objection to every attempt at distribution into a linear series. The only track to follow is that of genetic filiation—*πρῶτον*, to state first the simple, primary emotions, then to find out by what mental process, conscious or unconscious, the composite or derived emotions have arisen from them.....But this work is no longer a classification".¹⁷

¹⁷ *Psych. of Emotions*, pp. 138-139,

APPENDIX A

RASA-DOŚAS.

"There is no other circumstance", says Ananda-vardhana, "which leads to the violation of *Rasa* than impropriety; the supreme secret of *Rasa* consists in observing the established rules of propriety".¹ It is this impropriety referred to by the author of *Dhvanyāloka* which has been discussed by the later writers on poetics under the subject of the defects or *Dośas* of *Rasa*. In the phrase 'violation of *Rasa*' (*Rasabhaṅga*) appearing in the above quotation the term *Rasa* can mean nothing but *relish of poetry*, for it is relish which is liable to be distorted if any rules of propriety are not observed. But the term *Rasadośa*, to differentiate it from the wider class of the general defects of a literary composition all of which may affect our poetic relish, ought to be confined to comprehend only such defects as may occur in the delineation of an emotion. This short chapter as an appendix is restricted to a brief discussion of the genuine *Rasadośas* only.

The defect which has been dealt with first by many of the important authors² is the mention by name of a *Rasa* or a *Sthāyī* or *Sancāribhāva*. The implications of admitting a defect like this may easily be conjectured. The affected state of the mind of a person under the sway of an emotion can never be directly perceived. It is always inferred by the bodily movements and the facial expressions of the person and by the situation in which he is placed. Now the poet who wishes to

¹ अनौचित्यादृते नान्यद्रसभंगस्य कारणम् ।

प्रसिद्धौचित्यबन्धस्तु रसस्योपनिषत्परा ॥"

—D.A., p. 180. (Translation by Dr. S. K. De).

² Such as Mammata, Viśvanātha, Hemacandra and Kanhaiyā-lāla Poddāra.

depict the emotion should not merely mention it by name. He should rather portray the whole scene so graphically, not omitting any relevant detail, that his readers may be able to have a clear vision of it and may know eventually the mental condition of the hero of the scene. But such detailed description of the situation and the expressions cannot always be possible, particularly in a narrative poem in which often there are many characters and a host of emotions and feelings pertaining to each character. At least sometimes the naming of the emotions and the feelings have been regarded faultless even by the writers on poetics. While Hemacandra admits that there is no defect in indicating a *San̄cārībhāva* by name when necessary,³ Poddāra holds that sometimes also a *Sthāyībhāva* can be so indicated.⁴ As a matter of fact the mention by name of the *Bhāvas* or the *Rasas* should not at all be considered to be a fault. If the description of an emotional experience is already picturesque, it cannot be rendered defective by also naming the emotion. If an emotion is indicated merely by name, where can lie a *Rasadoṣa* when absolutely there is no delineation of an emotion? And, lastly, if an author wishes to be brief and chooses to describe only the important features of an emotion which he mentions also by name to avoid ambiguity, on no reasonable grounds can we find fault with him or his composition.

The "far-fetched indication"⁵ of the *Anubhāvas* and the *Vibhāvas* has been considered as another *Rasadoṣa*. The conjunction, as we have already observed in the third chapter of the second section of this work, of the *Ālambana* and the *Uddīpana Vibhāvas* does not constitute the whole cause of an emotion; and hence if only the two kinds of the *Vibhāvas* are described, we cannot know for certain what emotion they should

³ Vide K.A., p. 133.

⁴ Vide K.K., pp. 374-375.

⁵ *Kāvya-prakāśa*, p. 236.

have aroused. Similarly as different feelings can manifest themselves in similar expressions, a mention of the *Anubhāvas* only cannot always suggest unequivocally the intended emotion. So in either case the delineation of the emotion would be incomplete. The absent factor, *Anubhāvas* in the first case and *Vibhāvas* in the second, would have to be imagined by the reader, who in doing so would certainly feel both doubt and difficulty and would also be liable to mistake. This defect of ambiguity resulting from the incomplete depiction of an emotion has, therefore, been rightly conceived. It was admitted also by Abhinavagupta in his seventh obstacle in the realization of *Rasa*, viz., *Samśayayoga*.⁶

The third *Rasadośa* consists in the import of the elements (*Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *San̄cāribhāva*) of an opposite *Rasa* in the delineation of a *Rasa*.⁷ This defect is based on the conception of the opposition and friendship of emotions. *Rasas* have been related with one another in three ways: (1) either as enemies or antagonists (*Virodhī* or *Śatru Rasa*), or as friends (*Avirodhī* or *Mitra Rasa*), or as neutrals (*Udāsīna* or *Taṭastha Rasa*). And then each *Rasa* has got certain specific *San̄cāribhāvas*, which alone can be blended with it, the rest being again incongruous. The defect under discussion is manifested when the emotions said to be inconsistent with each other are shown to exist simultaneously in the same person in respect of the same object, or when they have a common *Āśraya* and a common *Ālambana*. But this defect in any delineation of the emotions can be admitted only when the coexistence of the so-called antagonistic emotions has not been accounted for by a clear background of the scene. If, however, the bygone happenings are such as may fully justify psychologically the concurrence

⁶ Vide *Phil. of Aesth. Pleasure*, pp. 190-191, and *Theories of Rasa and Dhvani*, pp. 105 and 108.

⁷ "निरोधिरससम्बन्धिविभावादि परिग्रहः ।"

—D.A., p. 199.

of any two or more emotions, we cannot rationally censor their simultaneous happening. In *Ākāśadīpa* of Jayaśankara Prasāda we find an instance of the coexistence of such antagonistic feelings as love and hate. It is Campā who loves Buddhagupta, and we cannot doubt the sincerity and ardency of her love, for she can sacrifice even her life for his sake. It is again Campā who hates Buddhagupta, the murderer of her father; and like her love her hate is also real, for she cannot wed him in spite of her desire to do so.⁸ But evidently in this delineation of the opposite emotions in respect of the same *Āśraya* and the same *Ālambana* no defect can be discovered, for in the environment, in which Campā, the *Āśraya*, is placed, it is natural for her to experience these emotions simultaneously.

There are even other defects which have been related to *Rasa*. But they can hardly be regarded as genuine instances of *Rasadoṣas*, for they do not refer to any inner fault in the delineation of an emotion. Let us consider "an example of 'untimely introduction'", which "we have in the second Act of *Veṇīsaṁhāra*, where, while the slaughter of numerous heroes is proceeding, the poet proceeds to describe the loving dalliances of Duryodhana with Bhānumatī".⁹ Here though the introduction of the erotics in the midst of a murderous fighting may cause a distraction of the relish, yet so far as the depiction of the sexual emotion in itself is concerned, there is nothing to be found fault with by the defect 'untimely introduction of an emotion'.

⁸ "मैं तुम्हें घृणा करती हूँ, फिर भी तुम्हारे लिए मर सकती हूँ। अन्धेर है, जलदस्यु ! मैं तुम्हें प्यार करती हूँ।"—*Madhukarī*, vol. I, p. 10.

⁹ *Kāvya-prakāśa*, p. 240.

APPENDIX B

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